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TH AL LAW JO RAL
STEPHEN G. BREYER
Preface
Constitutional interpretation, like the interpretation of any legal text,
involves an ongoing conversation among bench, bar, and academy. Lawyers
and judges participate by applying the law to particular sets of facts in the
course of arguing and deciding cases. Their work provides source material for
academics, who can step back from the fray of litigation and place judicial
opinions in context, discovering their implications, analyzing their reasoning,
and suggesting elaboration or modification. Their work, in turn, helps lawyers
and judges make better arguments and craft better decisions in the next case.
And so on. From this dialogue emerges law that is better able to deal with the
human problems of those whom the Constitution was written to serve.
With America's Constitution: A Biography and Revolution by Judiciary, Akhil
Amar and Jed Rubenfeld have made valuable and much needed contributions
to this conversation. Each picks up a different thread of the discussion. Amar
returns our attention to the text of the document. He emphasizes the
relationship of each individual phrase to other phrases in the Constitution and
the consequent need to read the document as a whole, lessons too often
forgotten in battles over judge-made doctrines and tests. This careful reading
engages historians, political scientists, and constitutional decisionmakers both
inside and outside the judiciary. Rubenfeld offers a powerful and insightful
theory of constitutional interpretation by the federal courts that will help
judges understand constitutional history and apply that history to today's
problems of constitutional interpretation.
I am delighted that The Yale Law Journal has decided to advance this
conversation -a conversation that means better law. And I recommend the
careful reading of both books not only to their fellow academics, lawyers, and
judges, but also to the American people, to whom (as Amar reminds us) the
Constitution belongs.
Stephen G. Breyer is Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
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JED RUBENFELD
The Paradigm-Case Method
There are three fundamental topics in constitutional law: doctrine,
interpretation, and legitimacy. Doctrine concerns the law as it is or should be in
any particular constitutional field. Interpretation concerns the methods judges
do or should deploy in deciding what the Constitution means. Legitimacy
concerns the claims of authority that constitutional law-a body of law
rendered by unelected judges supposedly on the basis of a two-hundred-year-
old text -can make to justify its legal supremacy in a society that calls itself
self-governing.
Most constitutional scholars devote their careers to one of these topics.
Some make contributions to two of them. Remarkably, Akhil Amar has
changed the way we think about all three-and he has done so again in
America's Constitution: A Biography! Popular sovereignty is Amar's paradigm of
political legitimacy; a mixture of intratextualism and originalism are his
interpretive lodestars. The intriguing insights he delivers for constitutional
doctrine can be found on page after page of his book.
The ideal account of American constitutional law, if there were such a
thing, would integrate these three topics in a seamless whole. It would be at
once, inextricably, an exercise in political theory, hermeneutics, and legal
analysis. From a theory of the legitimate role of constitutional law in a
democracy, an overarching methodology of interpretation would emerge, and
from that methodology would follow concrete results for a wide array of hotly
disputed doctrinal issues. This kind of integrated account, pipe-dream though
it may be, has been the goal I have lumbered toward in my own constitutional
scholarship. Revolution byJudiciary: The Structure ofAmerican Constitutional Law
completes this project.2
1. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: ABIOGRAPHY (2005).
2. JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (2005).
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In fact, Professor Amar and I are both "popular sovereigntists." That is, we
both take seriously the idea that the Constitution must be seen and read as a
product of democratic self-lawgiving. This "must" not only purports to be a
descriptively accurate reflection of what it was that Americans understood
themselves to be trying to do at the various times when they made and remade
their Constitution. This "must" also derives from considerations of legitimacy.
Both Professor Amar and I believe that constitutional law can justify its
foundational status in our legal-political order only to the extent that it can
make good on its claim to being law made by the American people to govern
themselves.
As a result, in many ways, Professor Amar and I are more alike than we are
different. We both believe in the aspiration of popular self-government
through a democratically self-given constitution. We both believe that this
aspiration should suffuse the entire business of constitutional interpretation as
well as every field of constitutional doctrine. And we both have been led by
these commitments to take the Constitution's text and its historical meaning
much more seriously than do many other constitutional scholars.
Anyone who recognizes text and historical meaning as bearing special
importance in constitutional interpretation ought to make it his business to
know the Constitution's text and history. That is what Akhil Amar has done.
He has amassed over the years and now deploys a comprehensive knowledge -
unsurpassed by any living scholar I know of-of the Constitution's genesis, its
historical meaning, and the complex interrelationships among its provisions.
But behind text and history there must always be an anterior account-of
constitutional and democratic theory, of interpretive method -that assigns text
and historical meaning their proper place in constitutional law. For myself, I
have been more preoccupied with this anterior picture. At issue here are the
foundational premises of the whole enterprise of constitutional self-
government. How do we make sense of the peculiar conjunction of institutions
we see in modern democracies, in which a seemingly undemocratic, highly
judicialized body of constitutional law holds itself out as superior to the will of
the governed as expressed through elections or elected representatives? This is
the question with which Bickel and Ely began; it is the question with which I
begin as well. From their answers to this question, Bickel and Ely sought to
motivate an account of constitutional interpretation as a whole and of the
broad contours of constitutional doctrine. I give a different answer to the
foundational question than did either Bickel or Ely; as a result, I am led to a
different picture of constitutional interpretation and of constitutional doctrine
as well.
Trying to fill in this picture -trying to work out the proper theory of
constitutional interpretation and draw out the implications for the great sweep
1978 Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
11S:1977 2oo6
THE PARADIGM-CASE METHOD
of constitutional doctrine -is the goal of Revolution by Judiciaty. The twentieth
century saw one revolution after another in constitutional interpretation: the
rise of Lochner,3 the advent of modem free speech jurisprudence, the great
triumph of Brown,4 the explosion of Congress's commerce power, and the birth
of the modem right of privacy. These revolutionary developments are
sometimes revered, sometimes reviled, sometimes merely puzzled over,
sometimes taken for granted. But these revolutions by judiciary have been and
remain today a central part of American constitutional law; perhaps another
one is taking place even now. The great problem is that constitutional law has
absolutely no account explaining or justifying them. Constitutional law-I am
not speaking of constitutional theorizing, but of the law itself- has no account
of when judges have the legitimate authority to announce constitutional
doctrines that break radically from past and present meaning alike, or of what
judges should be doing when they introduce such revolutionary change in the
doctrine, or of how such radical changes in constitutional meaning are to be
evaluated.
This is the gap Revolution by Judiciary is meant to fill. The book essentially
makes two big arguments about constitutional interpretation. One is purely
descriptive and positive, the other theoretical and normative. The first
argument concerns a surprisingly consistent pattern that runs throughout
actual American constitutional doctrine; the second is about the justifiability of
this pattern. In Parts I and II of this Introduction, respectively, I'll summarize
the main lines of both these arguments.
I. THE INTERPRETIVE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
On the descriptive front, I claim to have identified a basic interpretive
structure underlying all American constitutional law. The fundamental idea is
pretty simple. It has to do with the role of historical meaning in constitutional
law and hence with the undying topic of "judicial activism."
Modern constitutional law is notoriously ahistorical. In field after field, on
matters of considerable importance, today's doctrine defies original
understandings. This is famously true, for example, of modern equal
protection law, both in its condemnation of racial segregation and in its
protections against sex discrimination. Brown v. Board of Education,' the most
3. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
4. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. Id.
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luminous of twentieth-century constitutional cases, plainly violated original
understandings 6 -despite the Sisyphean efforts of originalists to show the
contrary.7 Miranda v. Arizona8 is another utterly ahistorical modern case.
Today's Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate the terms and
conditions of labor wholly within states;9 this would have astounded the
Framers, who thought they had kept in-state labor relations - i.e., slavery- out
of Congress's legislative jurisdiction." Modern regulatory takings law plainly
6. To repeat the most salient point of the well-known evidence: The very Congress that
framed the Fourteenth Amendment maintained segregated public schools in the nation's
capital. John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of
the Laws," 1972 WASH. U. L.Q 421, 46o-62. In addition, eight ratifying, non-Confederate
states either provided for or permitted segregated public schools in 1868. See RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDuCAION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 633-34 (1976). Nor should it be imagined that the
original understanding was "separate but equal": Far from providing black children with
tangibly equal facilities, five more non-Confederate states excluded black children altogether
from public education. Id.
7. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 75-76 (1990). Here, Bork simultaneously conceded the "inescapable fact" "that those
who ratified the [fourteenth] amendment did not think it outlawed segregated education or
segregation in any aspect of life," yet asserts that Brown "is consistent with, indeed
compelled by, the original understanding." How? As follows: "[E]quality and segregation
were mutually inconsistent, though the ratifiers did not understand that"; faced with the
choice, judges "must choose equality," which was the "purpose that brought the fourteenth
amendment into being ... [and] was written into the text." Id. at 82. Good try, but this
move - essentially a shift from specific intentions to general purposes, joined to an assertion
that the general purpose was "inconsistent" with the specific intention- surrenders all the
results originalists demand elsewhere in constitutional law. The ratifiers believed that the
death penalty was constitutional? So what? Capital punishment and the prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment "were mutually inconsistent, though the ratifiers did not
understand that"; faced with the choice between them, judges must choose abolishing cruel
and unusual punishment, which was the "purpose that brought the [eighth] amendment
into being" and "was written into the text." Roe v. Wade is un-originalist? Not any more:
"equality and [banning abortion] were mutually inconsistent, though the ratifiers did not
understand that" either. See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TimE: A THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 178-79 (2001). For another heroic attempt to make
Brown safe for originalism, see Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation
Decisions, 81 VA. L. REv. 947 (1995). For a careful, decisive response to McConnell, see
Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor
McConnell, 81 VA. L. REv. 1881 (1995).
8. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9. See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78-79 (2000) (acknowledging that the
Age Discrimination Act falls within Congress's commerce power); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act).
1o. See Paul Finkelman, The Founders and Slavery: Little Ventured, Little Gained, 13 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 413, 443-44 (2oo1). As Professor Finkelman put it, "it would not be possible to
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violates the original understanding, which saw compensable takings only when
government physically dispossessed owners or divested them of title. '
Some decry (or purport to decry) the flouting of original meaning in
modern constitutional law. Others celebrate it. In the debate over originalism,
however, a peculiar fact seems to have gone unobserved: For all its ahistoricity,
constitutional law almost inviolably adheres to one particular kind of original
understanding, even while departing from original understandings that fall
outside this set. When this pattern is brought to light, an overarching approach
to constitutional interpretation as a whole also comes into view. In brief,
American constitutional law adheres systematically to one kind of original
understanding (which I call "foundational Application Understandings"),
while routinely discarding all other original understanding (which I call "No
Application Understandings"). Or so I claim in my book.
When I show this pattern to people, and bring out its underlying logic,
they usually find it surprising-and, at least at first, odd. There are two
reasons, I believe, for this. First, although constitutional theorists-originalists,
proceduralist, moralists, and so on-may have their own favored and fairly
determinate interpretive methods, constitutional law itself appears on its face
to have no such method. Modem constitutional case law essentially lacks any
articulate account of what judges are supposed to do when called on to
interpret the constitutional text. So, the idea that there is in fact a fairly
determinate interpretive structure underlying the case law comes as a surprise.
Second, the pattern I am about to describe involves the idea that some
original understandings require interpretive deference while others do not, and
this idea runs against the grain. Whether pro- or anti-originalist, nearly
everybody believes there's something wrong with judges who pick and choose
among original understandings; judges who attend to history selectively are
cheating. 2 In other words, most of us accept the premise that all original
imagine the modem interpretation of the Commerce Clause as long as slavery existed." Id.
at 444.
11. See, e.g., John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the
Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 1099, 1133, 1148, 1156 (2000).
12. The presumed pathologies of selective exploitation of historical understandings are the nub
of every objection to "law-office history." See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in
Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 554 (1995); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio
and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 119, 122 n.13. An exception to the
usual view can be found in Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive
Constitutional Theoy: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765 (1997). In this
interesting and carefully reasoned article, Professor Doff argued for an explicitly selective
"heroic originalism" that would reject original understandings "too distasteful to count." Id.
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understandings should, methodologically speaking, be treated equally. They
should all be given the same interpretive weight, whether a lot or a little or
none at all. On this view, judges who act as if some original meanings "tie their
hands," while ignoring others, are lying either to themselves or to the rest of
us. They have obviously arrived at their decisions on other grounds, invoking
history only when it suits their goals.
If I am right, however, we need to revise this conventional way of thinking.
Constitutional law turns out to be structured around the idea that one species
of original understanding is different from all the others. One set of historical
meanings demands categorical interpretive deference; all others can be ignored
without much compunction.
To make this pattern visible, I need first to distinguish between two
different kinds of specific understandings that people can have about how a
legal provision will or will not apply to particular sets of facts. In fact, the
distinction is, precisely, between understandings that the provision will apply
to particular sets of facts and understandings that the provision will not apply
to particular sets of facts.
Take free speech. We can distinguish, in the simplest possible terms,
between two analytically different kinds of specific understandings of the First
Amendment's prohibition against abridging the freedom of speech. On the one
hand, there are particular measures - say, laws banning nonobscene
pornography- that we believe to fall within the ambit of this constitutional
prohibition. That is, the constitutional prohibition applies to such laws: The
prohibition is triggered; the laws are prohibited. On the other hand, there are
particular measures-say, perjury laws-that we believe to fall outside the
ambit of the provision. The prohibition does not apply in such cases; the laws
are not prohibited. I call the former "Application Understandings" and the
latter "No Application Understandings." Pretty clunky terms: I wish I had
better ones, but there they are.
Now make a further distinction. For a particular constitutional provision,
some Application Understandings may have played a special, central, definitive
role at the time of enactment. Many of our constitutional rights were enacted
with a core, specific original purpose: to abolish particular laws or practices
deemed intolerable (I will name a few in a moment). In such cases, we have
what I call "foundational Application Understandings": Application
Understandings that were widely shared at the time of enactment, by
at 18io. By contrast, the pattern I am about to describe does not distinguish among original
understandings on their moral merits.
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supporters and opponents alike, and that played a special, animating role in
getting the provision enacted.
As a matter of historical fact, there are exceedingly few foundational
Application Understandings. The prohibition of prior restraints was almost
certainly a foundational Application Understanding for the freedom of speech
(a term I use to include both the freedom of speech and of the press). 3 The
prohibition of at least some seditious libel laws was probably another.14 After
that, it gets pretty hard to say what, specifically, the freedom of speech was
definitively understood to prohibit.
By contrast, the No Application Understandings of our constitutional
rights were and are virtually limitless. No Application Understandings can
refer to anything the right does not prohibit. Thus, the freedom of speech was
and is understood not to prohibit criminal trials without a jury, the sale of flour
in ten-pound bags, and ordinary trespass laws.
My descriptive claims are founded on the distinction between Application
and No Application Understandings. The initial thesis is this: Despite all the
years that have passed, and despite its radical nonoriginalism on many
dimensions, constitutional law today still adheres to virtually every single
foundational Application Understanding. For example, freedom of speech still
emphatically prohibits prior restraints"s and seditious libel laws ;,6 the
13. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *151-52 ("The liberty of the press ... consists in
laying no previous restraints upon publication .... "); LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A
FREE PRESS, at xii-xv (1985). As late as 1907, the Supreme Court could still suggest that the
freedom of speech might prohibit only prior restraints. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S.
454, 462 (1907).
14. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (1941) (arguing, in part
on the basis of the celebrated Zenger trial, that the First Amendment was enacted to "wipe
out the common law of sedition, and make further prosecutions for criticism of the
government ... forever impossible"); William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost
Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1984).
is. See, e.g., Doe v. Dep't of Pub. Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 50 n.17 (2d Cir. 2001) (calling
prior restraints "'the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights'" (quoting Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976))).
16. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). New York Times overruled those
early-twentieth-century cases, such as Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), in which the
Court upheld prosecutions under the Espionage Act of 1917 brought against persons who
essentially had dared to protest the country's involvement in the First World War. A century
earlier, some federal courts had upheld prosecutions under the Alien and Sedition Acts of
1798. If the understanding that the First Amendment prohibited sedition laws was not
solidly established in 1798, it became so with Jefferson's presidential victory in 18oo. See
LEVY, supra note 13, at 282-308. As I explain at greater length in my book, historical
Application Understandings can become foundational even if not so held at the time of the
founding. See RUBENFELD, supra note 2, at 120-24. In New York Times, the Court recognized
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Establishment Clause still prohibits a national church; 17 the Fourth
Amendment still prohibits general warrants;,8 the Fifth Amendment still
prohibits uncompensated acts of eminent domain; 9 and the Fourteenth
Amendment still prohibits Black Codes. 0
By contrast, modem constitutional law violates a great many original No
Application Understandings -some of which were, as a historical matter,
extremely important. For example, as noted above, it is as certain as such
things can be that the Fourteenth Amendment was originally understood not
to prohibit racial segregation of public schools or of most other public facilities.
Brown jettisoned that No Application Understanding. Similarly, the Equal
Protection Clause was originally understood not to prohibit at least some, and
perhaps most, of what we today call sex discrimination." Today, that No
Application Understanding is history. The First Amendment, on the original
understanding, did not prohibit blasphemy laws.22 Today it does. To
generalize: The historical understandings rejected by modern constitutional
law are, almost exclusively, No Application Understandings.
the Sedition Act of 1798 as a paradigmatic violation of the First Amendment. 376 U.S. at
273-74; see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 626 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (observing
that the Sedition Act would be "patently unconstitutional by modem standards").
17. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
18. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (198o).
ig. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001).
20. It does so through the rule that laws employing racial classifications are subjected to strict
scrutiny, see, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), and through the principle that
laws enacted to further "White Supremacy" are plainly unconstitutional, see Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1967).
21. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (upholding a state statute
excluding women from the practice of law); ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE:
THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 146-48 (1975).
22. As late as 1921, courts upheld blasphemy convictions. See, e.g., State v. Mockus, 113 A. 39
(Me. 1921). Early-nineteenth-century judges, including some of the most respected, had no
difficulty rejecting challenges to blasphemy laws-even those specifically protecting
Christianity from impugnment-under state constitutional guarantees. See, for example,
People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 295 (N.Y. 1811), in which Chief Judge Kent stated:
Nor are we bound, by any expressions in the constitution, as some have strangely
supposed, either not to punish at all, or to punish indiscriminately the like attacks
upon the religion of Mahomet or of the grand Lama; and for this plain reason, that
the case assumes that we are a christian people, and the morality of the country is
deeply ingrafted upon christianity, and not upon the doctrines or worship of
those impostors.
Needless to say, Kent's remarks do not reflect the law of the land today. See, e.g., State v.
West, 263 A.2d 602, 605 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970).
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This asymmetry causes peculiar, seemingly contradictory assertions to crop
up in the case law on the significance of original meaning. When judges deal
with a foundational Application Understanding, they unabashedly refer to and
rely on historical meaning. For example, when explaining the
unconstitutionality of prior restraints, modem Justices emphasize that the
"elimination of prior restraints was a 'leading purpose' in the adoption of the
First Amendment," and that a "[p]rior restraint upon speech suppresses the
precise freedom which the First Amendment sought to protect against
abridgment."23 Similarly, when explaining the unconstitutionality of an
insufficiently particularized search warrant, today's judges refer without
embarrassment to original understandings: "It is familiar history that . . .
'general warrants' were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and
adoption of the Fourth Amendment." 4 Yet in many cases where there is a
pertinent No Application Understanding-such as the understanding that the
Equal Protection Clause would not prohibit racial segregation or sex
discrimination- the Court has little or no compunction about ignoring
historical meaning. History, in such cases, simply drops off the radar screen.
Such contrasting treatment of historical meaning can look like outcome-
driven, inconsistent hypocrisy. And it may have been just that some or much of
the time. But the fact remains that the Court's inconsistent treatment of
historical meaning has its own kind of consistency, with a precise logic,
structure, and method. Systematically and almost without exception-with
respect to both constitutional rights and constitutional powers-modern
doctrine adheres to historical Application Understandings even while it
frequently disregards historical No Application Understandings. I document
this pattern in greater detail in Part I of my book.
If this structure holds throughout constitutional law, as I try to show it
does, it is really quite remarkable. Most of us believe that historicism in
constitutional law- the view that constitutional, interpretation should be
faithful to historical meaning-can't be entirely right, yet most of us also
believe it can't be entirely wrong. Hence we have debated for decades the
proper place of original meaning in constitutional law. But it turns out that all
along, constitutional law has offered its own distinctive answer to this debate,
an answer that we have failed to grasp. The original Application
Understandings are binding; the No Application Understandings are not.
23. Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 & n.5 (1968).
24. United States v. Bridges, 344 F.3d 1oo, 1014 (9 th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Indeed, I would argue that all Application Understandings -even those
that develop long after the Founding-are in general firmer, harder to dislodge,
than No Application Understandings. This is just another way of saying that it
is easier for the Supreme Court to announce a new right than to take away a
right already established. But the special bindingness I've been referring to so
far belongs only to a special class of Application Understandings. For any
particular constitutional provision, some Application Understandings may
have played a special, central, definitive role at the time of enactment. Many of
our constitutional rights were enacted with core original purposes. These
foundational Application Understandings are the ones I have been referring to
so far. And they not only are intact in contemporary constitutional law. They
have, more significantly, served as paradigm cases, shaping the doctrine as
exemplary holdings around which the rest of the case law is organized.
Consider, for example, the Self-Incrimination Clause. The core Application
Understanding of this Clause is well-known: It prohibited the kind of
interrogation practice found in certain seventeenth-century English courts such
as the Star Chamber,2" where an individual was placed under oath, asked if he
was guilty of a crime, and subject to severe punishment for refusing to answer.
In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thought, this practice put guilty
defendants in a tight spot. They faced three unattractive options: incriminate
themselves and go to jail; lie and condemn themselves to hell as perjurers; or,
refuse to answer and go to jail anyway. 6 Confirming the systematic
interpretive structure described above, constitutional law today expressly
adheres to this historical Application Understanding: "At its core, the privilege
reflects our fierce unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt that defined the operation of
the Star Chamber." 7
But the prohibition of the "cruel trilemma" is not only still in force in
modem self-incrimination doctrine. To use the words just quoted, it is
recognized as the "core" application of the guarantee. It serves a paradigmatic
function definitive of meaning, shaping modern doctrine even as that doctrine
expands far beyond the original understanding. Take Miranda. This famous
case, as noted earlier, plainly violates specific original understandings.
25. See John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at
Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1074 (1994).
26. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION 134-35 (1968); see also JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 2250 (John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961).
27. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596 (199o) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 44o (1974).
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Historically, the "cruel trilemma" was thought to exist only when the accused
was under oath.2" Hence, the self-incrimination guarantee, as originally
understood, would not have applied to the Miranda situation, in which an
unsworn individual is questioned by the police. Miranda therefore violates a
historical No Application Understanding. At the same time, however, Miranda
builds on the historical Application Understanding. According to the Supreme
Court, the Miranda doctrine rests on the recognition that the same kind of
"cruel dilemma" the Self-Incrimination Clause was enacted to prohibit can
exist even when an individual is questioned outside the sworn-testimony
context.29 In the Court's view, a guilty individual interrogated in police
custody, if unwarned of his right to remain silent, will face a "modem-day
analog" of the "historic trilemma."3° We can agree or disagree with this
reasoning, but it vividly demonstrates how core Application Understandings
serve as paradigm cases, anchoring and shaping the development of future
doctrine even as the doctrine comes to reject historical No Application
Understandings.
The examples could be multiplied. Everyone knows that the concepts of
"suspect class" and "suspect classification" figure centrally in modern equal
protection doctrine. These concepts, in turn, draw their strength and core
meaning not from an abstract philosophy or from legal definitions but from a
paradigm case: the unconstitutionality of the nineteenth-century Black Codes,
the abolition of which was a central purpose-perhaps the central purpose-
behind the Fourteenth Amendment." This simple insight opens up a clear view
28. Cf. Langbein, supra note 25, at 1048-73, io8o n.142; Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth:
Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L.
REv. 1o86, 11oo (1994).
2g. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 596; cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485
(1964).
30. As the Court put it in Muniz:
Because the privilege was designed primarily to prevent "a recurrence of the
Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in their stark brutality," Ullmann v.
United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956), it is evident that a suspect is "compelled
... to be a witness against himself' at least whenever he must face the modern-
day analog of the historic trilemma -either during a criminal trial where a sworn
witness faces the identical three choices, or during custodial interrogation where,
as we explained in Miranda, the choices are analogous and hence raise similar
concerns.
496 U.S. at 596.
31. See, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCrION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at
198-205, 257 (1988); Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The
Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 64-65 (2000).
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of Brown's relationship to historical meaning. As far back as 1879, the Court
had begun the process of paradigm-case reasoning: of interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment in light of the paradigmatic unconstitutionality of the
Black Codes. Thus, in Strauder v. West Virginia, the Court extrapolated from
this paradigm case the principle that states could no longer pass hostile and
discriminating legislation against blacks, legislation singling out blacks and
branding them with a stamp of "inferiority."32 In Brown and the cases that
followed, the Court simply, and at long last, applied this principle to the
nation's racial separation laws. Yes, Brown violated original No Application
Understandings, but it rests plausibly and compellingly on an interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment seeking to do justice to that amendment in light of
its paradigm case.
To summarize: Modern American constitutional law may lack an articulate
account of its own interpretive method, but it appears to embody such a
method all the same. Generally speaking, American constitutional
interpretation is structured by paradigm-case reasoning, in which the
paradigm cases are given by historical Application Understandings. The law
treats these understandings as definitive of core meaning and builds doctrine
around them. The task of building up doctrine from paradigm cases is of
course an open-ended one - quite familiar to judges in a common law system -
that necessarily involves normative judgment. That is why I refer to the effort
to "do justice" to a constitutional provision in light of its paradigm cases. But
this much is certain: In the process of constructing doctrine around the
historical Application Understandings, judges in our system frequently jettison
historical No Application Understandings, including No Application
Understandings fundamentally important to Americans of an earlier
generation.
So much for description. Now for the theoretical claim.
II. COMMITMENTS, INTENTIONS, AND THE PARADIGM-CASE
METHOD
The question, of course, is why. Is there any reason to distinguish
Application from No Application Understandings in constitutional
interpretation? My answer to this question, given in the second part of the
book, is pretty long and a little complicated. It's a lot harder to summarize
briefly. But in essence, I try to connect constitutional law's asymmetric
32. 100 U.S. 303,307-08 (1879).
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treatment of historical meaning to the theory of self-government over time,
which I have tried to develop at length elsewhere.33
The idea of self-government over time is to be contrasted with a
widespread, conventional conception of present-oriented, or "presentist," self-
government. The presentist conception holds that self-government ideally
consists of government by the self s own present will. An agent is maximally
self-governing, on this view, to the extent he follows his own voice, his own
present will or preferences, in the here and now. Very generally speaking,
governance by the self s present will is the prevailing conception of self-
government throughout modern political science, economics, political
philosophy, and constitutional theory.3'
The idea of self-government over time takes a different view. It holds that
self-government requires an effort to hold the self to commitments - self-given
ends, principles, or courses of action -over time, even when holding the self to
those commitments runs contrary to present will or preference. Laurence Tribe
gave this Kantian thought powerful expression thirty years ago:
To be free is not simply to follow our ever-changing wants wherever
they might lead. To be free is to choose what we shall want, what we
shall value, and therefore what we shall be. But to make such choices
without losing the thread of continuity that integrates us over time and
imparts a sense of our wholeness in history, we must be able to ...
choose in terms of commitments we have made .... 35
Note that both the presentist and temporally extended conceptions of self-
government might be logically admissible and even correct, but limited to
different domains. For example, the presentist conception may correctly offer
the best account of freedom for a being with no self-understanding as a
temporally extended identity. The presentist conception might therefore offer
the correct account of freedom for many animals. A dog is maximally free, on
this view, just to the extent that it can do what it wants to do here and now.
For human beings, however, the presentist conception of self-government
appears to leave out something fundamental. People have a capacity for
33. See RUBENFELD, supra note 7.
34. See id. at 17-73 (demonstrating that this conception of self-government underlies the work of
political philosophers from Rousseau to Habermas, political scientists such as Robert Dahl
and Jon Elster, and American constitutional theorists from Jefferson to Alexander Bickel and
John Hart Ely).
35. Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not To Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for
Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1326-27 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
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autonomy-for self-lawgiving- that most other animals do not. People have
the capacity to give themselves enduring commitments -whether to
institutions, to principles, to other human beings, or to some wholly trivial
course of action-and to live out those commitments over time, even when
doing so runs contrary to their then-present preferences.
I try to build up a conception of constitutional self-government organized
around this idea of making and following commitments. I call this the
"commitment-based" or "commitmentarian" conception of self-government,
and I try to show that this conception makes the best sense of the project of
American constitutionalism. For purposes of this summary, only one thought
is crucial to this commitment-based conception of self-government: American
constitutional law is to be understood as a project of temporally extended,
democratic self-government. 6 In other words, constitutional law aspires to be
the institution through which this nation seeks to lay down and hold itself to
its own fundamental legal and political commitments over time. Constitutional
law is not a check on democracy. Nor is it merely a protector of democracy, as
for example by protecting the rights necessary for democratic politics. Nor is it
a vehicle of democracy, as for example by guaranteeing a set of processes
through which the present will of the governed can be expressed and
effectuated. No: Constitutional law is democracy-over time. Or at least it is
supposed to be. That is its promise and its aspiration.
But I am not going to rehearse here the arguments I make to try to
establish this view of American constitutionalism. Instead I want to move
straight to the final - and, in Revolution by judiciary, the most important - piece
of the puzzle. If you assume that American constitutionalism rests on and
embodies a commitment-based conception of self-government, you can
actually make sense of the distinction between Application and No Application
Understandings in constitutional law.
To show how, I ask readers to follow me in (1) a careful analysis of the
distinction between intentions and commitments; and (2) a set of arguments
designed to explicate how and why we, as individuals, will often regard the
Application Understandings of our commitments as bearing a special weight
that our No Application Understandings cannot claim.
A. Distinguishing Commitments from Intentions
There is a clear phenomenological distinction between commitment and
intentions. Commitments oblige. Mere intentions do not.
36. See RUBENFELD, supra note 2, at 89-98; RUBENFELD, supra note 7, at 91-103, 145-77.
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An intention formed at time one is not usually regarded as binding at time
two. If at nine o'clock this morning, I had the intention of leaving the office
today at five, this intention does not somehow impose an obligation on me to
leave at five. When five o'clock comes, I may feel differently. If so, I will stay on
without compunction.
To be sure, I may have had a good reason for intending to leave at five.
Perhaps I have to pick up my children at that time. That reason may impose an
obligation on me. But the mere fact that I formed an intention does not. My
nine o'clock intention was based on my nine o'clock preferences. If my
preferences have changed by five, I need no special justification to depart from
my morning intention. I feel differently now, and that's the end of it. An
intention does not give the agent an additional reason to act- a new reason,
independent of the reasons the agent had for forming the intention in the first
place.
Commitments are different. The whole point of a commitment is to impose
an obligation. If I commit myself to do X at some future time, I'm obliging
myself to X when that time comes. Thus commitments do create -or at any
rate, their point is to create -new reasons to act. Say that at nine this morning,
for some reason, I did not merely intend to leave the office today at five, but
committed myself to doing so. Now it is a very different thing if I happen to
"feel differendy" when five o'clock come. I might prefer to stay on, but I
committed myself to leaving. I probably anticipated that I would feel
differently later; that's why I made the commitment. The point of a
commitment is to impose a future obligation on the self to take (or not take)
some action even if doing so runs contrary to later preferences.
It is actually a problem of considerable intricacy to explain how a
commitment made at time one could in fact create new reasons to act at time
two. The problem is easy to solve if we have in mind cases in which the person
making the commitment at time one deploys some external mechanism -tying
himself to the mast, giving to someone else the keys to his liquor cabinet,
entering into a contract -that alters the feasibility, costs, or benefits of his
time-two options. But I am speaking here of situations in which the agent
deploys no such precommitment mechanisms. He merely commits himself; he
merely gives his word -and he gives it not necessarily to others, but rather to
himself. How can I "commit" myself this way? Hobbes, for one, thought it
could not be done: "[H]e that is bound to himself only, is not bound. 3 7 A
sizeable philosophical literature exists on this problem, but I am not going to
37. THoMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 204 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press rev. student
ed. 1996) (1651).
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discuss here that literature or my solution to the problem. 8 Instead I am going
to take it, as most of us do, that we can make commitments, even to ourselves,
and that these commitments do impose obligations on us. The decisive
question is this: If an agent is obliged to keep his commitments, what is the
status of his No Application Understandings of those commitments? Are his
original No Application Understandings commitments in themselves and
therefore binding on him?
B. Are No Application Understandings Commitments?
Suppose I make a commitment never again to deliberately run over small
animals with my car. At the time, I have any number of No Application
Understandings of this commitment. For example, I understand that this
commitment does not prohibit me from smuggling drugs into the country with
my car (except, perhaps, in the rare case in which I could do so only by running
over small animals). What is the status of this No Application Understanding?
Does it mean that I am committed to drug-smuggling? Of course not. My
No Application Understanding means only that my small-animal commitment
has No Application to drug-smuggling. It does not somehow commit me to
drug-smuggling. If I refused to smuggle drugs into the country, I would not
have violated my commitment
But does my No Application Understanding at least demonstrate that I am
somehow committed to my being free, insofar as my own values and
resolutions are concerned, to smuggle drugs into the country with my car? Of
course not: I may view drug-smuggling as completely forbidden, without
believing that it is forbidden by my small-animal commitment. On the day I
made my small-animal commitment, perhaps I already had another
commitment prohibiting me from smuggling drugs. Or, if not, I could later
enter into an international agreement prohibiting me from drug-smuggling,
without in any sense having violated my small-animal commitment.
In other words, it is quite obvious that my small-animal commitment, even
when combined with my No Application Understanding of it, represents no
kind of commitment at all with respect to drug-smuggling- neither a
commitment in favor of it, nor against it, nor to my being free to engage in it.
I realize I have said nothing that ought to surprise anyone. Yet what I have
said is already enough to make out the fundamental point that No Application
Understandings are not themselves commitments. They are at most mere
intentions. They are not binding.
38. See also RUBENFELD, supra note 2, at 71-98; RUBENFELD, supra note 7, at 99-144.




Take the original understanding that the Equal Protection Clause would
not prohibit racially segregated state public schools. Obviously, that
understanding did not commit anyone or any states to racially segregating
their public schools. States could of course desegregate without violating the
Equal Protection Clause. But more than this, if what I said in the preceding
paragraphs is right (which, I think, it controvertibly is), then the original No
Application Understanding did not, by itself, commit anyone to leaving states
free to have racially segregated public schools.
The Equal Protection Clause, as originally understood, did not prohibit
racially segregated public schools. The intention, presumably, was that it
would not prohibit racial segregation in public schools. But it made no
commitment with respect to racially segregated state public schools. A
prohibitory commitment is a commitment to prohibit certain things. Whatever
the commitment does not prohibit, it makes no commitment toward.
Whatever falls outside the domain of the commitment's application is not an
object of the commitment. A separate, independent commitment is required if
the agent making the prohibitory commitment wishes to commit himself to the
further proposition that something he understands to be permitted-to fall
outside the scope of his prohibition -will remain permitted. In short, a No
Application Understanding of a commitment is never itself a commitment.
There may well have been an original intention that the Equal Protection
Clause would not prohibit racial segregation in state schools, but intentions are
not commitments.
If, therefore, we accept the idea of commitment-based constitutionalism -
and with it the idea that the fundamental business of constitutional
interpretation is to adhere to the nation's constitutional commitments-we
have a reason explaining why judges are not required to adhere to historical No
Application Understandings. These understandings are not commitments.
They are therefore not binding on judges who consider only the nation's
constitutional commitments to command adherence.
C. How Application Understandings Can Be Commitments
Turn now to foundational Application Understandings. Sometimes, when
we make a commitment, we are brought to it because we underwent some
episode from which we drew, as a kind of lesson, a conviction that we ought
never to engage in a certain course of action again. Even if we want to. Or
especially if we want to. Barring ourselves from engaging in this course of
action is the very reason, the core purpose, behind our commitment.
Suppose Odette commits herself never again to deceive Swann, her
husband. Shortly thereafter, the handsome Duke proposes to Odette that he
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and she spend a night together. Odette wants to say yes. On the other hand,
she also wants to honor her commitment. She doesn't have to honor it, of
course, but that's what she wants to do. She means to be faithful to her
commitment. So she has to decide whether spending a night with Duke would
count as an act of deceiving Swann.
It occurs to Odette to reason as follows. "To deceive means affirmatively to
misrepresent something, not merely to fail to tell something. Therefore,
spending a night with Duke will not be an act of deceiving Swann so long as I
never affirmatively lie about it." On this basis, Odette says yes to Duke and
tells herself she is not violating her commitment to Swann.
This interpretation of Odette's commitment is not illogical or impossible.
But consider the following additional fact. When Odette made her
commitment, the reason she did so was that she had just spent the night with
the handsome Duke, without telling Swann about it. She wanted to impose an
obligation on herself never to repeat this act. That's why she committed herself
not to deceive Swann again.
In other words, Odette's commitment had a foundational Application
Understanding. And it so happens that this foundational Application
Understanding dealt with the very same course of action she has now
"interpreted" her commitment to permit. Once we know this additional fact, it
becomes fair to say that Odette has pulled a sleight of hand with her
interpretation. She has not really interpreted her commitment at all. She has
violated it under the guise of interpreting it.
What allows us to say so? When we make a commitment with a
foundational Application Understanding, we are actually making not one, but
two commitments-one specific, and one general. Odette was committing
herself never again to sleep with Duke by and through her more general
commitment never again to deceive Swann. If, we might say, she was
committing herself to anything, she was committing herself not to do that
again. A foundational Application Understanding is thus a commitment in its
own right.
I am not saying that all commitments must have specific, foundational
Application Understandings of this kind. The point is only that this normative
structure - in which we make a more general commitment that includes,
definitively, a more specific commitment as an Application Understanding
thereof- is possible and more or less familiar. In other words, foundational
Application Understandings can be commitments in their own right, made by
and through the more general commitment of which they are specific
understandings; No Application Understandings never are.
If, therefore, American constitutional law is best understood through the
lens of commitmentarianism, there is an excellent reason for judges to




distinguish between Application and No Application Understandings. When
our constitutional provisions have foundational Application Understandings,
these Application Understandings are commitments, and commitment-based
interpreters are bound to adhere to them. By contrast, No Application
Understandings are not commitments, and judges may freely depart from
them.
Observe that what I have said applies even to the most clearly established,
widely held No Application Understandings, even to a No Application
Understanding without which a given constitutional provision might never
have been enacted. Conceivably, had the Fourteenth Amendment been
originally understood to abolish racial segregation in public facilities, or to
prohibit sex discrimination, it would never have been enacted. All the same,
these No Application Understandings remained at most intentions, not
commitments, and later judges are not required to stick to them.
But can judges claim to be faithfully interpreting a commitment if they
interpret it to require something that its original makers intended it not to
require? Certainly. Commitments are often like that: They turn out, if we
really want to do them justice, to require considerably more of us than we may
originally have thought. A person who has children, for example, or a person
who resolves to become a great pianist, makes a commitment that can easily
prove to require far more than he originally intended.
How does interpretation work when an interpreter finds that it applies to
some action not originally considered to be within its scope? Consider another
Odette, who also makes a commitment never to deceive another Swann, this
time not her husband. Our new Odette also has a new foundational
Application Understanding: This time, it was a lie she told Swann. At the time
she makes the commitment, she specifically and clearly thinks to herself, "I'm
still free to hide things from Swann, so long as I don't affirmatively lie to him.
This commitment has No Application to mere omissions."
Shortly thereafter, Swann says something to Odette indicating that he
believes she intends to marry him. In fact, she doesn't, but she knows that if
she remains silent, Swann will read her silence as assent. She wonders if she's
obliged to speak up and disabuse him. She remembers her commitment; she
also remembers her No Application Understanding.
If Odette were an originalist, her job would be easy. She would invoke her
original understanding, and the case would be dosed. But if she takes a
commitment-based view of interpretation, her task is harder.
She made a commitment not to deceive Swann. She made no commitment
in favor of omissions. True, she understood her commitment not to apply to
omissions, but that No Application Understanding is not itself a commitment,
and is not therefore binding on her. Instead, she has to reflect, as best she can,
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on what it means to deceive. In particular, she will think about her
foundational Application Understanding: What was the lie she had told
Swann, and what was it about this lie that made it so reprehensible? Is it
possible that she would be perpetrating the very same kind of misconduct if
she permits herself to remain silent after Swann's declarations, knowing that
Swann will take her silence for assent? Is it possible that her original
understanding was wrong-that in some situations, omissions can deceive? Of
course it's possible. While she's not required to do so, it would be entirely
legitimate for Odette to interpret her antideception commitment to prohibit
her from remaining silent in these circumstances.
Similarly, and through precisely the same kind of reasoning, it was entirely
legitimate for the Supreme Court to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to
prohibit racial segregation and sex discrimination. Honoring a commitment
may well involve rejecting original No Application Understandings. This is not
a prescription for ahistorical constitutional law. It is a prescription for historical
anchoring. Constitutional interpretation, when it distinguishes between
Application and No Application Understandings, treating the former as
paradigmatic and the latter as nonbinding, remains deeply anchored in the
nation's core constitutional commitments: elaborating these commitments,
doing justice to them, even when that means recognizing in these
commitments requirements extending beyond the confines of what was
originally contemplated.
I have now said more than enough by way of introduction. The best way to
make more concrete my approach to constitutional law, my claims about
revolutions in interpretation, and the relationship of my work to Professor
Amar's, will be for the two of us to engage in a more direct exchange. Before
we get to that, I just want to add only one more thing: my thanks to the editors
of The Yale Law Journal for their incredible dedication, patience, intelligence,
and creativity in making this happen.
Jed Rubenfeld is the Robert R. Slaughter Professor ofLaw, Yale Law School.
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TH AL LAW 'OURAL
AKHIL REED AMAR
America's Constitution and the Yale School of
Constitutional Interpretation
America's Constitution: A Biography' tries to explain how and why the
supreme law of our land was enacted at the Founding and then amended over
the ensuing centuries. The biography's narrative tracks the textual flow of the
Constitution itself; article by article and amendment by amendment, I take my
readers on an interpretive journey through the document. While I give some
constitutional patches of text far more attention than others, I try to say at least
something in passing- ideally, something fresh and important-about every
notable constitutional provision.
The book targets a wide audience. At one end of the spectrum I aim to
make the Constitution's letter and spirit understandable to members of the
general public say, high school seniors taking Advanced Placement History or
Government. At the other end, I have tried to write something that even gray-
haired scholars will find significant and surprising. (To put the point
autobiographically, I have filled my account with facts, ideas, interpretations,
and insights that I stumbled upon only in the course of researching and writing
this book after nearly two decades of teaching constitutional law at Yale.)
I shall not today attempt a comprehensive summary of the book's twists
and turns.' Instead, I shall try to place America's Constitution against the
backdrop of several noteworthy constitutional law books authored by my
predecessors and colleagues on the Yale Law School faculty over the last half-
1. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005).
2. Readers seeking such a digest might profitably consult any number of reviews and
summaries already in print. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Clothed with the Legitimate
Authority of the People, 91 VA. L. REv. 2023 (2005) (book review); Gordon S. Wood, How
Democratic Is the Constitution, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Feb. 23, 2006, at 25. They might also scan
my own postscript, in which I try to distill some of my book's most distinctive claims. See
AMAR, supra note I, at 465-77.
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century. Together, these books define the core curriculum of what might be
called the modern Yale School of Constitutional Interpretation.3
I. BICKEL'S LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
The publication of Alexander Bickel's The Least Dangerous Branch in 1962
marked a milestone in the history of American constitutional scholarship. 4
Prior to World War II, serious books on the Constitution came mainly from
high-powered judges, lawyers, political scientists, and historians -consider, for
example, Joseph Story, Alexis de Tocqueville, Thomas Cooley, Woodrow
Wilson, Charles Beard, Andrew C. McLaughlin, Charles Warren, and Edward
S. Corwin. For much of the early twentieth century, common law courses such
as contracts and property dominated law school curricula, and few law
professors penned big books on broad questions of constitutional law. When
one such ambitious book did appear in the 1950s-William Crosskey's epic
two-volume saga, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United
States'- it was met with savage criticism from much of the established legal
professoriate.6
A new era dawned when Yale's Charles Black (about whom I shall have
much more to say presently) published a marvelous book, The People and the
Court,7 in 196o and his colleague Bickel responded with his own provocative
book two years later. Since the publication of these two classics, the
prominence of constitutional law within top law schools has risen considerably,
as has the proportion of cutting-edge constitutional scholarship produced by
law professors.
3. The words "books" and "core curriculum" are significant. I shall not discuss in any detail the
countless important and interesting constitutional law articles authored by Yale professors.
Nor shall I analyze many other interesting Yale books that are not yet part of the established
or emerging constitutional law canon for the academy, the profession, or the bench.
4. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS (1962).
S. 1-2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES (1953).
6. Julius Goebel, Jr., Ex Parte Clio, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 450 (1954) (book review); Ernest J.
Brown, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1954); Henry M. Hart, Jr., Professor Crosskey
and Judicial Review, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1456 (book review). For an incisive account of these
reviews, see PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 17-21
(1982).
7. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960).
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Several of the largest questions that Black and Bickel posed remain central
to constitutional discourse today. How can judicial review by unelected judges
holding lifetime appointments be reconciled with democratic theory and with
the commitment to popular self-government evident throughout America's
Constitution? What sorts of questions are off-limits to judges? Are such limits
to be drawn and enforced solely by the legislative and executive branches, or
should judges themselves also develop regimens of self-restraint?
While America's Constitution: A Biography does touch on these questions, I
have tried to shift and widen the focus so as to give readers a less court-
centered and more panoramic account of constitutional law. Bickel took for
granted the basic democratic thrust of the nonjudicial branches, but in so
doing, he glided by many constitutional questions that deserve more careful
study. For example: Who was allowed to vote in congressional elections at the
Founding, and how and why have these rules changed over the centuries? How
much, or how little, did the Three-Fifths Clause skew antebellum
apportionment maps and thereby compromise the fundamental
representativeness of the House of Representatives? How should we
understand the Senate's equal representation of unequally populous states?
How, if at all, did the Seventeenth Amendment democratize the Senate, and
how did this direct-election amendment influence other branches of
government? Why did the Framers eschew direct national elections of the
President, and how has the electoral college system changed, both formally and
informally, over the years? Can various constitutional limits on congressional
and presidential eligibility be squared with democratic theory?
As for the issues at the heart of Bickel's book- issues directly concerning
the judicial branch -here, too, my account differs markedly from Bickel's. For
example, I try to cast light on the history and structure of the process of judicial
nomination and confirmation. Bickel's book says almost nothing about this
process s - an odd omission for a work that seeks to analyze the Supreme Court
in a broad political context. Odd, too, was Bickel's equation of the Supreme
Court with the entire federal judiciary, an equation evident not only in the
book's full title - The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics-but also in its opening sentence: "The least dangerous branch of the
American government is the most extraordinarily powerful court of law the
world has ever known."9 In my book, by contrast, I note both similarities and
differences between the Supreme Court and other federal tribunals. For
8. For passing references, see, for example, BICKEL, supra note 4, at 31-32, 9o. See also
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 3-4 (1978).
9. BICKEL, supra note 4, at i (emphasis added).
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example, while the Supreme Court's size has shifted only marginally in two
hundred years - from six to nine Justices, 1° the size of the federal judiciary as a
whole has skyrocketed. Today, there are roughly fifty times as many Article III
judges as at the Founding.1 Or to put the point another way, in the 1790S there
were roughly seven House members for every lower federal court judge,
whereas today there are two federal judges for every House member. My Yale
Law students are far more likely to clerk for federal judges than to intern for
members of Congress. With these basic facts in mind, we can begin to see
some interesting aspects of the rise of the Framers' third branch over the
centuries.
Another question raised by the distinction between the Supreme Court and
the third branch: Why did Article III allow lower federal courts to try various
cases that were off limits to the Supreme Court when sitting in original
jurisdiction? This, of course, was the technical issue underlying Marbury v.
Madison.2 Bickel opened his book with an extended analysis of Marbury, but he
said virtually nothing about various jurisdictional and procedural issues at the
heart of the case. Instead, Bickel focused on the great question of judicial
review. 3 While I, too, have much to say about judicial review, I also analyze the
technical issue of original jurisdiction. That issue, I argue, gives us a window
onto grand historical and structural themes at work at the Founding-in
particular, how certain geographic considerations drove many of the do's and
don'ts that became part of the Constitution of 1787-1788. For example, the
original jurisdiction rules of Article III were, I argue, largely motivated by
venue considerations and the felt need to safeguard local juries, who played a
much larger role in the Founders' world than do juries today. Because the
Supreme Court would sit in the nation's capital while other federal courts
would hold trials in the hinterlands, any expansion of the Court's original
jurisdiction would threaten to cut local juries out of the loop and would
compromise other important venue values.14
The difference between Bickel on Marbury and Amar on Marbury telescopes
larger differences of approach and interpretive style. Bickel's book had rather
little to say about the Constitution's text, history, and structure; instead Bickel
concentrated on the Court's recent case law. My book does just the opposite.
To say this is not necessarily to criticize Bickel. In a field as vast as
1o. This is after briefly peaking at ten in the mid-nineteenth century.
ii. See AMAR, supra note I, at 216-17.
12. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
13. See BICKEL, supra note 4, at 1-14.
14. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 231-33.




constitutional law, no single book (or author) can do everything, and
methodological choices must be made. For better or worse, my own
methodology places me much closer to Bickel's towering Yale colleague,
Charles Black, and to his most famous Yale students -John Hart Ely and Bruce
Ackerman -than to Bickel himself.
II. CHARLES BLACK'S STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP
In his elegant meditations on Structure and Relationship in Constitutional
Law, Charles Black powerfully reminded us that the Constitution is more than
a jumble of disconnected clauses."5 Because the document forms a coherent
whole, sensitive readers must go beyond individual clauses to ponder the larger
constitutional systems, patterns, structures, and relationships at work.
Throughout America's Constitution, I have tried to heed Black's wise counsel.
A few examples. In McCulloch v. Matyland, 6 Chief Justice Marshall
famously upheld Congress's power to create a national bank. The case is often
read as pivoting on the words of the Necessary and Proper Clause, but Black's
book correctly stresses that Marshall's opinion in fact did not place significant
affirmative weight on this clause. 7 Before Marshall's McCulloch opinion even
began discussing this clause, the Chief Justice had already laid out his main
argument for broad congressional power to create a federal bank. And though
Marshall did wave in the direction of various other clauses in Article I, Section
8, his basic point was essentially structural rather than textual, resting on what
Black described as the Constitution's "general implications." 8 In my Biography,
I seek to build upon Black's insight with the following account of McCulloch:
Reading the document through a geostrategic prism, Marshall
emphasized the national need for an army able to defend a "vast
republic, from the Saint Croix to the Gulph of Mexico, from the
Atlantic to the Pacific." Because a national bank with branches across
the continent might help in paying soldiers on-site and on time,
Marshall (who had spent the winter of 1777-78 encamped at Valley
Forge) held that such a bank fell within Article I's enumerations
concerning "the great powers to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money;
is. CHARLEs L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
16. 17U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
17. BLACK, supra note 15, at 13-14.
18. Id. at 14.
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to regulate commerce; to declare and conduct a war; and to raise and
support armies and navies."19
Thus, Marshall's was a structural argument in two easy steps. Step One: The
central purpose of the Constitution was to safeguard national security across a
vast continent. Step Two: The creation of a national bank fits snugly within
that central purpose, given the many ways in which such a bank might
facilitate continental defense measures.
Now let's take this structural insight and use it to parse a clause that has
generated some noteworthy case law of late, namely the clause empowering
Congress "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes."2" Here is how I begin my discussion of this
clause in my book:
Modem lawyers and judges typically refer to these words as the
"commerce clause," and today's Supreme Court has moved toward
reading the paragraph as applicable only to economic interactions. But
"commerce" also had in 1787, and retains even now, a broader meaning
referring to all forms of intercourse in the affairs of life, whether or not
narrowly economic or mediated by explicit markets. Bolingbroke's
famous mid-eighteenth-century tract, The Idea of a Patriot King, spoke
of the "free and easy commerce of social life," and other contemporary
texts referred to "domestic animals which have the greatest Commerce
with mankind" and "our Lord's commerce with his disciples."2'
Note that my textual argument thus far is not that "commerce" must be read to
apply beyond economic matters, but only that it may properly be read this way,
if constitutional context and structure so warrant. And thus my main analysis
of the issue at hand is indeed structural:
[T]he broader reading of "Commerce" in this clause would seem to
make better sense of the framers' general goals by enabling Congress to
regulate all interactions (and altercations) with foreign nations and
Indian tribes -interactions that, if improperly handled by a single state
acting on its own, might lead to needless wars or otherwise
compromise the interests of sister states. Draft language at Philadelphia
had in fact empowered Congress "to regulate affairs with the Indians,"
19. AmAR, supra note i, at i1o (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 408, 407).
2o. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3-
21. AMAR, supra note 1, at 107 (citing entries from the Oxford English Dictionary).




but the word "affairs" dropped out when the delegates opted to fold the
Indian clause into the general interstate and international "Commerce"
provision. Without a broad reading of "Commerce" in this clause, it is
not entirely clear whence the federal government would derive its
needed power to deal with noneconomic international incidents -or for
that matter to address the entire range of vexing nonmercantile
interactions and altercations that might arise among states.22
I conclude my discussion with the following thoughts:
Under a broad reading, if a given problem genuinely spilled across state
or national lines, Congress could act. Conversely, a problem would not
truly be "with" foreign regimes or "among" the states, so long as it
remained wholly internal to each affected state, with no spillover. On
this view, legal clarity might be advanced if lawyers and judges began
referring to these words not as "the commerce clause," but rather as the
"international-and-interstate clause" or the "with-and-among clause."23
22. Id. at 107-o8 (footnotes omitted). An endnote provides additional elaboration of the
structural gap opened up by an unduly narrow reading of the word "commerce":
Imagine, for example, a situation in which one state's regulation of upstream land
created adverse effects for residents of downstream states. Federal power over
admiralty jurisdiction would not necessarily cover such a case if the stream were
non-navigable. On the international front, imagine a transnational incident that
called for a domestic federal-law solution as distinct from an international
agreement, compact, or treaty.
Id. at 542 n.18.
23. Id. at io8. A footnote provides some additional historical data:
Federal power over genuinely interstate and international affairs lay at the heart of
the plan approved by the Philadelphia delegates. According to the Convention's
general instructions to the midsummer Committee of Detail, which took upon
itself the task of translating these instructions into the specific enumerations of
Article I, Congress was to enjoy authority to "legislate in all Cases for the general
Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which the States are separately
incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the United States may be interrupted
by the Exercise of individual Legislation." It also bears notice that the First
Congress enacted a statute regulating noneconomic interactions and
altercations-"intercourse"-with Indians. Section 5 of this act dealt with
crimes - whether economic or not- committed by Americans on Indian lands.
Id. at n.* (citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 131-32 (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)). In the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, the influential James
Wilson drew the basic structural dividing line as follows:
Whatever object of government is confined, in its operation and effects, within
the bounds of a particular state, should be considered as belonging to the
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal 2003
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
While the above passages obviously feature a smattering of textual and
historical arguments, the animating impulse is structural, A la Black (and, dare
I say it, Marshall). The Constitution was structured in order to create a central
regime that could competently handle all affairs-whether or not economic-
with Indians and foreign nations. A closely related Founding purpose was to
create a central governmental structure that would handle all genuine conflicts
and controversies -all intercourse and affairs- that might arise between rival
states, lest the aggrieved parties be tempted to take matters into their own
hands and thereby imperil continental peace and prosperity. While some
clausebound textualists-originalists 4 have mustered various snippets of history
to support a purely economic reading of "commerce" in Article I, Section 8,
their approach fails to give due weight to the fact that the Constitution was not
ratified by the American people clause by clause, but as a whole. Each of the
document's clauses must be read not in isolation, but through the prism of the
Constitution's overarching structures and purposes. That is how Americans in
fact ratified the so-called Commerce Clause, and that is how sensitive and
sensible interpreters today should read it.2"
Similar structural analysis can help illuminate the basic contours of Articles
II and III. The President's power to act unilaterally in a grave national
emergency so as to preserve the nation as an ongoing operation can be read
into the opening clause of Article II, vesting the President with a residuum of
"executive power" above and beyond the specific presidential powers
enumerated elsewhere in Article 11.6 A textualist might further note that
government of that state; whatever object of government extends, in its operation
or effects, beyond the bounds of a particular state, should be considered as
belonging to the government of the United States.
2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONsTrrUION 424 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836).
24. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 695
(1996); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. Rev. 1387
(1987); Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First
Principles To Uphold Federal Commercial Regulation but Preserve State Control over Social Issues,
85 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1999). In the case law, see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-602
(1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
25. It also bears note that none of the leading clausebound advocates of a narrow economic
reading of "commerce" has come to grips with the basic inadequacy of their reading as
applied to Indian tribes, or has squarely confronted the originalist implications of the Indian
Intercourse Act of 1790, in which the First Congress plainly regulated noneconomic
intercourse with Indian tribes. See Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (entitled "An Act
To Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes" (emphasis added)).
26. In certain situations, unilateral presidential action may need to be confirmed by a
subsequent congressional statute in order to continue to be lawful after the legislature has
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Article II's opening language pointedly differs from Article I's, which vests
Congress only with various legislative powers "herein" enumerated. I make
these textual arguments, but candor obliges me to admit that, once again, the
animating impulse is structural: I applied the textual gloss only after I
glimpsed the structural insight. And here is the structural nub, relied on by all
of America's great Presidents, especially George Washington and Abraham
Lincoln: The Presidency is the only branch structured to be permanently in
session, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. Also, it is the only
branch whose power resides in a single, unitary figure. The evident
constitutional design here is thus to enable one part of the government to act
quickly and decisively, with unity, energy, vigor, dispatch, and, if need be,
secrecy. When an insurrection breaks out or an invasion occurs or a foreign
policy crisis erupts, Congress may not even be in session, and unless the
President acts unilaterally to preserve the status quo ante, Congress may never
again be able to act. Washington and Lincoln grasped these basic structural
truths about executive power, and so should we.
A lower-stakes example of sensible structural analysis: The text of the
Advice and Consent Clause makes no distinctions between presidential
nominations to cabinet positions on the one hand and Supreme Court
openings on the other. But, structurally, it makes a huge difference whether the
Senate is being asked to approve an executive branch subordinate who will take
orders from the President and will leave office when the President leaves, or is
instead being asked to confirm a judicial officer who is independent of the
President and who may linger in judicial office long after the nominator has left
the White House. Ever since the Founding, the Senate has understood this
obvious structural distinction and has treated the two types of nominations
differently, with much more deference to a President's cabinet picks than to his
judicial nominations. Charles Black himself called attention to this distinction
long ago, and I reiterate it in my book, with detailed data of actual Senate
practice from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 7
been duly convened and has had time to consider the matter. For a discussion of Lincoln's
understanding of and conformance to this principle at the outset of the Civil War, see AMAR,
supra note i, at 132-33 & 546 nn.4-6.
27. Compare Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees,
79 YALE L.J. 657, 659-60 (1970), with AMAR, supra note 1, at 194 & 565 n.42. Consider
another set of issues implicating the Presidency, the Judiciary, and the Senate -namely,
impeachment. Once again, structural analysis is helpful:
In making Congress the pivot point, the Constitution structured impeachment as
a system of national accountability. Because the president would uniquely
represent the American people as a whole, the decision to oust him could come
only from representatives of the entire continent. Though the Constitution did
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Consider, finally, the issue of judicial review. Let's imagine that we deal
with a constitutional principle that applies against both state and federal
governments -say, the Article I rule that neither government may enact a bill
of attainder. Black argued that whatever deference federal judges in a close case
might properly pay to Congress as a coordinate branch elected by the entire
national citizenry, no similar deference was due to a single state legislature.28 I
offer a similar analysis, relying, once again, primarily on structural
argumentation of a Blackian sort. I begin by noting that:
Although the Constitution shielded individual judges against politically
motivated salary cuts or attempted removals, it left the Court as a whole
open to political restructuring. For example, the political branches
could detour around an obstinate Court majority by expanding the size
of the Court and appointing new justices more likely to defer. 9
I then make a key structural contrast:
Unlike Congress and the president, state governments would have
no formal say in determining the Court's general contours or in making
the specific decisions about whom to put on it or pull off it. A state
whose laws were declared unconstitutional could detour around the
existing justices only by convincing the other federal branches that its
not expressly say so, its basic structure afforded a sitting president temporary
immunity from ordinary criminal prosecution during his term of office. All other
impeachable officers, including vice presidents, cabinet secretaries, and judges,
might be tried, convicted, and imprisoned by ordinary courts while still in office.
But as Hamilton/Publius passingly implied in The Federalist Nos. 69 and 77 and
Ellsworth and Adams reiterated in the First Congress, America's president could
be arrested and prosecuted only after he left office. Unlike other more fungible or
episodic national officers, the president was personally vested with the powers of
an entire branch and was expected to preside continuously. Faithful discharge of
his national duties might render him extremely unpopular in a particular state or
region, making it essential to insulate him from trumped-up local charges aiming
to incapacitate him and thereby undo a national election. (Imagine, for example,
some clever South Carolina prosecutor seeking to indict Lincoln in the spring of
1861 and demanding that he stand trial in Charleston.) Thus, only the House, a
truly national grand jury, could indict, and only the Senate, a national petit jury,
could convict, a sitting president. Of course, the people of the nation could also
remove a sitting president at regular quadrennial intervals. Once out of office, an
ex-president might be criminally tried just like any other citizen.
AMAR, supra note i, at 2Ol-O2 (footnotes omitted). Here, too, I follow in Black's footsteps.
See CHARLEs L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 40-41 (1974).
28. BLACK, supra note 15, at 72-78.
29. AMAR, supra note i, at 212.
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grievance had merit. The Constitution's structure thus emboldened the
Court to vindicate national values against obstreperous states even as it
cautioned the justices to avoid undue provocation of Congress.
In fact, Congress had many weapons to wield or at least brandish
against the justices, if it so chose. For instance, the legislature enjoyed
vast discretion to grant or withhold judicial pay increases, to fund or
deny judicial perks and support staff, to reshape the inferior federal
judiciary, and even to strip the Court of jurisdiction in many cases.
Even more telling was the Judicial Article's silence on issues of
judicial apportionment. The precise apportionment rules for the House,
Senate, and presidential electors appeared prominently in the
Legislative and Executive Articles. These rules reflected weeks of
intense debate and compromise at Philadelphia and generated extensive
discussion during the ratification process. Yet the Judicial Article said
absolutely nothing about the how large and small states, Northerners
and Southerners, Easterners and Westerners, and so on, were to be
balanced on the Supreme Court. This gaping silence suggests that the
Founding generation envisioned the Court chiefly as an organ
enforcing federal statutes and ensuring state compliance with federal
norms. Just as it made sense to give the political branches wide
discretion to shape the postal service, treasury department, or any other
federal agency carrying out congressional policy, so, too, it made sense
to allow Congress and the president to contour the federal judiciary as
they saw fit. If, conversely, Americans in 1787 conceived of the Court
not as a faithful servant of the House, Senate, and president but rather
as a muscular overseer regularly striking down federal laws as a fourth
chamber of federal lawmaking, then it is hard to explain why the
document gave the first three chambers plenary power over the fourth's
apportionment."0
Of course, I cannot be sure that Charles Black himself would have agreed
with every one of my attempted applications of the structural method that he
so beautifully deployed and illustrated. But I would like to think that my late
friend would have been happy to see that his broader methodological teachings
30. AMAR, supra note i, at 213-14. For Black's meditations on Congress's powers over the Court,
see BLACK, supra note 5.
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continue to live on as a vital part of the twenty-first-century Yale School of
Constitutional Interpretation.
III. JOHN HART ELY'S DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
"You don't need many heroes if you choose carefully." So wrote John Hart
Ely as he memorably dedicated his great book, Democracy and Distrust, to his
hero Earl Warren.' Ely himself was one of my heroes and his book has been an
inspiration. 32
Perhaps more than any other scholar of his era, Ely reminded us that
political liberals no less than political conservatives may properly lay claim to
be the rightful heirs of the Constitution; liberals, no less than conservatives,
Ely urged, could and should aspire to be faithful interpreters of the document's
text, history, and structure.33
Like Professor Black before him, Professor Ely championed a particularly
holistic brand of constitutional interpretation. Certain open-textured
constitutional clauses, Ely famously argued, required interpreters to attend to
the larger themes implicit in the Constitution as a whole. But Ely also urged
interpreters to pay great heed to the document's specific words and to the
original intent underlying those words -always remembering, as Ely took
pains to stress (in his own italics) that "the most important datum bearing on what
was intended is the constitutional language itself."34 Throughout my own work, I
have tried to pursue a brand of interpretation closely akin to Ely's.
In his opening pages, Ely spotlighted the significance of historical baselines
and vectors in a Constitution that had been framed in the eighteenth century
and then repeatedly amended over the ensuing years. In a single -brilliant! -
sentence, Ely helped his readers (and this reader in particular) see that the key
issue was not how democratic was the original Constitution as judged by
modern standards, but rather how democratic was it for its time? In the 178os,
31. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, at dedication
(198o).
32. By the time that Democracy and Distrust was published, Ely had joined the Harvard Law
School faculty, but the book was the product of many years of reflection, much of which
occurred at the Yale Law School, where Ely studied and began his professorial career.
33. As Ely noted in his opening paragraphs, "It would be a mistake to suppose that there is any
necessary correlation between an interpretivist approach to constitutional adjudication and
political conservativism." ELY, supra note 31, at i. Ely went on to draw attention to the
mighty contributions of Hugo Black, a liberal lion and a confessed textualist-originalist. Id.
at 2-3.
34. Id. at 16.
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Ely pointed out, the Founders were the world's leading liberal democratic
reformers: "The very process of adopting the Constitution was designed to be,
and in some respects it was, more democratic than any that had preceded it."3
It turns out that Ely was even more right than he knew when he penned this
profound and profoundly important sentence -as I try to show with detailed
data in the opening pages of my own book documenting how at least eight
states used specially inclusive voting rules during the unprecedented
ratification-convention elections held in 1787-1788.36
As for subsequent amendments, Ely helped his readers see that one key
question is whether amendments have essentially effected a liberalization or an
anti-liberalization of the document. As it turns out, the amenders have, in
general, been liberal democratic reformers in their eras just as the Founders
were in theirs. Thus, according to Ely:
There have also existed throughout our history limits on the extent of
the franchise and thus on government by majority. But the . . .
constitutional development[] has been continuously, even relentlessly,
away from that state of affairs .... Excluding the Eighteenth and
Twenty-First Amendments - the latter repealed the former - six of our
last ten constitutional amendments have been concerned precisely with
increasing popular control of our government. And five of those six...
have extended the franchise to persons who have previously been
denied it.37
And as Ely observed later in his book:
Extension of the franchise to groups previously excluded has... been a
dominant theme of our constitutional development since the
Fourteenth Amendment, and it pursues both of the broad
constitutional themes we have observed from the beginning: the
achievement of a political process open to all on an equal basis and a
consequent enforcement of the representative's duty of equal concern
and respect to minorities and majorities alike. 3s
35. Id. at 5.
36. AMAR, supra note i, at 5-7 & 503-05 nn.1-2. To my knowledge, no previous scholar has ever
brought these important data to light.
37. ELY, supra note 31, at 6-7.
3. Id. at 99.
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Much as Black highlighted his own distinctive brand of constitutional
argument, so too did Ely. Call Ely's approach the argument from constitutional
trendline. In Ely's words: "In judging the propriety of... a line of growth it is
surely appropriate, indeed I should think it imperative, to look to the ways our
constitutional document has developed over the... centuries. ... " 9
As I point out in the concluding pages of my book, the textual
configuration of the Constitution's amendments-in chronological order-
draws attention to the document's general trendline.4' To be sure, trendline
analysts must be wary of overgeneralization; history rarely travels in only one
direction, and Ely himself reminded us of two amendments - Prohibition and
its repeal-that in effect cancelled each other out. Indeed, after providing
readers with a "brisk" tour of the entire Constitution (in rough textual order,
from the Preamble to the twentieth-century amendments), Ely took care to
caution that "our Constitution is too complex a document to lie still for any pat
characterization."4 In my own rather less brisk tour of the Constitution, I have
tried to remember Ely's warning, even as I have tried, in true Elysian fashion,
to identify various larger constitutional themes and trends.
IV. HAROLD KOH'S NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION
In his 199o book, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the
Iran-Contra Affair, then-Professor Harold Koh powerfully reminded us of the
centrality of geostrategic and national security considerations at the Founding:
From the very beginning, our Constitution has been obsessed with the
idea of national security.... [N]o fewer than twenty-five of the first
thirty-six Federalist Papers concerned national insecurity, with most
linking the young republic's international weakness to the incapacity of
the national government.
... America's geographical separation from the rest of the world,
which played a crucial role in fostering its liberal political tradition,
39. Id. at 123.
40. AMAR, supra note 1, at 459-63.
41. ELY, supra note 31, at 87-101.
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figured equally prominently in the development of America's
constitutional traditions.42
With all this I find myself in perfect agreement, and much of my opening
chapter tries to show how the basic argument of the Federalists in general (and
of the Federalist Papers in particular) rested on a grand geostrategic theory:
England, the argument went, was largely free because it was an island nation
whose insularity freed it from dependence on a large (and likely liberty-
threatening) standing army. If Americans could form a more perfect union in
1787 modeled on the union of England and Scotland some four score years
earlier, they too could avoid standing armies and would thereby reap huge
dividends from their geostrategic insularity. (Thus, in 1787, the key
contribution to the Federalist Papers was not the now-famous No. lo, but rather
the now-obscure No. 8.) More than courts, separation of powers, federalism,
and rights, the most important protector of American liberty would be her
oceans.
Later in my book, I do part company somewhat with my dear friend, Dean
Koh. As I see it, the President enjoys a rather more robust set of constitutional
powers than Dean Koh would recognize. Some of the features of the
Presidency - its capacity for quick and decisive action - are not merely political
science explanations of why the President is able to "get away" with some or
other exercise of power, but are also (at least sometimes) legal justifications -
more precisely, structural justifications - of various presidential actions.
But at a still deeper level, my book takes Dean Koh's big idea and runs with
it: Our Constitution has been profoundly shaped by national security
considerations, and in all sorts of ways that have not been fully recognized,
implicating issues well beyond the separation of powers debates at the center of
Koh's book. For example, why did many states at the Founding lower property
qualifications for voting that had operated in the colonial period? Largely
because various unpropertied militiamen were patriots who fought on the
American side of the Revolution. Similarly, black men got the vote in the
Fifteenth Amendment thanks in large part to their military service in the Civil
War; women won passage of the Nineteenth Amendment during World War
I, after President Wilson explicitly endorsed the Amendment as a "war
measure" and explained how women's suffrage would improve America's
moral standing in postwar Europe; and eighteen-year-olds won adoption of
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in large part because of their military service in
Vietnam. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was emphatically a war
42. HAROLD HONGJu KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 74-77 (1990).
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measure designed in part to prevent the English from supporting the
Confederacy; Prohibition passed as a war measure; and none of the five
amendments in the 1950s and 196os can be fully understood without
appreciating the background of World War II and the Cold War. Also, many of
the provisions of the Founders' Constitution were drafted so as to encourage
immigration and westward expansion for geostrategic and national security
reasons; and several other provisions were designed to prevent foreign
monarchies and aristocracies from undermining free and fair American
elections. In a sense, then, virtually our entire Constitution could be described,
a la Koh, as "The National Security Constitution." 43
V. BRUCE ACKERMAN'S WE THE PEOPLE
A casual reader of my biography might think that I am a strong critic of
Bruce Ackerman. What this casual reading misses, however, is that I am also in
many ways a disciple.
My disagreements with Ackerman lie close to the surface of America's
Constitution. In his epic trilogy-in-progress, We the People, Ackerman has
argued that the Founding itself was flagrantly illegal-most obviously, in its
disregard of the Articles of Confederation's rules for proper amendment of that
document. 44 I dispute Ackerman's legal characterizations here, as I make clear
in my opening chapter.4" In my view, the Articles of Confederation were a mere
treaty whose repeated violations by virtually all states legally justified exit from
the Articles if a supermajority of states so agreed, as provided by the
Constitution's Article VII. Ackerman also thinks that in the process of adopting
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, Reconstruction Republicans
"played fast and loose" with the Founding document and acted in ways "that
simply cannot be squared" with the amendment-procedure rules laid down by
Article V., 6 Here, too, I disagree, and indeed I spend several pages making the
case for the Article V legality of these Amendments and giving readers lots of
historical evidence and legal arguments that they will not find in We the People
(or anywhere else, for that matter). 4' As for Ackerman's notorious third
"constitutional moment" - the (nontextual) New Deal Amendment ratified
43. For more discussion of the points summarized in this paragraph, see AMAR, supra note 1, at
17, 67-70, 164-66,271-72, 356-59,376,395-400,416,424-25, 436, 44o, 446-48.
44. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 32-68 (1998).
45. See AMAR, supra note i, at 30-32 & 518-19 n.72.
46. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 44, at ioo, io9, 111.
47. See AMAR, supra note i, at 364-8o.
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(outside Article V) in the late 1930s -this amendment does not appear in my
copy of the Constitution, nor does it appear in my biography of the document.
Conversely, I pay a good deal of attention to various Progressive-era
Amendments that Ackerman glosses over; and I also attend to the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment, which Ackerman claims is invalid because it failed to
comply with his own theory of constitutional change 8 even though it did
satisfy the strict letter (and, I would argue, the spirit) of Article V. Finally, my
general interpretive method is far more textual and conventional and far less
abstract than Ackerman's.
So much for the major disagreements. Now for the important elements of
discipleship. Whereas Bickel, Black, Ely, and Koh made good use of writings
by political scientists and historians, Ackerman has distinguished himself as an
accomplished political scientist and historian in his own right. We the People
blends law, political science, and history in ways that no other Yale book had
done before. I, too, aim to weave together the three disciplines in a book
featuring original historical discoveries and rigorous analysis of political science
data alongside standard legal analysis. Like Ackerman (and also Koh), I seek to
offer a nuanced account not just of judicial review but of constitutional
deliberation, contestation, and decisionmaking in all three branches of
government. Following in Ackerman's footsteps, I see the Constitution and its
Amendments not just as texts to be parsed, but as deeds to be studied and
interpreted. In the 178os, We the People actually did something-we ordained,
we established, we constituted-and this constituting (or, if you like, this
Constitution) raises important questions: Who did this? How? Under what
voting procedures? With what sort of legitimacy? Similar questions arise in
assessing the ways in which We the People have made amends over the
centuries. For example, was the federal army's prominent involvement in the
process by which various southern states voted on the Fourteenth Amendment
in the 186os any part of the amendment as an embodied deed? If so, what was
the meaning of this deed and how might it require sensitive interpreters to
rethink Founding texts governing the military? Even if we focus only on the
words of later amendments, how much or how little do these words require
reinterpretation of earlier constitutional texts? As we have seen, Ely briefly
touched on this question (as, indeed, he briefly touched on the idea of
interpreting the Constitution of 1787 as a democratic deed and not a mere
enacted text); but it has been Bruce Ackerman more than anyone else- at Yale,
or elsewhere -who has stressed the need for modern interpreters to synthesize
48. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 44, at 490-91 n.1.
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the meanings of different constitutional texts adopted by different generations
of We the People.
Thus, even as I end up disagreeing with many of Ackerman's answers, I
also find myself repeatedly pondering the questions that he has so powerfully
framed.
Vl. JED RUBENFELD'S FREEDOM AND TIME AND REVOLUTION BY
JUDICIARY
About my colleague Jed Rubenfeld and his two books, I shall say very little
in this Introduction. Some of what I have to say I have already said before: "Jed
Rubenfeld is the most gifted constitutional theorist (not to mention the most
elegant legal writer) of his generation." 49 And much of what I want to say, I
hope to say in the Amar-Rubenfeld (or is it the Rubenfeld-Amar?) dialogue
that follows. So, dear reader, read on. The Yale School of Constitutional
Interpretation remains open and in session.
Akhil Reed Amar is the Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
49. This quotation may be found on the dust jacket of Revolution byJudiciary.
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TH AL LAW JO RAL
AKHIL REED AMAR & JED RUBENFELD
A Dialogue
I. THE ORIGINALIST CASE FOR BROWN
J E D R U B E N F E L D: Akhil, you and I have a great deal in common, but also
some fundamental differences, at least in principle. Equal protection doctrine
might provide a good backdrop to make these differences clear. When it comes
to Brown v. Board of Education, our disagreements are not of a fundamental
nature. You're inclined to be much more accepting than I of the claim that the
Fourteenth Amendment was originally understood to bar racial segregation (at
least of some kinds), so you don't see Brown as the revolutionary case that
many of us do. I take Brown to be a clear case of the rejection of an original No
Application Understanding; you don't. But this is not a fundamental
disagreement because, if I understand you correctly, you do not object to my
central thesis: Original No Application Understandings may be rejected when
doing so does justice to the text and the original paradigm cases.1
But you and I do have fundamental disagreements on other matters of
equal protection law, because-again, if I understand you correctly-you
believe in something I don't. You believe in foundational No Application
Understandings, whereas I say that the only foundational paradigm cases are
Application Understandings. For you, the inapplicability of the Fourteenth
Amendment to "political" rights such as voting was part of the original
understanding and remains binding on judges today. In other words, on your
view, the Fourteenth Amendment cannot today be properly read to strike down
racial discrimination in cases involving "political" rights.
With respect to racial discrimination in voting cases, you will of course
point out that the Fifteenth Amendment takes care of things. But doesn't this
1. Thus, I think you also probably accept my basic account of how the First Amendment today
is properly read to strike down blasphemy laws, even if, on the original understanding, the
First Amendment would have had no application to blasphemy laws.
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mean that it would be perfectly constitutional for a state to deny blacks (on the
basis of race) "political" rights other than voting? The Fourteenth Amendment
would not apply because, on your view, you are bound by the original
understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment would have no application to
"political" rights. And the Fifteenth Amendment would not apply, because that
Amendment only concerns the right to vote. Do I state your view correctly? If
so, does this implication of your view cause you any concern? Are there any
examples of other nonvoting political rights that you can think of to which this
view might apply?
A K H I L A M A R: Jed, I like your idea of discussing equal protection issues as a
way of illustrating the similarities and the differences of our approaches. In a
nutshell, I think the Reconstruction Amendments, rightly read, plainly
prohibited Jim Crow in 1896 and 1954. On the other hand, I also believe that
Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment simply does not apply to political
rights such as voting. And so many voting rights and other political rights cases
that the modern Court has analyzed under the Equal Protection Clause would,
I believe, be more properly considered under the Republican Government
Clause of Article IV and various voting rights Amendments, beginning with
the Fifteenth.
If it's okay with you, let's start with the issue of state-mandated racial
segregation-Jim Crow-and then work our way forward toward voting
rights. As I read the text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state
would clearly be prohibited from branding a person as a second-class citizen -
as an inferior -simply because he was born black. (This is the principle that I
believe is affirmed in the Amendment's first sentence.) Thus, a state law whose
candid preamble explicitly proclaimed that black Americans are hereby
declared inferior to white Americans would, I believe, violate the core meaning
of the Amendment. (In this, I think I rather closely follow your paradigm case
method, as you have noted.) The question as of 1896 or 1954 is thus for me a
simple one: Does the regime of Jim Crow-a vast and pervasive system of
racial regulation- in fact proclaim just this message in its purpose, effect, and
social meaning?
My answer to this question is that Jim Crow was, in both 1896 and 1954, a
rather clear case of governmental action seeking to create and reify a
constitutionally impermissible caste structure, a regime of second-class citizens
for those born with dark skin, a vast state program that stretched out its
tentacles to keep blacks down. Jim Crow was never equal in fact or in
purpose -or in how it was perceived by society, both white and black. Such a
system of racial apartheid thus violated the central meaning of the
Reconstruction Amendments.




Of course, I am aware that some - many, in fact - of the supporters of the
Fourteenth Amendment denied that it would ban all forms of segregation. But
many other framers and ratifiers disagreed. More to the point, the precise
nature of the pro-segregation argument that came from the framers and
ratifiers in the 186os does not cause me to read the text of the Amendment as
somehow inapplicable to segregation. Some segregationists claimed that
segregation could and would in fact be equal. But Jim Crow was not equal in
1896 or 1954 and genuine civil equality is the constitutional test, as set out by
the text. Other segregationists may have persuaded themselves that the
Amendment did not apply to formally symmetric laws imposing restrictions on
both races: Blacks over here and Whites over there. But nothing in the text
signals its categorical inapplicability to symmetric laws. True, symmetric laws
are not always and necessarily unequal on my view; but neither are symmetric
laws categorically exempt from the equality test laid down by the text. Yet
other segregationists in 1866 seemed to believe that private schools that
received irregular subsidies would fall outside the ambit of state action. But Jim
Crow circa 1896 and 1954 was undeniably and pervasively the product of state
action. And still other segregationists apparently believed that the Amendment
did not apply to the federal government (including the galleries of Congress
itself). But the first sentence of the Amendment most emphatically did apply to
all governments, as did the companion language of the Civil Rights Act of
1866.2
As I read the historical evidence, none of the segregationist arguments in
1866 were codified into the words of the Amendment itself in a way that
supports Plessy or undercuts Brown. The Amendment's text thus fits better
with the views expressed by its many antisegregationist supporters and
ratifiers. I mention all this because I think you are rather too quick in
dismissing the basic originalist argument for Plessy's wrongness and Brown's
rightness. The arguments that I have made thus far do concededly owe a large
debt to your paradigm-case method - thank you! - but they do not strike me as
wholly nonoriginalist. You seem to think that Brown cannot be defended on
originalist grounds, but I wonder whether I haven't just done so, if a sensible
originalism focuses, as it should, on the text in light of the history (including
what you would describe as No Application Understandings, but focusing on
the pervasiveness and precise content of those historical understandings in
relation to the constitutional text). So before we turn to voting rights, I would
2. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 380-83 (2005) [hereinafter
AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION]; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 195 rl.*, 281-83 (1998) [hereinafter AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS].
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be interested to know whether you find my defense of Brown nonoriginalist or
whether you think it is originalism based on an implausible view of history.
J E D R U B E N F E L D: Certainly you are making an originalist argument. The
question, I suppose, is whether it is convincing-and whether what you say
about racial segregation will undermine your ffirther claim that the Fourteenth
Amendment (Section 1) does not apply to political rights. If by originalism we
meant that a judge should strike down a specific kind of law under a
constitutional prohibition only if there is evidence showing that the framers
and ratifiers specifically so understood the prohibition-or at least that a
majority of them did-then it sounds as if your argument is not convincing.
I am only citing the evidence that everyone cites, but that Congress
provided for racially separate schools in Washington, D.C., as well as allowed
racial segregation in congressional galleries, does in my view argue against the
notion that the Fourteenth Amendment's framers believed that the principles
of equality and citizenship lying behind it required an abolition of racial
segregation.3 As far as the public understanding goes, the maintenance of
racially separate schools in such large northern cities as New York and
Cincinnati (even as integration took place in, say, Chicago) has always seemed
to me to speak pretty seriously against the notion of a shared, common
understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment barred such schools.
Of course, you could take the view that where there was disagreement
among the framers and ratifiers on an issue, and, further, that where the
evidence does not convince you of a dominant, majority understanding on
either side of the issue, an originalist judge is free to go either way, at least so
long as the text permits it. Perhaps you feel that the applicability of the
Fourteenth Amendment to racial segregation belongs in this kind of category.
If that is your view about the state of the historical evidence, I am not sure I
agree with it, but to me - and to you, if I read you correctly - it does not really
matter in the end: Original No Application Understandings have been
jettisoned in many areas of constitutional law. I think you agree with this
3. See, e.g., John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of
the Laws," 1972 WASH. U. L.Q 421, 460-62; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Cultural Crises of the
Fuller Court, 104 YALE L.J. 2309, 2339-43 (1995) (reviewing OWEN M. FiSS, TROUBLED
BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910 (1994)); Michael J. Klarman, Brown,
Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REv. 1881
(1995). Note that the segregation decisions of the Fourteenth Amendment's congressional
framers' reflect their views of the principles underlying that Amendment, regardless of
whether they viewed Section i as a limitation by its own terms on the federal government.




observation, even if you do not agree that the phenomenon is as common as I
have described it.
Moreover, I think we agree about the basic idea that justifies this: Judges
may override original No Application Understandings to do justice to the text
in light of its paradigm cases. So even if there had been an original
understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment would not bar racial
segregation in public schools and other public facilities, neither you nor I
would necessarily view courts as bound by that understanding. We both
believe that the Fourteenth Amendment's paradigm cases are properly read to
stand (at the very core) for the principle that a state may not deliberately brand
or treat blacks as inferior or second-class citizens. We both believe that
"separate but equal" did just that. So we both believe that Brown is justified
regardless of whether it comported with the specific understanding of the
majority of the framers and ratifiers.
Let me just add that I consider this defense of Brown -the paradigm case
defense of Brown -to be an originalist defense. But if I follow you, what we
disagree about is this: Some No Application Understandings, on your view, are
special. They are specially central to the original meaning, and, more than this,
they are reflected in a special way in the text. When there exists a No
Application Understanding of this kind, judges are not free to abandon it.
Racial segregation of particular public facilities does not fall in this category for
you. Even if there had been an original understanding that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not bar racial segregation - in the senatorial gallery or perhaps
even in public schools, for example -such a No Application Understanding
would not have fallen into this special category. So as to racial segregation, I
think you and I do not have to take issue with the history: It does not matter.
By contrast, on your view, the understanding that the Fourteenth
Amendment's prohibitions had No Application to political rights did fall into
this special category. On your view, it was central to the original meaning, and
it was reflected in a special way in the text of Section 1. Do I have this right?
II. VOTING RIGHTS AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
J E D R U B E N F E L D: I am sure you will elaborate this view in your next reply,
but for now another question. If the Fourteenth Amendment, by reference to
its paradigm cases, can be properly read to prohibit states "from branding a
person as a second-class citizen, as an inferior, simply because he was born
black," how will you avoid recognizing that this principle is violated when a
person is denied the vote merely because he was born black? Certainly this
denial brands blacks as "inferior." You will have to say that it doesn't, however,
make them "second-class citizens." But I think you may have a problem here,
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even if voting was not then considered a specific privilege or immunity of
citizenship.
A K H I L A M A R: You pose a great question - and one that I have wrestled with
over the years. But I think that you, too, may have a problem -as may anyone
else who truly seeks to capture the text of the Constitution in a particular way.
Here is one way to put the problem: If the Fourteenth Amendment applies to
voting, then what exactly was all the fuss over the Fifteenth Amendment
about? And how can we make sense of the Fifteenth Amendment's text as
anything more than a supremely curious and clumsy redundancy?
I will eventually try to answer these questions, but let me start-
autobiographically -by tracing my own interpretive journey on these issues.
My initial view was that the text of the Fourteenth Amendment demanded
equality; and that at its core was a prohibition on explicit race-based inequality
that privileged whites over blacks. And what could be more straightforward
than saying that laws explicitly barring blacks from voting (or imposing stricter
standards on black voters) were just like the Black Codes that you and I both
believe were the very laws the Fourteenth Amendment clearly meant to
prohibit?
Then I began to do historical research. I found that the virtually uniform,
highly visible, public pronouncements of the Fourteenth Amendment's
backers - in a vast number of official places and publications - insisted that the
Amendment did not apply to "political rights" such as voting, but rather
encompassed only "civil rights."'4 These pronouncements were central to the
political debate over the Amendment's framing and ratification. Without these
clear public pronouncements -which shaped the American people's
understanding of the pending Fourteenth Amendment-the Amendment
would, I think, have been defeated. But even more significant (for me) was
what these supporters said, and its relationship to the text of the Amendment.
They said that the domain of equality affirmed by the text is limited: The
Amendment extends to civil equality but not political equality.' And, as I shall
explain below, I now see how this near-universal explanation of the
Amendment by its supporters was codified into the Amendment's text and
public meaning.
It is useful to begin by comparing various no-application-to-voting
statements from the 186os to some of the no-application-to-segregation
4. See AMAR, THE BInL OF RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 216-17 & n.* (citing dozens of statements).
S. This is why, at one key point in my earlier comments, I used the phrase "civil equality" as an
important qualification of my anti-Pessy, pro-Brown analysis.




statements from the 186os that I discussed earlier. To repeat, some 186os
segregationists simply said that separate could and would in fact be equal. But
these arguments conceded that true civil equality was the textual test. Other
segregationists, by contrast, seemed to think the Amendment did not apply to
the federal government. But the text of the first sentence does limit all
government, and so did the companion language - almost in haec verba - of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. Moreover, many framers understood this point.6 It's
also worth noting that the applicability of the first sentence of the Amendment
to the federal government was a central feature of some of the first Justice
Harlan's landmark opinions -both for the Court and for himself.7 (So on this
point, I capture both the text and early doctrine.)
Thus, when confronting 1866 pronouncements by the Amendment's
official supporters and sponsors that the Amendment would have No
Application to voting, my initial inclination was to ask, "where does it say that
in the Amendment's text?" And then I began to see the answer-which I would
not have seen but for my willingness to pay heed to paradigmatic No
Application Understandings at the time of enactment (the very sort of data
your approach tends to dismiss, I think.). One point-though not strictly
textual-was that the Amendment was in ordinary everyday parlance referred
to as "the Civil Rights Amendment." The companion Act of 1866 was officially
known as the Civil Rights Act. (Recall that the first sentence of the Fourteenth
Amendment is lifted almost word for word from this Act, which was closely
linked in the public mind to the Amendment itself.) And as noted above, "civil
rights" was used emphatically in contrast to "political rights" such as voting.8
6. Perhaps others did not, in part because the first sentence was a rather late addition to the
Amendment's text.
7. See, e.g., Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 591 (1896) (Harlan, J., majority opinion)
("[T]he Constitution of the United States, in its present form, forbids, so far as civil and
political rights are concerned, discrimination by the General Government, or by the States,
against any citizen because of his race. All citizens are equal before the law. The guarantees
of life, liberty and property are for all persons, within the jurisdiction of the United States,
or of any State, without discrimination against any because of their race. Those guarantees,
when their violation is properly presented in the regular course of proceedings, must be
enforced in the courts, both of the Nation and of the State, without reference to
considerations based upon race."). Note that in his reference to "political rights," Harlan
was of course relying on the Fifteenth Amendment. See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
556 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Gibson).
8. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. S 1981)
(officially captioned as "An Act to protect all Persons in the United States in their Civil
Rights"). The phrase "civil rights" was also used in contrast to "social rights." For me, the
distinction between civil rights and social rights is reflected in two basic Fourteenth
Amendment ideas. First, the Amendment does not automatically apply of its own self-
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2021
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Two more - and clearly textual - points then began to crystallize for me.
First, the Amendment's opening sentence talks about the rights of all citizens
born in America-women as well as men, blacks as well as whites. To be a
citizen is different than being a voter. Women in 1866 were seen by
Republicans as equal birthright citizens who could, for example, sue and be
sued in diversity jurisdiction. The Dred Scott case had said that blacks could
never be citizens (and thus could not invoke diversity jurisdiction). But the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment emphatically rejected Dred Scott's
holding and much of its reasoning; indeed, they tried to overrule it by statute
in the 1866 Civil Rights Act-whose key citizenship sentence later became the
opening sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dred Scott had said that
blacks could not be citizens because they were not allowed to vote in many
places. The Dred Scott dissenters rejected this logic: Equal citizenship rights did
not entail equal voting rights. Civil rights (of blacks and of women) should not
be conflated with political rights, said the Dred Scott dissenters. And the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment apparently agreed with this. They
wrote an Amendment whose domain extended to "civil equality" but not
"political equality." They said that blacks were not improperly demeaned as
citizens when not allowed to vote, just as women were not demeaned as
citizens when disenfranchised. (Of course, this view of the Fourteenth
Amendment must be revisited in light of the later Fifteenth and Nineteenth
Amendments.)
Second, the second sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment fleshed out the
first by elaborating that what it meant to be an equal birthright "citizen" was to
enjoy certain "privileges" and "immunities." Now, as a matter of ordinary
language and plain meaning, the right to vote certainly can be understood as a
"privilege" - and so can the related political rights of jury service, militia
service, and governmental service. But this was plainly not how the supporters
of the Fourteenth Amendment were using these words. (And here again, it is
my focus on paradigmatic No Application Understandings that caused me to
executing force to certain nongovernmental activities. (Hence the state action doctrine,
whose textual font is the opening "No state shall" language of the Amendment's second
sentence.) Second, although Congress does have power under Section 5 to enforce the
equal-birth-citizens idea of the Amendment's opening sentence (which does not use the
phrase "No state shall") against various nongovernmental practices and institutions that
might threaten a regime of equal citizenship, there are real boundaries to this congressional
power. For example, Congress, cannot under Section 5 require private persons to refrain
from race discrimination in private dinner parties and dating. Such "social" practices lie
beyond the domain of equal citizenship, which may extend beyond the strictly governmental
(especially if Congress so provides) but does not apply to highly private spaces governed by
individual associational-social freedom.
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read the text in a different way than you might.) In effect, the Fourteenth
Amendment's supporters were using the phrase "privileges or immunities of
citizens" as a kind of legal term of art closely akin to the usage of a similar
phrase in Article IV. The Article IV phrase promised out-of-staters equality
with in-staters across a wide spectrum of civil rights-of property, speech,
religion, access to courts, and so on-but not political equality in voting,
military service, jury service, or governmental service. A New Yorker visiting
Virginia has as much of a right to speak or to sue as does a Virginian, but the
visitor has no right to vote in Virginia elections. The intratextual linkage
between Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment thus confirms that the text
of the latter likewise applies to civil equality but not political equality.
These two textual points are not just my own idiosyncratic reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment but in fact closely track the textual, historical, and
intratextual arguments explicitly made by the Supreme Court in the 1875 case
of Minor v. Happersett.' So my reading captures both the text and the (early)
doctrine. In Minor, no one even thought to argue that the Equal Protection
Clause applied to voting. Everyone understood that the key clause of Section 1
focused on privileges and immunities of citizens. Textually, the Equal
Protection Clause focused more on the equal application of laws than on the
basic substance of laws. But for me, the key point is that the Equal Protection
Clause is aimed at persons, not citizens, and was understood by all as
paradigmatically focused on the rights of (nonvoting) aliens-a rather
awkward text for voting rights. And if this text, or some other text does indeed
apply to voting, then I come back to my earlier question: What is the Fifteenth
Amendment about, if the Fourteenth already applied to voting?
So here are my questions for you. What do you think of my intratextual
claims about Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment? Can the Amendment
be read as semantically inapplicable to voting? If it can be read this way-and
also can be read more broadly-what is the role of near-universal No
Application Understandings in making the interpretive choice? What is the
role of the precise reasons given for the No Application claim by those who
made this claim in the 186os while the Amendment was still pending? And if
the Fourteenth Amendment really can be stretched to apply to voting,
notwithstanding the near-universal public understanding in 1866-1868, then
just how are we to make sense of the text and enactment history of the
Fifteenth? Is this Amendment, on your view, otiose?
9. 88 U.S. 162 (1874).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal 2023
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
J E D R U B E N F E L D: Your argument sounds as if it were directed to someone
who refused to acknowledge that the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, was
originally intended to have no application to racial discrimination in the
suffrage. But of course I do acknowledge that. Never mind the superfluity of
the Fifteenth Amendment: The framers would never have written Section 2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, imposing political penalties on states that denied
black men the vote, if they thought such denials were already barred by
Section i.
The question, however, is whether it is proper today to read the Fourteenth
Amendment to bar racial discrimination in voting. To me the answer to that
question is obvious: Yes. On the basis of its paradigm cases, the Fourteenth
Amendment is compellingly read to stand, at its core, for the principle that
states cannot deliberately treat blacks as second-class citizens, and denying
blacks the vote plainly violates this principle. In fact, you wrote above that "a
state law whose candid preamble explicitly proclaimed that black Americans
are hereby declared inferior to white Americans would . . . violate the core
meaning of the [Fourteenth] Amendment." Surely a law denying blacks the
vote does just that: It proclaims that black Americans are inferior to white
Americans. I don't quite see how you avoid this conclusion.
Putting that question to you aside, I can think of three different objections
you might make to this conclusion. Here are the objections and my answers to
them.
First, you might say that I disregard the original understanding. If so, I
plead guilty. You already know my answer: This was a No Application
Understanding; modern constitutional law repudiates many original No
Application Understandings; and that's perfecdy legitimate so long as judges
are doing justice to the text in light of its paradigm cases. That's how
revolutions by judiciary come about.
Second, you might be making a further point about the text and the clarity
with which Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment excludes political rights,
once we really understand how that text was originally understood. In other
words, on your view, once we acknowledge that for the framers, voting was not
a privilege or immunity of citizenship -and that the framers chose these terms
of art consciously and precisely to exclude political rights -it must follow that
we cannot read the Fourteenth Amendment to ban racial discrimination in
voting laws. Such a reading of the Fourteenth Amendment would violate, and
make no sense of, the very language we're purporting to interpret.
Honestly, I don't think this objection is as strong as you believe, even on
your own premises. Let me try to persuade you. I grant that the framers and
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not see voting as a privilege or
immunity of citizenship. I will even grant for purposes of this argument that
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these are terms of art in a special sense, so that later interpreters are somehow
semantically barred from ruling that voting is a privilege or immunity of
citizenship. (I don't actually accept this idea, but I'm going to accept it here
arguendo.) Does it follow from these premises that denying the vote to blacks
does not make them second-class citizens?
No. Take the Yale Law School. Let's stipulate that being Dean of the Law
School is not a privilege or immunity of being a professor here. That is, if Yale
Law School Professor X is denied the post, he is not denied a privilege or
immunity of his professorship. Let us add further, hypothetically, that even
eligibility for the deanship is not a privilege of professorship: Perhaps the Yale
Law School deanship is open only to professors who were junior professors
here, have been at Yale for at least twenty years, and teach constitutional law
(now that's really hypothetical). Taking all these facts as true, if Yale Law
School were to enact a rule banning black professors from the deanship, the
school would have made blacks second-class professors. Don't you think?
If so, then simply because voting was not considered to be a privilege or
immunity of citizenship, it does not follow that denying the vote to blacks does
not make them second-class citizens. Quite the contrary: Denying blacks the
vote is an extraordinarily powerful and effective way of treating them as
second-class citizens, even if voting is not itself a privilege or immunity of
citizenship.
If it were true, as you say, that the framers or ratifiers somehow believed
that race-based denials of the vote did not "demean blacks as citizens," this
belief would be, in my view, completely irrelevant. It's wrong, and it's
bottomed on a No Application Understanding, which later interpreters are free
to reject. Once you accept, on the basis of paradigm-case reasoning, that
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment stands at least for the principle you
and I both agree it does stand for -no deliberate treatment of blacks as second-
class citizens-it is no objection to striking down a race-based denial of the vote
that voting is not itself a privilege or immunity of citizenship. In other words,
if the text of the Fourteenth Amendment permits the principle we agree to,
then I think it must permit the result you resist -or at any rate, I think you
have not yet stated a textual (as opposed to historical) argument against that
result.
This is, I think, a problem for you. If the chief way you get to Brown and its
progeny is through the no-second-class-citizenship principle -meaning that
you need that principle to defend the wholesale eradication of "separate but
equal" after Brown-then I think you're in some difficulty, because denying
blacks the vote does make blacks second-class citizens, regardless of whether
voting is itself a privilege or immunity of citizenship. I understand that you
want the no-second-class-citizenship principle to be limited to matters of "civil
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rights"; that you want it limited to denials of rights that are in and of
themselves privileges or immunities of citizens; and that you think that voting
cannot today be interpreted as a privilege or immunity of citizenship. For
present purposes, I'm granting that voting is not a privilege or immunity of
citizenship. But if that's the only textual argument you have for keeping voting
out of the no-second-class-citizenship principle, I do not think you have made
a very strong argument yet.
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment committed themselves and the
nation to more than they bargained for. They committed the nation to
principles of equal citizenship and equal protection of the laws, and these
principles turn out to require more than the framers thought. These principles,
it turns out, plainly require a prohibition on denying blacks the vote - the right
that is today the quintessential right of citizenship. Nothing in the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment rules out this view. On the contrary, the text either
cries out to judges to interpret the concept of citizenship and to deliver their
best account of what the privileges and immunities of citizenship include -or,
at a minimum, it invites precisely the principle that you and I both endorse, the
principle that states cannot deliberately treat blacks as second-class citizens.
This principle fully authorizes judges to strike down racial discrimination in
voting, even if voting is not, in itself, a privilege or immunity of citizenship.
Both the Citizenship Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal
Protection Clause, in my view, support this result. To stick with the Privileges
or Immunities Clause for one moment longer, we might say that (1) one clear
privilege or immunity of citizenship is the right not to be treated as a second-
class citizen; (2) we derive this principle from the Fourteenth Amendment's
paradigm cases; (3) the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment may have held
the view that treatment as second-class citizens did not occur when blacks were
denied political rights, on the theory that political rights were not themselves
privileges or immunities of citizenship; but (4) this view, if they indeed held it,
was logically faulty, morally faulty, is not the only way to do justice to the text,
and reflects a No Application Understanding not binding on subsequent
interpretation.
III. TEXTS AND COMMITMENTS
J E D R U B E N F E L D: Your final objection to my view might derive from the
Fifteenth Amendment. This is a perfectly valid textual point. You are surely
correct that it counts against an interpretation of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment that it makes superfluous both Section 2 of that Amendment and
the entirety of the Fifteenth Amendment. Although this is a good point, in the
end I do not think it is anywhere near sufficient. Intratextualism is a
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methodology I approve of, but our Constitution is not so perfectly wrought a
document that one provision may not be read in such a way as to make another
provision needless. The Tenth Amendment and the Necessary and Proper
Clause basically become superfluous on a certain reading of the latter Clause,
the enumerated Article I, Section 8 powers, and other constitutional
provisions. But I accept that reading, I think you do too, and I think
McCullough does as well. It is a feature of the commitment-based paradigm-
case approach that constitutional rights and powers can come to mean more
than they were originally intended to mean. If that is true, then it becomes
quite possible for constitutional right A to come to mean something that
duplicates constitutional right B. That is what has happened with the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
The reading of the Fourteenth Amendment that I endorse is not, however,
otiose or merely duplicative of the Fifteenth. On my view- and of course on
most people's view- the Fourteenth Amendment easily and naturally is read to
prohibit racial discrimination with respect to all "political" rights, including
those not covered by the Fifteenth. Thus for me Strauder v. West Virginia,"° in
which the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited states from
excluding blacks from jury service, is an easy case and a strong, clear example
of the kind of paradigm-case reasoning I advocate. You, on the other hand,
have to take the view that Strauder's holding is wrong: The Fourteenth
Amendment has no application to jury service, because jury service is a
"political right."
To be sure, you will say that Strauder was rightly decided, but only because
you have some very interesting arguments to make showing that the Fifteenth
Amendment is properly read to cover jury service. But you are in the position
of having to say either that the Fifteenth Amendment covers all "political"
rights, including those that do not seem to involve voting (for example, militia
service and governmental service) - to me, a pretty doubtful proposition - or
else you will have to invoke some other clause somewhere else in the
Constitution to explain why states cannot deny blacks "political" rights. I am
not saying you cannot make these arguments, but do you not find them a little
strained-perhaps a little goal-oriented? To me, the much stronger, eminently
justified, and satisfying position is that the Fourteenth Amendment bars this
kind of blatant discrimination, the purpose of which would be to treat blacks as
inferiors and as second-class citizens. The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection and Citizenship Clauses committed the nation to eradicating such
laws, even if all the requirements of this commitment were not fully
10. 100 U.S. 303 (188o).
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understood at the time of enactment, and even if the framers believed they had
produced a text that did not include them.
A K H I L A M A R: Jed, your comments nicely illustrate the differences between
your methodology and mine. Candidly, I do worry about how your approach
seems to create a kind of bait-and-switch in the actual process of drafting and
ratifying amendments: The American public agrees to one set of publicly
understood rules, codified in the very words of the amendment, and then
judges say, "Aha! You forgot to say 'Simon Says!"'
Let me elaborate my uneasiness with your approach by sticking with our
case studies involving the Fourteenth Amendment's application or
nonapplication to segregation and voting. On segregation, I do not see the
national conversation in the 186os as one in which the Amendment's
supporters universally said, "the civil equality norm will not apply to
segregation." Rather, some supporters in effect said that "segregation does not
necessarily violate civil equality" and other supporters disagreed.' The two
sides of this debate did not uniformly treat the Amendment's text as if it said:
"Civil equality-but segregation laws are categorically exempt from this
command." But in the voting context, I do think that this is how the text was
almost universally defended and understood by both sides: "Civil equality-
but emphatically not political equality." Had the Amendment's framers drafted
and ratified a text that explicitly said "This amendment does not apply to
political rights" then surely judges would be bound by this semantic No
Application, even on your view, right? My claim is essentially a semantic one:
The Amendment's framers did say this, once one understands how they were
using words. Granted, they did not use the words "no political rights" but they
did use a legal term of art that, in the great national conversation of the 186os,
meant the same thing: "privileges or immunities of citizens" la Article IV. 2
As a formal matter, the Fifteenth Amendment can be read as declaratory, as
can the Tenth Amendment, and (later) the Twenty-Fourth. But the Tenth was
widely understood as declaratory when adopted, whereas virtually no one
thought the Fifteenth was merely declaratory and redundant of the Fourteenth
when both Amendments were drafted, debated, and ultimately ratified. So
your approach does rather less justice to history and to the actual deeds of the
ii. See Klarman, supra note 3; Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation
Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995).
12. Had the Amendment explicitly declared its inapplicability to political rights, your argument
about the invidious social meanings of racial disenfranchisement would, I think, be too
clever by half-an evasion of the clear limits on the Amendment's scope. For me, the same is
true of your argument as applied to the Amendment as it was actually drafted and ratified.
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American people in the amendment process than does a more standard
originalism focusing on the text, in light of the history and how Americans in
the amendment process actually used words.
On your view, should judges have properly held race-based suffrage laws
unconstitutional in 1868, one day after the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment? Given your view that such laws, with their strong message of
racial inequality, violate the Fourteenth Amendment's core principle-its
central paradigm case -then surely you must believe that courts were obliged
to strike down such laws from day one. And if so, shouldn't they also have held
sex-based suffrage laws unconstitutional, since these laws, too, could be said to
reflect an impermissible governmental declaration of women's inferiority as a
matter of birth status ?13 Of course, woman suffrage was the very issue litigated
in Minor v. Happersett, in which, as I have mentioned, the Court unanimously
argued that the text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment, and its
intratextual echo of the language of Article IV, all made clear that the
Amendment did not enfranchise women.1 4
As for Strauder, I believe that its result is correct and that in fact it failed to
go far enough -it prohibited race discrimination in juries only in cases with
black defendants. In a landmark 1875 law, Congress had already gone further,
prohibiting race discrimination in all juries, state and federal, regardless of the
race of the defendant. And this law explicitly echoed the language of the
Fifteenth Amendment -in keeping with my view that this Amendment was
indeed understood to embrace voting rights in a wide variety of political
contexts -the right to vote for governmental officials, to be sure, but also the
right to vote in various government bodies such as legislatures and juries. 5
13. The Fourteenth Amendment's text did not speak merely of race discrimination but of birth
equality more generally-and was so understood by many of its framers and ratifiers, as I
have argued. See AMAR, AMEicA's CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 383-85, 392-95; AMAR,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 215-18, 239-41, 245-46, 26o-61, 293-94.
14. The Waite Court's logic in this case also seemed to imply that the Fourteenth Amendment
likewise did not enfranchise black men.
is. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XV ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.") (emphasis added), with Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, S 4, 18 Stat. 335,
336 ("[N]o citizen... shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of
the United States, or of any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition ofservitde.... ")
(emphasis added). In three earlier Reconstruction statutes, Congress had likewise linked the
language of the Fifteenth Amendment to the right to hold office. See Virginia Readmission
Act of Jan. 26, 1870, ch. 12, 16 Stat. 62, 63 ("[ilt shall never be lawful for the said State to
deprive any citizen of the United States, on account of his race, color, or previous condition of
servitude, of the right to hold office") (emphasis added); Mississippi Readmission Act of
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Language is sometimes metaphoric, and legal language is no different. For
example, in the Fifth Amendment, "life and limb" can be read literally-in
which case double jeopardy is permitted outside cases of death and
dismemberment. But "life and limb" can also be read more metaphorically, to
apply to all serious criminal punishment. I think the latter reading makes more
sense of the framers' and ratifiers' basic purposes, as I have explained
elsewhere.16 In the Fifteenth Amendment context, I do indeed believe that the
"right to vote" was understood- for a variety of overlapping and interlocking
reasons that I shall not repeat here but that I have catalogued in both America's
Constitution'7 and The Bill of Rights8 and that have been extensively
documented in works by other scholars as well' 9 - as encompassing political
rights more generally.
Once Americans agreed to the Fifteenth Amendment, then it might well be
the case that good interpreters should read the Fourteenth more expansively
than they would have otherwise -just as, on my view, good interpreters should
read the Fourteenth more expansively once the Nineteenth Amendment was
ratified. (More on this below.) But if we today should read the Fourteenth
Amendment to mean far more than it meant to ratifying Americans in 1868, it
is, on my view, largely because these later Amendments (the Fifteenth and
Nineteenth) are doing much of the heavy lifting. As a way of sharpening this
point, I return to my questions about what a good judge should have done
about black suffrage and women suffrage one day after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment (and long before America had agreed to the letter and
spirit of the later Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments).
JE D R U B E N F E LD: On bait-and-switch: "We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness.. .. " The man who wrote this sentence owned slaves, as
did many of the men who signed the text in which it appears, as did the people
for whom they claimed to speak. Men are capable of holding principles whose
Feb. 23, 1870, ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67, 68 (same); Texas Readmission Act of Mar. 30, 1870, ch. 39,
16 Star. 80, 81 (same).
16. See Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 1o6 YALE L.J. 1807, 1810-12 (1997).
11. AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 400 & n.*, 612 n. io6.
is. AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 94-96, 273-74 & n.*; see also AKHHL REED AmAR,
THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 167-68 (1997).
ig. See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80
CORNELL L. REv. 203 (1995); Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Hybrid Nature of
Political Rights, So STAN. L. REV. 915 (1998).
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full implications they do not want to accept. Men are capable of committing
such principles to writing. Sometimes they do so in constitutions. When they
do, later interpreters are not constrained to put on the blinders of the past; the
blinders of the present will be quite sufficient.
If the Declaration's most famous sentence had been written into the
Constitution, it would not have been improper for a court, a century later, to
hold that this language outlawed slavery. On the contrary, a court that did not
so hold would fail to do justice to the text. And this would be true, on my view,
no matter how often the framers of that text had made public statements that
the text did not outlaw slavery, no matter how clearly they said that they had
chosen these words because these words had been used before by people who
didn't believe they outlawed slavery, and no matter how widespread that No
Application Understanding became in the public conversation surrounding the
enactment.
This is not bait-and-switch. The framers of a constitutional text can always
use narrower, less majestic, less principled language. No one stops them.
Certainly it is not as if the courts lure constitution-makers into grand
statements of principle, promising a narrow construction only to laugh in their
faces later. By the 186os, if not well before, the capacity of courts to interpret
broad constitutional language broadly was well established. The framers knew
Marbury v. Madison; they knew McCollough v. Maryland, which explicitly says
that courts should construe broad constitutional language broadly; and so on.
By contrast, the requirement that judges must construe constitutional
provisions in accordance with specific original intentions was not then any
better established than it is today.
If the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had wanted to enshrine or
entrench the states' right to deny blacks the vote, they could have easily done
so. For example, they could have added a Section 6, providing: "The
enumeration of certain rights in this amendment shall not be construed to deny
or disparage the power of the several states to deprive the Negro of the right to
vote or of any other political right." Why did they not do this, if they wanted to
be absolutely certain that no court would ever construe the Fourteenth
Amendment to cover so-called political rights? Perhaps they could not stomach
it. Perhaps they actually did not want to impose that prohibition on later
interpreters. We cannot know. The answer, "They didn't think it was
necessary," is plainly insufficient. To begin with, it makes them seem like
fools: See, once again, Strauder v. West Virginia, in which the Court would in
fact, just twelve years later, interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to strike
down a state law denying blacks what you say was originally understood as a
"political" right, not a "civil" right (jury service). More importantly, an excess
of caution is always possible and usually prudent when constitutional framers
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are genuinely insistent on a particular construction of their text -as the Tenth
Amendment illustrates. For whatever reason, the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment didn't include a Section 6. In the absence of such a prohibition,
judges have full authority to do justice to the principle committed to writing.
Indeed, that is their job.
In my view, the argument we are having is not semantic. It concerns the
nature of commitment. The Fourteenth Amendment makes no commitment to
any state power to deny blacks the vote. To be sure, the Amendment was
originally understood not to forbid that particular brand of racism. But it made
no commitment to that effect. Judges are bound only by the Constitution's
commitments -which, in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment, includes a
commitment to the equal protections of the laws and against the abridgment of
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. Judges are called
on to do justice to these commitments even if that means reversing original No
Application Understandings.
But in a way you agree to most of this. You are willing to read the Fifteenth
Amendment broadly, perhaps even "metaphorically," to cover all political
rights. In my view, what you are doing is elaborating a broad principle from
the paradigm case - the right to vote. As a matter of fact, you make the
Fifteenth Amendment cover matters- like militia and governmental service -
that seem to me to go further toward "switching" its text, from what it actually
says to something quite different, than I am prepared to accept. (I think I'm
much more of a textualist than you!) You do the same for women under the
Nineteenth Amendment. I gather that you are willing to go beyond literal or
plain meaning here because you think that it conforms to the framers' and
ratifiers' own interpretation, at some level of generality, of what they were
doing.
AKHIL A MAR: A few quick responses. As for what the Court said in 188o, I
find it far less plausible as an accurate account of the original meaning of the
Amendments that Congress proposed, and that Americans ratified, in the
186os and 1870s than what Congress itself said and did in its landmark statute
of 1875-which, to repeat, prohibited race-based jury discriminations based on
language directly borrowed from the Fifteenth Amendment, not the
Fourteenth. Not coincidentally, Congress thereby protected black rights more
expansively than did the Strauder Court. Only three years after Strauder, the
Supreme Court went on to repudiate other sections of the 1875 statute in the
infamous Civil Rights Cases of 1883. I say "infamous" because much of what the
majority said in this case-over a passionate and brilliant dissent by Justice
Harlan-is hard to square with the Fourteenth Amendment's text and
enactment history. In general, the post-Reconstruction Court is not an
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infallible guide to the original meaning of the Reconstruction Amendments -
see, for example, the Slaughterhouse Cases, the Civil Rights Cases, and Plessy. But,
then again, there is Minor v. Happersett, which did in my view cohere with the
Amendment's text and enactment history.
This points up another difference between your approach and mine: You
are rather more generous to the Court. I am often more skeptical, focused as I
am on the original meaning of the Constitution itself as ordained and then
amended. Almost none of the judges on the post-Reconstruction Court were
themselves open supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment when it was
pending.2" And history was moving at lightening speed in these years. What
was politically impossible to propose as a constitutional amendment in 1866 -
universal race-neutral suffrage-was in fact the core of an amendment
proposed only three years later. Conversely, many of the promises of the
Reconstruction Amendments were simply not fulfilled by Justices hearing cases
several years after the promises were in fact made.
IV. WRITERS AND INTERPRETERS OF THE CONSTITUTION
J E D R U B E N F E L D: I wonder if you can make the same defense, though, of the
quite fancy move in which you read back from the Nineteenth Amendment to
reinterpret the Fourteenth Amendment in such a way as to jettison original No
Application Understandings concerning sex discrimination. If I understand
your view, the Nineteenth Amendment, which speaks of the right to vote, ends
up not only guaranteeing women all "political" rights (including rights that
only "metaphorically" involve voting), but also guaranteeing women, through
a retroactive effect on the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, equal "civil"
rights as well. Is it your claim that this is how the makers of the Nineteenth
Amendment interpreted what they were doing?
On my view, their interpretation is not what counts. The words they
committed to writing count; their paradigm cases count. But the writers of a
constitutional text are not, in our system, its interpreters. You claim to give
much more weight to the framers' and ratifiers' interpretation of their own
texts than I. For me, their interpretation is simply irrelevant.
You ask a good question about whether, on my view, a judge the day after
enactment ought to have read the Fourteenth Amendment to bar segregation
or to block racist voting laws. I have two answers. First, it will usually be the
case that if an original interpretation of a constitutional provision was
20. See Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, The Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 655-78 (1994).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal 2033
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
genuinely universal, judges will share it. (Indeed, there's something suspicious
for me in the claim that your no-political-rights interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment was so "universal" in 1867 that the words of the
Amendment could not "semantically" have been understood in any other way,
given that all but two Justices of the Supreme Court in I88o didn't follow that
interpretation.) Second, judges probably ought in most cases to stick to
genuinely widespread, clearly intended meanings in the period directly
following enactment. A new constitutional enactment needs time to work its
way into the real fabric of society before the nation can be described as fully
committed to it. After time passes, the binding force of the commitment is no
longer open to doubt, and judges will be in a better position to assess whether
the intended Application Understandings are enough or whether the
commitment in reality requires more than was originally understood.
A K H I L A MAR: As for the sex discrimination question, I believe that the
Fourteenth Amendment as originally written was in fact far more attentive to
issues of sex discrimination than is conventionally understood; and that the
Nineteenth Amendment did indeed regloss the Fourteenth Amendment's text
with an additional egalitarian overlay. A great many Americans pondering the
Nineteenth Amendment when it was proposed did in fact understand its
relevance to issues of jury composition, legislative eligibility, and other political
rights. There is rather a lot of history here that is quite revealing.2 And as for
issues of military service, additional constitutional texts come into play-
including the Second Amendment, which reflects the ideal that in a sound
republic ("a free state") the military force ("the militia") should look like the
voters ("the people") and the voters should constitute the military. This isn't
the place to rehearse the entire argument exploring linkages between voting
rights and military service-I've done so at length elsewhere'- but the
argument does reflect my desire to understand the Constitution holistically, to
see how different provisions adopted at different times cohere to form one
supreme law.
In your own way, I know that you, too, aspire to holism, and to textualism.
Where I think we disagree is how enactment history comes into the picture,
and how much we should trust, and defer to, judicial doctrine that breaks free
21. See AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 426-28, 619-21 nn.5o-54; Amar &
Brownstein, supra note 19.
22. AmAR, THE BIL OF RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 48-49 & n.*; Akhil Reed Amar, The Second
Amendment: A Case Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 2ooi UTAH L. REV. 889; see also
AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 17, 19, 67, 322-26, 358, 373, 376, 396-97,
400,424-25, 445-47, 607 n. 51.
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from that history. But these differences should not obscure our similarities.
And so let me end where you began, by acknowledging that "you and I have a
great deal in common." Jed, I cannot tell how much it warms my heart to hear
you describe yourself as "much more of a textualist" than I am. I am truly
grateful for your company.
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MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN
How To Interpret the Constitution
(and How Not To)
INTRODUCTION: IS ORIGINAL MEANING MEANINGFUL?
I am honored to have been invited to write a joint review of two fascinating
new books about constitutional law by two distinguished scholars at the Yale
Law School- Professor Akhil Amar and Professor Jed Rubenfeld. It is
something of a daunting task: It is difficult to imagine two more sharply
contrasting approaches to the Constitution than Amar's America's Constitution:
A Biography and Rubenfeld's Revolution by Judiciary: The Structure of American
Constitutional Law. Professor Amar's tome (628 pages) is directed to explicating
the original meaning and history of the Constitution -all of it!- but does not
purport to offer a theory about how to reconcile that meaning with modern
practice that often departs from it. Professor Rubenfeld's slim book (231 pages)
offers a theory to justify modern practice, but it is a theory largely divorced
from the Constitution's text, structure, and history. In a real sense, these
offerings are two ships passing in the constitutional night.
In this double-barreled Commentary on both books, I (generally) praise
Amar's magnificent scholarship on the Constitution's original meaning and
(generally) question the usefulness of high-theory constitutional law
scholarship, like Rubenfeld's, that slights consideration of the Constitution's
text, structure, and history. If the overall Commentary has a unifying theme, it
is that questions of the Constitution's meaning must precede theories about its
application- and that the document must direct and constrain constitutional
theory and practice, not the other way around.
I thus begin with the book about the Constitution's words and phrases,
and their original meaning. Part I considers America's Constitution, embracing
many of Professor Amar's specific conclusions and championing his approach
to the study of the Constitution. Part II critiques the Revolution by Judiciary
advocated by Professor Rubenfeld and concludes with a prescription for
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reconciling-or, perhaps more precisely, for not reconciling-the Constitution's
original meaning with modern constitutional practice that departs from that
meaning. Professor Amar's book does not truly offer such a prescription,
though its implicit message is that something has got to give. My contention
will be that it is the practice that must give way, not the original meaning of the
Constitution. Professor Rubenfeld's book offers a different prescription-a
wrong one, in my view: the Constitution must give way to practice, at least
some of the time, in the manner Rubenfeld thinks indicated by his novel grand
theory of constitutional law.
Each half of the Commentary could stand on its own as a separate essay,
and I have given each its own subtitle and substructure. What unites the two
Parts (aside from being reviews of two recent books by two notable
constitutional scholars at the Yale Law School) is a question implicit in both
Amar's project and Rubenfeld's argument: Does the original meaning of the
Constitution matter? If it does, Akhil Amar's work is one of enormous scholarly
and practical importance and Jed Rubenfeld's borders on irrelevant. If it does
not, then Amar's massive scholarship is a massive waste of ink and brainpower,
and we should spend our time pondering clever theories like Rubenfeld's.
I. THE BEST BOOK ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION IN TWO HUNDRED
YEARS
Akhil Amar's America's Constitution: A Biography is the second best book
ever written about the U.S. Constitution.
The best, of course, is The Federalist-but this may be unfair, as it requires
counting a coauthored serial work (by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and
James Madison) that first appeared as a series of newspaper essays, later
collected into a single volume. Still, The Federalist, considered as a whole,
counts as the most important single exposition of the U.S. Constitution,
masterfully, lucidly, and colorfully written by a marvelous composite political
and constitutional theorist ("Publius"); definitive, or nearly so, in its treatment
of its subject (though not without its doubtful points); unsullied by trendiness
or time-bound matters of little significance; and, justifiably, of enduring
influence on all subsequent understanding, interpretation, and application of
the Constitution.
But America's Constitution comes in an amazingly, almost disturbingly,
dose second. Many of the same things can be said of America's Constitution as
can be said of The Federalist. America's Constitution is an absolutely spectacular,
magnificent work of scholarship. It is encyclopedic in its knowledge, dazzling
in its insights, definitive (or nearly so) in its treatment of topic after topic, lucid
and comprehensive without being ponderous, pretentious, or tedious in the
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slightest. It is, other than The Federalist, the best book on the U.S. Constitution
ever written, bar none, bound to become a standard reference for constitutional
scholars for decades to come. It beats out for second place on the all-time
constitutional hit list such distinguished rivals as Joseph Story's three-volume
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1891) (#3) (comprehensive
and brilliant, but often tendentious); Alexis de Toqueville's Democracy in
America (Vol. I) (1838) (#4) (not as comprehensive in its discussion of the
Constitution, but unfailingly sound); and James Kent's four-volume
Commentaries on American Law (1826-1830) (#5) (excellent but lengthy and
imperfect).1
Rounding out my personal top-ten list are: (#6) 1-2 DAvID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE SUPREME COURT (1985-1990); and (#7) 1-5 DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
CONGRESS (1997-2001). These works comprise the best modem systematic discussion of
constitutional doctrine, as developed by the Supreme Court and by Congress, and not
incidentally, some of the best analysis of the Constitution itself ever written.
(#8) DON E. FEHRENBACER, TE DRED ScoTr CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN
LAW AND POLITICS (1978). This is the best book ever written about a single Supreme Court
case and, more than that, an amazing explication of antebellum constitutional law and legal
thought, with special focus on the signal constitutional issue of the day, slavery. Though
there are many books about constitutional law that are limited to specific subjects, I think
this the best of the bunch, and the only one worthy of inclusion on a list of the ten best
books about the Constitution.
(#9) JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1996). This is an outstanding book about the ideas behind the
Constitution, but less good in its framing chapters about "originalist" interpretive method,
and, because of its period limitation, not as broad-gauged as America's Constitution.
(#io) LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988, 3d ed.
2000). Tribe's treatise is almost literally encyclopedic in its treatment of constitutional
doctrine, an intellectual tour de force whose brilliance is somewhat counterbalanced by its
decidedly leftward ideological tilt and its overly doctrinal and less textual approach. Still,
whatever one's quarrels with Tribe, and whatever one's disappointment with his decision to
give up on the second volume of his third edition (each successive edition improved on the
previous), the stature and quality of this work cannot be ignored in listing the most
important books about the Constitution.
Honorable mentions include Alexander Bickel's The Least Dangerous Branch: The
Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (1962), which remains the most eloquent, and best liberal
defense of a moderately activist role for the Supreme Court in molding the Constitution,
and must be ranked a very good book about the Constitution (which stars in a supporting
role only); John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (198o) is in
much the same vein, less eloquent, but more charming and more concerned with the
Constitution's text (to a point); Christopher Wolfe's The Rise of Modern Judicial Review
(1994) is the best conservative critique of the rise of judicial doctrine and corresponding fall
of the document and is, indirectly, an excellent book about the latter; Harry Kalven, Jr.'s A
Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988) is a magnificent
book about First Amendment doctrine in the Supreme Court; Paul Brest and Sanford
Levinson's Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking (2d ed. 1983) is the best of the modem
casebooks in its serious treatment of constitutional text and history, and in attention to
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An admission of bias, which may lead some to discount my praise a few
notches: Akhil Amar is an old friend of mine. We were accidental roommates at
Yale Law School during our second year of law school, a little over twenty years
ago. (His scheduled roommate didn't show up; I was transferring in and
needed a room.) We talked and argued much that year and the next (Amar is a
liberal Democrat; I am a conservative Republican) and have remained in touch
since then. I have been a fan of his career and his scholarship-perhaps more so
than many of our generation, whose views should be discounted, too, for latent
envy and resentment: Amar tends to make the rest of us look like decidedly
dimmer bulbs. In defense of my credibility, I have said harsh things about him
in print before, and would not hesitate to do so again.2 Like the skunk at a
picnic, nothing would give me greater pleasure than to stink him up in the
pages of his home law journal, if I thought he deserved it.
But he does not-not for America's Constitution. This is an absolutely
spectacular book about the Constitution, better than any of Amar's earlier
work-more mature, more fully realized, less self-congratulatory in tone, less
tendentious, less subject to the criticism of being too-clever-by-half and
seeking the ingenious, but borderline-foolish, answer. None of those critiques,
each of which could be leveled to some degree against certain of Amar's earlier
works, is fairly leveled against America's Constitution: A Biography. This is the
best thing Akhil Amar has ever written, by a considerable distance-and his
earlier work is undeniably dazzling, if occasionally too much so. I have quipped
interpretations by institutions other than the Supreme Court, though its later additions
suffer from creeping doctrinalism.
I would place The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, edited by Roy P. Basler
somewhere high on this list, if I could squeeze it into my category demands of a unified
(even if multi-volume) work. I have written elsewhere that Lincoln is the most important
constitutional interpreter in our nation's history. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as
Constitutional Interpretation, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 691, 692-93, 726 (2004). The complete works
of Alexander Hamilton would also qualify, if the category were construed that broadly. But
then we'd really have to count the collected judicial opinions of Chief Justice John Marshall,
and suddenly we're on a slippery slope away from true books about the Constitution.
2. I reviewed one of Amar's earlier books, three-fourths favorably, but with some pointed
attacks. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Dirty Harry and the Real Constitution, 64 U. CHI. L. REV.
1457 (1997) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997)) [hereinafter Paulsen, Dirty Harry]. At a symposium for the
thirtieth anniversary of Roe v. Wade, I savaged his absurd concurring opinion and called him
(in print and in public) "a coward and a collaborator" in acquiescing to a moral and
constitutional travesty on the most flimsy and highly idiosyncratic reasoning imaginable.
See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Paulsen, J., Dissenting, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE
SAID: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S MOST CONTROVERSIAL
DECISION 196, 213, 216-17 n.9 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) [hereinafter Paulsen, Paulsen, J.,
Dissenting].
2040 Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
115:20 37 20o6
HOW TO INTERPRET THE CONSTITUTION (AND HOW NOT TO)
to friends and colleagues that Akhil Amar is one-hundred-and-ten percent
brilliant, but that the last ten percent is often wrong. America's Constitution is
only one-hundred percent brilliant. It shaves off Amar's earlier tendencies to
extremeness and cleverness for its own sake. It pares down the fourth-best
arguments in support of a position, leaving only things that, for the most part,
make entire sense. It avoids a self-promoting tone that calls attention to itself.
There is, almost, nothing wrong with this book.
A roadmap for the rest of this part of the review: Section A offers a more
detailed description of Amar's project and why it generally succeeds so
spectacularly. (It also contains at least one point of strong criticism.)
Section B offers some thoughts on the book's subtitle: A Biography. The
notion that the Constitution as a document has a "life story" is a fine insight.
But care should be taken that nobody misappropriate Amar's work in support
of the interpretive license often associated with those who invoke the
Constitution as a living, organic document whose words' meaning changes at
the behest of modern interpreters. There is always a danger that a great book
will be cited for its title, not studied for its content, and that a shorthand
summary will displace its true words. America's Constitution is originalist-
textualist in its methodology, not a brief for roving interpretive updates. No
one who actually reads the book will make this mistake.
Section C argues that, for a true student of the Constitution, it would be
better to read Amar than to spend a year plowing through a standard law
school con-law casebook. I make the case for a Great Books approach to
studying the Constitution in law schools, either as a supplement to or as a
replacement for the current case method of study, and for inclusion of Amar's
book as part of a Great Books and Great Cases curriculum for studying the
Constitution.
A. Amar's Project
Part of what makes America's Constitution: A Biography distinctive is its
faithfulness to the Constitution's text. The narrative is organized by the text -
by the document, not by cases. The book is about the meaning of the
Constitution's words, not about the Supreme Court or its decisions (except,
from time to time, as cases help illustrate an insight into textual meaning). The
first appendix is the text itself- an annotated Constitution, with margin note
page number references to Amar's discussion of the language.
Surprisingly, one can think of few books about the U.S. Constitution that
focus on the document itself, other than treatises -and not all treatises even do
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this.' Most books about the Constitution are not about the Constitution, but
about judicial doctrine, institutional practice, or specific constitutional issues.
Thus, part of what makes it relatively easy to rank Amar's book so high on the
all-time list of books about the Constitution is that there are so few of them.
Amar's book is treatise-like in its organization, breadth, and
comprehensiveness, but immensely superior in terms of readability and
accessibility: Imagine a treatise that reads like a great historical narrative-or,
as Amar's subtitle not inaccurately advertises, "a biography." The combination
of excellent textual exegesis and good historical storytelling make this volume
singular.
America's Constitution proceeds patiently, almost effortlessly, through the
text, in the text's order: The Preamble-the act of "ordainment" and
constitutional creation; Article I's creation of Congress and its legislative
powers; Article II's creation of a unitary executive with sweeping powers;
Article III's creation of an independent and powerful judiciary, but not one that
is supreme over other interpreters; Article IV's important rules of state-state
and state-nation relationship; Article V's amendment process; Article VI's
designation of the document as "supreme Law of the Land" and its
implications; Article VII's rules of recognition for when the new system of
government would come into being (the bookend to the Preamble, in the
original document); the movement for and broad themes underlying the Bill of
Rights; the stories of early missteps leading to the Eleventh and Twelfth
Amendments; the story of Lincoln, Civil War, and Reconstruction as the
Constitution came to be made more perfect (or at least less imperfect) in the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments; and the "Progressive
Reforms" and "Modern Moves" leading to the amendments adopted in the
twentieth century. It is the story, with excellent color commentary, of the
meaning of the words of the Constitution, both the original document and the
words we, the people, have added to it over time.
Amar covers virtually everything of importance in the Constitution in a
relatively compact book (477 pages of text, with another 18o of notes,
appendices, and index).' On issue after issue, Amar takes complicated,
seemingly intractable issues and masterfully distills them into a few pages or
even a few paragraphs. On some points he offers a sharp viewpoint, sometimes
original and sometimes an encapsulation of received wisdom he accepts. On
3. Laurence Tribe's important treatise, American Constitutional Law, is primarily organized
according to doctrinal themes, not according to the Constitution's text. Its focus is judicial
doctrine, not constitutional text.
4- I note below some small concerns with the relative thinness of the coverage of the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
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other points, he avoids staking out too strong a view (even where he has done
so in other academic writing, which he relegates to endnote citations), framing
the issues and disputes and reducing them to their critical elements but leaving
to the reader the ultimate judgment as to which view is stronger. As a result,
constitutional scholars of contrasting views and approaches will find support in
America's Constitution for their preferred interpretations. But Amar will only
carry them eighty percent of the way -and usually for good reason.
If the book is vulnerable to one big-picture criticism, it would be that Amar
sometimes does not follow through far enough with the full implications of an
insight. But that is perhaps to wish that Amar had created a better brawl rather
than a better book. It is hard to fault Amar for restraint and modesty. America's
Constitution is more authoritative for all that it says in part because of all that it
refrains from saying. Similarly, Amar is ruthlessly disciplined - to a fault - in
avoiding current events distractions from his main objective of explicating the
Constitution's text and the stories that gave rise to the meaning of its words.
Even where they could appear and perhaps enhance the discussion, Amar
avoids Bush v. Gore, the Clinton impeachment, and Roe v. Wade. In doing so,
he sacrifices some contemporary punch for overall credibility.
But there is certainly more than enough excellent material in America's
Constitution. The list of important constitutional issues on which Amar's
discussion is definitive, or nearly so, is remarkable. Amar's exposition of Article
I's representation formulas and their political effects brings a seemingly dull
issue to life. His discussion of national legislative powers is insightful and
refreshingly slim, gracefully explaining the commerce, spending, and
necessary-and-proper powers and their moderate-nationalist implications
without the tedium that so often accompanies law school casebook treatments.
Amar's exposition of Article II's grant of "the executive Power" to a single,
unitary President with control over all executive subordinates, broad power as
military Commander-in-Chief, and a constitutional interpretive power of
"executive review," parallel to the courts' power of judicial review, is absolutely
marvelous. This is perhaps the only rigorous, principled defense of a strong
constitutional executive penned by a liberal Democrat in half a century. Amar's
insights into the President's powers of treaty formation, termination, and
application, and the status of treaties in the "supreme law of the Land"
hierarchy of Article VI, are novel and interesting.' Overall, Amar's treatment of
5. Amar floats the proposition, briefly, that treaties may be subordinate to statutes in Article
VI's hierarchy of federal law (rather than being of equal status and governed by a last-in-
time rule, as current doctrine alleges). This is a seemingly sleepy proposition with enormous
implications for a vast array of important statutes and treaties. For the definitive untangling
and reordering of this complicated area, one must repair to the work of one of Amar's
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the Presidency is one of the best constitutional analyses I have ever read,
including Alexander Hamilton' s.
6
Amar's treatment of Article III, the Eleventh Amendment, and sovereign
immunity is an excellent (and more accessible) summation of Amar's earliest
academic work.' His defense of the propriety of a meaningful, substantive
check on judicial appointments by the Senate is tightly argued in a single
paragraph. 8 His rejection of judicial supremacy is brave, if understated. To be
sure, its implications could have been more fuilly explored -he straddles the
issue somewhat, but appears to accept the supremacy of judicial judgments.9
Amar offers straightforward accounts of Article lV's Full Faith and Credit,
Privileges and Immunities, and Guarantee Clauses, making clear provisions of
the original Constitution that have left many constitutional scholars befuddled.
His treatment of the Article V amendment process, ignored in most
constitutional texts, is insightful and provocative, without swinging as wildly
as some of his earlier work in this area.'0 He tells well the story of the Twelfth
Amendment's roots in the Jefferson-Burr-Adams near-fiasco election of 18oo,
the Amendment's correction of one problem but simultaneous enhancement of
the political power of slave states, and the irony that it enabled the election-
once-of an anti-slavery northern, sectional president who received less than
forty percent of the popular vote and went on to free the slaves.
Amar's treatment of the Constitution's provisions concerning slavery is
quite simply the best I have ever read. The three-fifths compromise, in its full
former students. See Vasan Kesavan, The Three Tiers of Federal Law, loo Nw. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006).
6. There is a small chink when Amar discusses the constitutional standard for impeachment,
however: Amar wrote in defense of President Clinton during Clinton's impeachment;
though he does not discuss the Clinton case specifically in this book, one senses a slight
trimming of Amar's analysis to fit his earlier academic advocacy. AKHiL REED AAR,
AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 198-204 (2005).
7. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); Akhil Reed
Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65
B.U. L. REv. 205 (1985).
8. AMAR, supra note 6, at 220.
g. For a critique of this somewhat too conventional position, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power To Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994)
[hereinafter Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch]; and Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Merryman Power and the Dilemma ofAutonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO
L. REv. 81 (1993).
io. See Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1043 (1988) [hereinafter Amar, Philadelphia Revisited]; Akhil Reed Amar, The
Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 457
(1994).
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insidious effect on the nation's representation and politics, is laid out with
unusual clarity; the Fugitive Slave Clause, the slave-importation provisos of
Article I, Section 9, and Article V, Dred Scott's betrayal of the document and,
finally, the Thirteenth Amendment, receive their crispest and most precise
treatment of any book in history or law, trenchant and penetrating but without
posturing or needless soapbox oratory.1 Amar's analysis speaks for itself,
leaving the reader enlightened, angry, moved, and inspired. One is quietly
forced to wrestle with the reality, for example, that the presidency of Thomas
Jefferson, and the defeat of John Adams in the election of 18oo, was the
product of the original Constitution's indefensible electoral reward to the
South for slavery, and that the tilt of the nation's politics and law toward
slavery was the predictable result of the Constitution's provisions. Amar's
vision of alternative ways in which the Framers might plausibly have dealt with
slavery, limiting its expansion geographically or temporally, while still forging
a more perfect Union in the 178os, provides a compelling illustration of the
Framers' lack of perfect constitutional foresight, even though the solutions
were right in front of them and politically attainable. Slavery, secession, and
Civil War, one is left to conclude, could have been avoided with a little better
constitutional craftsmanship at the outset.
Amar's accounts of the lawfulness of the process of adoption of the
Constitution and, much later, of the Reconstruction Amendments, is calmly
lucid and persuasive, leaving Professor Bruce Ackerman's elaborate atextual
construct crushed in its wake. (Amar has few obvious ideological opponents in
the book. Ackerman, Amar's colleague at Yale, is the only one prominently
identified in the text. Other competing views are noted and replied to in the
notes.) Amar's defense of the Fourteenth Amendment's "incorporation" of
individual rights against state governments, an argument he has made before,
is slimmed and refined. 2 His arguments for a broad understanding of
congressional power under Section 5 of that Amendment, and for the
incorrectness of The Civil Rights Cases of 1883, are set forth with care and
precision, and without overstatement.
A slight disappointment is Amar's rather thin treatment of the Bill of
Rights. This is attributable in part (as he notes) to the fact that he wrote an
ii. For a fuller, definitive treatment of the constitutional issues surrounding slavery-an
account so good and about issues so important that it makes my top ten roster of books
about the Constitution, even though it is limited to the Constitution's treatment of slavery-
see DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS (1978).
12. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 135-230 (1998);
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, ioi YALE L.J. 1193 (1992).
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earlier book devoted exclusively to the Bill.13 It is not that what Amar says
about the Bill of Rights in America's Constitution is of inferior quality (with one
exception I discuss presently); it is simply that it receives short-shrift. What
Amar says about the Bill of Rights in America's Constitution is very good,
focusing on the story behind, and reasons for, the Constitution's first ten
amendments-what was included, what failed to make it-and the broad
themes connecting seemingly disparate provisions: popular sovereignty,
institutions, juries, militias, and states. But in the best one-volume treatment of
the entire U.S. Constitution ever written, one would have liked to have seen a
little more treatment of the First Amendment, rather than simply a reference to
an earlier book. The same is true of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth amendments,
which again Amar has covered in other books.1 4
Any 65o-plus-page narrative treatise on the Constitution will have its
doubtful points.'" Amar's "Akhil"es' heel is his treatment of the Ninth
Amendment. After a plausible argument that the Ninth Amendment counsels
against too-grudging a reading of the breadth of specific rights granted by
other provisions-a weak version of "penumbras and emanations" -Amar's
usual textualist rigor completely fails him: In the only two truly bad
paragraphs of the book, Amar proceeds to "ponder the existence of'-he does
not explicitly embrace - "other Ninth Amendment 'rights' of 'the people"' that
"might not be inferable from the Constitution's text and structure but that
nevertheless might deserve constitutional status."16
Rights not inferable from text and structure, but that might deserve
"constitutional status"? This is not textualism or originalism. Amar tries,
haltingly, to erect hedges against unconstrained just-desert rights-inferring,
saying they must "genuinely be rights of 'the people'.1 7 In earlier work, Amar
had suggested that the content of the Ninth Amendment's "unenumerated"
rights consisted of the popular right of a deliberative majority of the people to
13. AMAR, supra note 12. That earlier book was good but does not make my top ten list.
14. In addition to discussion in The Bill of Rights, Amar collected his earlier academic
scholarship on the criminal procedure amendments into his fine first book entitled The
Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First Principles. See Paulsen, Dirty Harry, supra note 2.
i. Even The Federalist gets some things wrong. Hamilton wrote that the President could not
remove subordinates without Senate confirmation of the firing (No. 77), and that a Bill of
Rights was unnecessary because federal powers could not plausibly be construed to reach
most individual rights (No. 84). Both views were unpersuasive and wrong-as Amar shows,
in getting both issues right. See AMAR, supra note 6, at 192-95 & 565 n.40 (discussing
appointments and removals and explaining Hamilton's error in The Federalist No. 77); id. at
119-27, 315-29 (discussing the need for a Bill of Rights).
6. Id. at 328.
17. Id. at 329.
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alter or abolish their form of government-the natural right of "the people"
that propelled the American Revolution.s Here, however, Amar appears to
embrace to-be-discovered rights beyond those of the collective people and ends
up with a mushy balancing test that sounds distressingly close to modern,
Harlanesque substantive due process formulations:
Modern judges (and others) seeking to discover and declare
unenumerated rights of "the people" should look for rights that the
people themselves have truly embraced-in the great mass of state
constitutions, perhaps, or in widely celebrated lived traditions, or in
broadly inclusive political reform movements. In short, judges seeking
guidance on the real rights of "the people" must give due weight to the
very sources and sorts of legal populism that helped generate the Bill of
Rights itself. 9
Thus does the Ninth Amendment (rather than the Due Process Clause)
become Amar's activist Trojan Horse, a gift that, if taken in, could be the
undoing of all else. Secreted in the belly of Amar's view of the Ninth
Amendment is a license for marauding judges to depart from the text as they
think best - in the name of the text.2"
The Ninth Amendment simply will not bear Amar's reading. The proper
understanding of the Amendment -"The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people"-is that it states a rule of what we today would call
"nonpreemption." The specification of federal constitutional rights, possessed
by individuals or by the people generally against the federal government (and a
,8. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note io, at 1o5o.
19. AMAR, supra note 6, at 329.
2o. Is there any reason to believe that, under Amar's vague rendering of the Ninth Amendment,
Chief Justice Taney's atrocious substantive due process holding in Dred Scott (a holding and
reasoning that Amar rightly condemns, id. at 264-66, could not be sustained on the
alternative ground of the Ninth Amendment? After all, Taney premised his decision on
Amar-like criteria: entrenched state constitutional and statutory provisions (in certain
regions), sustained by a constitutional tradition of protection at the national level,
supported in substantial measure by the text itself (as Amar persuasively shows), building
on popular understandings and movements (at least in certain regions of the nation), and
sustained by popular democratic judgment, repeated over many years (and embraced as
recently as the 1856 election of President Buchanan, who was inaugurated two days before
the decision was announced). The problem with Amar's reading of the Ninth Amendment
(aside from its indefensibility as a matter of textual interpretation) is that it permits
essentially any result a court can plausibly concoct out of whatever textual extrapolation or
extratextual interpolation it chooses. Taney might well have been pleased. Armed with
Amar's pliable Ninth Amendment, who needs substantive due process?
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few possessed against state governments, set forth in Article I, Section io), was
not to work a pro tanto repeal of state law rights possessed against state
governments. Such a disclaimer was necessary (if at all) only to counter
Federalist arguments (like Hamilton's) that adopting a Bill of Rights might be
construed to have such an effect, thereby enlarging federal power and
diminishing individual rights. The text of the Amendment, its political context,
and historical evidence of its meaning and purpose all confirm this reading.21
Beyond this, one could infer a general political principle that the adoption
in positive constitutional law of particular rights should not be understood to
supersede the natural law rights of man. There would scarcely be much need to
state this, however, as no one at the time would have assumed that human law
could justly abridge God-given natural rights. At the same time, no one would
have mistaken the language of the Ninth Amendment as conferring, as a matter
of positive law, unspecified natural law rights. At most, the Ninth Amendment
could be read as stating the truism that nothing in the Constitution
legitimately could take away the natural rights of all human beings- including
such things as life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the right of the people
as a collective to alter or abolish their form of government whenever it becomes
destructive of its proper ends of securing those rights. The adoption of a Bill of
Rights does not somehow repeal by implication the natural rights principles
embraced in the Declaration of Independence.
But the free-floating "unenumerated rights" reading, which Amar floats so
freely (even if he does not quite embrace it explicitly), is simply not textually
defensible. This discussion is the single major flaw in an otherwise magnificent
book. But it is a major flaw, from which I invite my old friend to retreat in the
second edition (or the paperback).
B. A Biography of a Written Constitution
Putting the two terrible Ninth Amendment paragraphs to one side,
America's Constitution: A Biography, considered as a whole, cannot fairly be
taken as an argument for the modern "living constitution" argument that the
words of the Constitution are for succeeding generations (of judges, usually) to
infuse with the meanings they choose. It is A Biography in the instructive sense
of being the life story of the creation, structure, nature, and meaning of a text
that drew on a prior tradition, has been altered dozens of times over a period of
two hundred years, and has no fixed endpoint. (The book concludes with a
wry analysis of that "white space" at the end of the document -the possibility
21. For further development, see Paulsen, Paulsen, J., Dissenting, supra note 2, at 198-99.
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of further amendments to be added by later generations, and the significance of
ongoing creation of the document. ' ) It is the biography of a document. It
consists of the stories, contexts, and linguistic antecedents that gave life to the
words of the document the framers wrote, plus the sequel of stories of the
epochs, incidents, and currents that gave rise to the words of the Constitution's
twenty-seven amendments. It is the life-story of the text. But it is rigorously
and unrelentingly textualist. No one who reads this book faithfully (as opposed
to inventing their own un-read inference from its subtitle) will make the
mistake of attributing a methodologically "noninterpretivist" approach to
America's Constitution, just as (I submit) no one who reads the Constitution
faithfully will make the mistake of attributing a methodologically
"noninterpretivist" approach to America's Constitution. The central feature of
the document - the first thing one notices about it, if not a dolt or a mystic - is
its written-ness. America's Constitution is a written constitution, not an
unwritten one. And our written Constitution directs that it is "this
Constitution" - a written document - that is supposed to be the supreme Law
of the Land, not anything else.23
Amar's interpretive methodology is one of original-meaning textualism, of
a generous but still rigorous type. His approach places him, oddly, in common
cause with judicial and legal conservatives, not freewheeling liberals. Although
Amar is a political liberal, he does not let his politics drive his textual
interpretation. "Liberals" can learn a lesson from this. They can learn the
further lesson that original-meaning textualism is no mere cover for
conservative political preferences, that it can yield surprisingly liberal political
results on occasion, and that the methodology cannot fairly be reduced to a
caricature.' Amar's book demonstrates, quite the contrary, that originalist
methodology often produces a range of possible fair interpretations and that
there will often be room for reasonable differences as to result as among
persons purporting to be, and struggling faithfully to be, textualists. But so too
"conservatives" can learn from this book the lesson that principled textualism
22. AMAR, supra note 6, at 458-63.
23. U.S. CONST. art. VI. On the Constitution's reasonably clear interpretive instruction that it is
the written text that is controlling and that, for those who would purport to be applying it
as law, this text controls as against any and all unwritten traditions, departures, accretions,
diminutions, or linguistically anachronistic changes, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706, 2709-10, 2739-43 (2003) [hereinafter
Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury]. See also Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEo. L.J. 1113,
1124-33 (2003) (developing at length the textual argument for original-meaning textualism).
24. Jed Rubenfeld's book, which I discuss below, is deeply unsatisfactory on precisely this
point. See infra Part III.
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does not invariably support their preferred substantive outcomes either. One
may recognize that originalism is frequently hijacked by its own purported
adherents for their own political purposes; and one may recognize that
originalism sometimes does not dictate clear answers but merely frames the
legitimate bounds of disagreement, without rejecting the methodology itself.
America's Constitution: A Biography is no defense of words-as-springboards
"living constitution" judicial activism. It is a defense of the Constitution's text.
C. How To Teach the Constitution
Wouldn't it be better to teach "constitutional law" by teaching about the
text of the Constitution, rather than focusing single-and-narrow-mindedly on
Supreme Court doctrine in cases that, with alarming and increasing frequency,
have precious little to do with the document itself? Wouldn't it be better to
study America's Constitution: A Biography than any of the several carbon-copy
casebooks that go by some variation of the name Cases and Materials on
Constitutional Law?
It depends (I suppose) on what one is trying to teach and learn. If one is
concerned only with Supreme Court doctrine, then one could do without Amar
(and for that matter without the Constitution itself, for the most part). But
surely that view - the dominant view in law schools today - is a defect with our
present teaching canon of constitutional law. One can certainly respect the
value of teaching important Supreme Court decisions explicating the broad
themes of the Constitution and specific provisions thereof, and of studying
cases that have shifted the way "constitutional law" has developed away from
the document and toward changing doctrine. A course in constitutional law
that ignored these developments would be deficient in important ways. But it
is certainly a far greater sin for a course in constitutional law to ignore the
document itself.
That is the problem with most constitutional law courses in American law
schools today, and with most (if not all) casebooks used in such courses.2"
They choose pretty much the same cases (and omit the same hugely important
25. The nearest thing to an exception is the excellent "Brest, Levinson" edited casebook, entitled
Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials, the second edition of which I
list as an Honorable Mention on my list of best books about the Constitution. See supra note
1. The book is much more concerned with history and with institutions and interpreters
other than the Supreme Court than other constitutional law books are. The volume is
currently in its fourth edition, and has added Akhil Amar and his colleague Jack Balkin to
the roster of co-editors. The book is still excellent but has (with the addition of the new co-
editors?) become much more heavily doctrinal, jargon-filled, and case-heavy in its later
sections.
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cases, like Dred Scott). They tend to focus only on cases-and almost
exclusively recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions-as the source of
constitutional law, ignoring how often, and with such great consequence, the
Constitution is interpreted and applied by Congress, the executive branch,
lower federal courts, and all branches of state government. They largely ignore
history: The reader can find endless pages of note cases discussing the twists
and turns of the Supreme Court's most recent three-part, two-tiered doctrinal
test over the course of the last twenty-odd years, but almost no history of the
formation of the Constitution and historical treatment of its principles in the
first 15o years of our nation's history. And most glaringly of all, most modern
constitutional law casebooks largely ignore the Constitution itself-the
document that is ostensibly the subject of study and the source of
"constitutional law."
I offer a modest proposal: Throw out the casebooks altogether and teach
the constitutional law course as a Great Books and Great Cases on the
Constitution course. Assign The Federalist and Akhil Amar's America's
Constitution: A Biography. Then, teach, in detail, only the fifteen or twenty most
significant constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court and of the political
branches, unedited, as case studies touching on most (but not all) of the more
important subject matter, doctrinal, interpretive, and history-impacting
developments in American constitutional law over the course of 2oo-plus years.
But deliberately make no attempt to cover every case or teensy-weensy ripple of
modern doctrine, recognizing that those cases are often here today and gone
tomorrow. Emphasize how to think about constitutional issues rather than the
latest judicial thinking about those issues, for that will be what is of enduring
value to law students from a law school course in constitutional law.
Imagine it: A course whose only cases are whole-text (or nearly so)
versions of what are arguably the most important constitutional decisions of all
time: The Alien and Sedition Acts, the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, and
James Madison's "Report of i8oo"; Marbury v. Madison; McCulloch v.
Maryland; Gibbons v. Ogden; Luther v. Borden; Prigg v. Pennsylvania; Dred Scott
v. Sandford; Lincoln's First Inaugural, July 4, 1861 Message to Congress, and
Emancipation Proclamation; Ex Parte Merryman; The Prize Cases; Ex Parte
Milligan; Slaughter-House Cases; The Civil Rights Cases; Plessy v. Ferguson; Giles
v. Harris; Debs v. United States; Lochner v. New York; United States v. Darby and
Wickard v. Filburn; Korematsu v. United States; Ex Parte Quirin; Youngstown
Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer; Brown v. Board of Education; Baker v. Carr; Mapp v.
Ohio; Miranda v. Arizona; United States v. O'Brien; New York Times Co. v.
United States; Nixon v. United States; Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey; Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke; Texas v. Johnson; Rosenberger v. University of Virginia; United States v.
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Lopez; United States v. Morrison; Bush v. Gore; and Lawrence v. Texas. One or
two big cases a week (unedited) for fifteen weeks, with corresponding
assignments of The Federalist and America's Constitution: A Biography. What a
fascinating way to teach constitutional law! (For those who would miss all of
the "note" cases, think of how brilliant a scholar you will seem to your students
by filling them in with a lecture about all the wrinkles and variations left open
by the great cases, or show them what a masterful imagination you have by
using them as "hypotheticals.",)26
For the faint of heart, I offer a more modest proposal-and a prediction:
Assign America's Constitution: A Biography along with a traditional casebook, to
enrich understandings, reemphasize the text, and serve as a corrective check-
and-balance to the excesses of present casebook case-ism and doctrinalism-ism.
The prediction is that, whatever I say, this is likely to become a popular
practice over the next five to ten years. It is a tribute to Amar's book that it will,
almost certainly (and quite properly), change to some degree the way the U.S.
Constitution, and constitutional law, is taught and understood for many years
to come.
I. STRAWMAN: JED RUBENFELD AND GRAND THEORY
Professor Jed Rubenfeld's Revolution by Judiciary presents a puzzle: How
could such an obviously smart guy write such a terribly messed-up book about
constitutional interpretation? The answer seems to be much like Oz's to the
Scarecrow: It's not that our protagonist doesn't have a brain-he's obviously
an extraordinarily bright, resourceful fellow. He's just a victim of disorganized
thinking.
Revolution by Judiciary suffers not from any lack of intellectual firepower,
but from poor aim. The book suffers, greatly, from disorganized thinking: It
posits a problem that does not exist; offers a description of it that does not
match reality; then solves it with an ingenious construct, but one that is utterly
of the inventor's imagination.
z6. Two confessions: First, I have never had the courage to teach constitutional law this way; I
am (nearly) as trapped in the mold as everyone else. (But I may try it next fall.) Second, the
above two paragraphs are loosely plagiarized from the working preface of my own
casebook-in-development, co-edited with Michael McConnell, Steven Calabresi, and Vasan
Kesavan: The Constitution of the United States, optimistically forthcoming in 2007 from the
Foundation Press. But I think I wrote that part of the preface. We stop short of the all-out
Great Cases approach but use it as a guidepost. Like Amar's book, our casebook is organized
by the Constitution's text, not by Supreme Court doctrine.
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In Section A, I critique Rubenfeld's thesis about the "problem" of
constitutional law and his solution to it. In Section B, I critique the
phenomenon of grand theory approaches to constitutional law as a general
matter, and offer an alternative, un-grand approach to interpreting and
applying the Constitution: focusing on the original linguistic meaning of the
text (much as Amar's book does). Finally, in Section C, I briefly address the
true problem with constitutional law: the obvious and mildly embarrassing
fact that a good deal of our constitutional practice today is not true to the
meaning of the Constitution, and the fact that our scholarship lacks the brains,
the heart, or the courage to confront (and correct) this straightforward
problem.
A. Rubenfeld's Problem and Solution
Rubenfeld's thesis is that the field of constitutional law supplies no answer
to the most basic question of constitutional law: How are we to go about the
enterprise of constitutional interpretation? Constitutional law thus cannot
justify its controversial, or even its easy, case decisions. Says Rubenfeld:
Incredibly, American constitutional case law has almost nothing to say
about what judges are supposed to be doing when they go about the
business of interpreting the Constitution.
In constitutional law,... there are no such overarching interpretive
precepts or protocols. There are no official interpretive rules at all....
... There is no law of constitutional interpretation.
Thus is constitutional law, which speaks to so many issues today,
silent on one subject: itself.27
With all due respect, this is nonsense. If there is a problem with
constitutional law today, it surely is not that it has "almost nothing to say"
about how to "go about the business of interpreting the Constitution." It is
that it has far too much to say! Our cases, our practice, and our theorists point
27. JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4-5 (2005).
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in wildly different directions, offer and illustrate competing interpretive
theories, and reveal a cacophony of voices virtually screaming for attention.
Constitutional law is "silent" on how to go about the business of constitutional
interpretation? Surely Rubenfeld jests. We suffer not from a deficit but a
surfeit of constitutional theory. Thus, we see the repeated attempts in
constitutional law scholarship to offer new efforts to systematize and
synthesize- grand theories to explain (or to explain away) judicial decisions
that almost certainly had nothing to do with the grand theory being advanced.
But Professor Rubenfeld has rushed in to fill the gap, solving this central
problem of constitutional law with a comprehensive theoretical framework.
Styling his book as standing in the tradition of Alexander Bickel's The Least
Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics and John Hart Ely's
Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, Rubenfeld claims to
succeed where Bickel and Ely failed. Rubenfeld's proposition is that not all of
the Constitution's specific "intentions" control subsequent interpretation; only
the Constitution's "commitments" do. He derives this distinction not from the
Constitution's text, but from philosophy.2"
The distinction between intentions and commitments can then explain
most (but not all) of constitutional law. Judicial decisions can be divided into
core "Application Understandings" of a constitutional provision and noncore
"No Application Understandings." An Application Understanding is
Rubenfeld's jargon for the agreed core of what a constitutional provision
covers. Those core understandings are commitments that must be adhered to.
A No Application Understanding is an understanding of what is not included
within a given right or power. But these are mere intentions from which a
subsequent judicial decision may depart.29
All of constitutional law can be explained by this framework, Rubenfeld
argues, except for two broad areas, the Contract Clause and the Declare War
Clause. The departure from the core Application Understanding of the
Contract Clause, in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell," however, was "a
widely admired decision" and should be understood as creating a new
interpretive paradigm -a new constitutional commitment, as it were.31 On the
other hand, the departure from the core Application Understanding of the
Declare War Clause-the original understanding that Congress, not the
President, has the constitutional power of war-initiation, honored in the breach
28. Id. at 71-124.
29. Id. at 14-18, 20-68, 99-107.
30. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
31. RUBENFELD, supra note 27, at 67.
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by a fair amount of constitutional practice -should be stopped and reversed,
and should not be treated as a new paradigm.32
In addition, a number of decisions by the Rehnquist Court since 199o, in
the areas of federalism, commerce power, sovereign immunity, affirmative
action, and freedom of expressive association, cannot be explained by this
model, Rubenfeld explains. But this is because those decisions reflect a vicious
and lawless right-wing agenda that should lead us to ask whether
constitutional law has "stopped making sense" because of the nonconformity
of these conservative decisions with Rubenfeld's explanatory model.33
The book is devoted to explication of this general thesis. Now, it's not a
completely ridiculous idea. But it suffers from a classic Yale School problem: A
really bright fellow superimposes a construct of his own invention on the
corpus of constitutional law decisions, seeking to justify them (or most of
them) under a newfangled rubric that explains what is otherwise inexplicable.
Sure, not everything fits within the new rubric, but that just proves that what
does not fit is wrong. Bickel's The Least Dangerous Branch is the most graceful
and sophisticated (and, not coincidentally, the least extravagant) book in this
grand-theory Yale tradition. Ely's Democracy and Distrust provided a valiant
attempt to rationalize the Warren Court's work, but not the 1970s' more
untenable extensions. 34 Bruce Ackerman's We the People three-volume project is
another example, with a much grander, more creative, and marvelously
entertaining (if deeply vulnerable) meta-theory of his own, seeking to explain
the New Deal era and other results he likes.
Jed Rubenfeld's effort cannot quite keep up, in grandeur, eloquence, or
sophistication, with these other works. But the more fundamental problem is
with the genre itself- with its twin premises that there is a problem that needs
solving concerning constitutional interpretation and that the solution to this
problem lies in some grand new political or philosophical theory extrinsic to
the Constitution itself. Is it really the case that interpreting the Constitution is
so inexplicably complex that it requires a Yale professor (or several of them) to
devise equally complex grand theories to explain constitutional law?"
32. Id. at 68.
33. Id. at 145-202.
34. I count John Hart Ely as a Yale Law School product, even though Yale improvidently kicked
him out by denying him tenure.
35. Different readers will have different assessments of the degree to which Rubenfeld's project
succeeds on its own terms. Space does not permit, and time and interest do not commend, a
page-by-page discussion of the case descriptions and doctrines that Rubenfeld employs in
developing his account of constitutional law today and its consistency with his construct.
But readers should employ a critical eye: I found Rubenfeld to be the proverbial Unreliable
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B. Applying Ockham's Razor to Grand Constitutional Theory
There is, I submit, a fairly simple, nongrand answer to all of this grand
theorizing about constitutional law. The Constitution does entail rules
governing its own interpretation and application, and they are reasonably clear
and straightforward ones (as I will explain presently). They do not answer all
questions, but they answer a lot of them. As to "constitutional law" in the
broader sense of judicial decisions and doctrine, the nongrand answer is that
some of the Supreme Court's major decisions in the corpus are faithful
interpretations of the Constitution and some are not. Not all of the "good"
ones (from any given policy-preference perspective) are faithful applications of
the document; not all of the "bad" ones are unfaithful. Grand theoretical
attempts to systematize constitutional law to make it all work out tidily, in
favor of the theoretician's preferred outcomes, are invariably doomed to failure.
They can be interesting projects, but in the end they tell us more about the
theoretician's preferred outcomes than about the Constitution.
My un-grand but radical position (within the small world of academic
constitutional theoreticians) is simply this: The enterprise of constitutional
interpretation - of discerning the document's meaning - consists of giving to
the Constitution's words and phrases the meaning they would have had, in
context, to informed readers of the language at the time of their adoption as
law, within the relevant political community. Contrary to Rubenfeld's
assumption, and that of many other academic theorists, this seems to be the
interpretive method prescribed by the Constitution itself. The straightforward
internal textual argument for original-meaning textualism is that the
Constitution is a written document; that it specifies "this Constitution" as the
thing that is to be considered supreme law; that the default rule for textual
interpretation was, at the time of the Constitution's adoption, the natural and
original linguistic meaning of the words of the text; and that any argument for
anachronistic interpretations of the text- that is, for substituting a personally
idiosyncratic, nonstandard, or time-changed meaning in preference to the one
that would have been understood at the time, and in the context, in which the
text was adopted-ends up substituting some other words for the words
chosen in "this Constitution." In short, the Constitution is written law, and the
Narrator in the doctrinal sections of the book, see RUBENFELD, supra note 27, at 3-68,
disagreeing repeatedly with descriptions of a case holding or a characterization of an
opponent's argument or evidence, and questioning many an unexplained premise or
debatable assumption. (For some illustrations, see infra notes 27, 31-33 and accompanying
text.)
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meaning of a written legal instrument is the original meaning of its words, not
a different meaning substituted by someone else. 6
The enterprise of constitutional adjudication consists of applying the
original linguistic meaning of the document to lawsuits in which a question of
constitutional meaning is properly presented. This requires another step:
discerning second-order rules about what to do when the Constitution supplies
a rule of law that applies to the case at hand; what to do when it does not; and
what to do when the answer is unclear. But it is not too hard to come up with
such rules. Simply put: If the meaning of the words of the Constitution
supplies a sufficiently determinate legal rule or standard applicable to the case
at hand, that rule or standard must prevail over a contrary rule supplied by
some other competing source of law (typically a state or federal statute, or an
executive branch or agency action). That is because of the supremacy of the
Constitution over other law.37 Thus, if the Constitution supplies a rule, that
rule prevails. But if the meaning of the Constitution's language fails to provide
such a rule or standard -if it is actually indeterminate (or under-determinate)
as to the specific question at hand -then a court has no basis for displacing the
rule supplied by some other relevant source of law applicable to the case
(typically, a rule supplied by political decisions made by an imperfect
representative democracy).? Folks legitimately might disagree as to when the
original meaning produces a determinate answer, or what counts as sufficiently
determinate to supply a constitutional rule appropriate for judges to apply to
invalidate political decisions. But that should be the core of the enterprise.
This is not, of course, a description of current practice. But an account of
practice is also fairly simple: Some judicial decisions are consistent with this
description of the proper approach to constitutional interpretation and
adjudication. Some clearly are not. (That raises certain problems of its own,
which I discuss in the next Section.) And some-a good many interesting
ones - are debatable. This is not surprising. Many constitutional provisions
36. This is a much-compressed version of a fuller textual, structural, and linguistic argument for
original-meaning textualism as the method the Constitution itself prescribes for
understanding the Constitution that Vasan Kesavan and I have set forth elsewhere. See
Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 23, at 1124-33; see also Paulsen, supra note 23, at 2709-10, 2739-
43 (emphasizing, with Marbury, the intrinsic nature of written constitutionalism). The
"default rule" insight comes from Saikrishna B. Prakash, Unoriginalism's Law Without
Meaning, 15 CONST. COMM. 529, 540-46 (1998).
37. This of course is the core of the argument of Marbury for the proposition we call judicial
review. See Paulsen, supra note 23, at 2711-24. It is instructive that the argument for
constitutional supremacy is a structural and textual one purely internal to the text.
38. For a short defense of this principle, see Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 9,
at 332-37.
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will have core areas of agreed meaning and application, but leave legitimate
room for disagreement about the periphery. The interesting and difficult cases
concern the periphery. 9
But that's really pretty much all there is to it. Constitutional law, while
greatly interesting, is not a deeply mysterious thing. It takes a Yale professor to
make it one. Most grand theories of constitutional adjudication that seek to
erect an elaborate superstructure feel like professors' attempts to justify
decisions they like but that are not explainable in such conventional terms, to
criticize the ones they dislike but that are not easily impeachable in such
conventional terms, and to argue their preferred positions in the ones that
remain up for grabs.4
39. There will be easy cases that fall within the core of agreed understanding about the original
meaning of particular constitutional provisions. And there will be more difficult cases in
which the document's meaning is more ambiguous or its application to a particular problem
is less clear, leaving difficult questions on the margin of whether a court properly may hold
that a rule or standard supplied by the text actually exists to displace the rule otherwise
supplied by political action.
Rubenfeld's somewhat confused "Application Understandings" and "No Application
Understandings" rubric seems like a garbled (and misleading) way of expressing what
should be a rather simple idea: Clear constitutional rules are always controlling, but if the
Constitution's meaning is not perfectly clear on a given point, different times legitimately
can act on different understandings, each falling within the range of meaning admitted by
the text. This might mean that judicial understandings within this range are supreme over
political understandings, but legitimately may vary from time to time; or it might mean that
the proper judicial approach is to defer to differing political understandings adopted at
different times, within the range admitted by the text. In addition to its lack of clarity,
Rubenfeld's construct suffers in two serious respects on this point. First, he offers no
principled criteria for how to interpret the Constitution; he attacks a strawman version of
originalism, but he does not set forth an alternative theory of constitutional meaning.
Second, even if one has a stable, clear, and principled interpretive method, the "Application
Understandings" versus "No Application Understandings" framework does not map well
onto the reality that some texts bear a range of interpretation. Rubenfeld's rubric is
unsatisfying both as a matter of theory (even within a stable and clear interpretive
framework, the range of meaning of a constitutional text is not well captured by asking the
binary question of whether or not it "applies," nor does Rubenfeld's construct deal with
issues of unclear overlap between rights and powers, rights in conflict, and the like) and
even more so as a description of practice (witness Rubenfeld's two exceptions, one of which
he accepts and one of which he doesn't, and his long litany of recent "conservative" decisions
of which he disapproves). An illustration of both the theoretical problem and the descriptive
problem is how difficult it is for Rubenfeld to fit separation-of-powers and federalism
issues-issues of division of power-into his framework. RUBENFELD, supra note 27, at 56-
67.
40. This general description certainly applies to Professor Rubenfeld's project. As noted,
Rubenfeld derives his construct from a long excursion into philosophy. RUBENFELD, supra
note 27, at 71-141. The discussion is interesting, but its relevance in describing constitutional
law is dubious. All of which suggests a philosopher Rubenfeld overlooks: William of
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Rubenfeld is driven to his construct by a caricature of originalism.
Rubenfeld does not understand the method as it is understood by most of its
adherents today, conflating it (whether intentionally or not) with a version of
crude intentionalism that focuses on the specific subjective intentions or
expectations of individuals as to how a provision might be applied-that is,
subjective individual interpretations of the document (of a historical period)-
rather than focusing on the objective linguistic meaning of the words of a text
(taken in historical context).
This distinction, subtle but central to all good understandings of
originalism today (and abundantly present in the scholarly literature in the
field), is essential. It is a distinction that has long been familiar in law. As then-
Professor Oliver Wendell Holmes put it more than a century ago, "We do not
inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means. ' 41 Or,
as Professor Gary Lawson has stated it more recently:
Originalist analysis, at least as practiced by most contemporary
originalists, is not a search for concrete historical understandings held
by specific persons. Rather, it is a hypothetical inquiry that asks how a
fully informed public audience, knowing all that there is to know about
the Constitution and the surrounding world, would understand a
particular provision. Actual historical understandings are, of course,
relevant to that inquiry, but they do not conclude or define the
inquiry- nor are they even necessarily the best available evidence.42
Ockham, who held that, as between two possible explanations for a phenomenon, the
simpler is usually the more likely. Is it not simpler, and ultimately more plausible, to
describe constitutional law as the task of discerning the original meaning of the words of the
document, noting the ways in which practice departs from that meaning, and inquiring how
(or whether) to reconcile the document's meaning with that practice?
41. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HAv. L. REv. 417, 419 (1899).
For a colorful reprise on Holmes's aphorism, see In re Sinclair, 87o F.2d 134o, 1342 (7th Cir.
1989), in which Judge Easterbrook wrote, "the search is not for the contents of the authors'
heads but for the rules of language they used." I have developed this point in other writing.
See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 9, at 227 n.23 ("There is a logical and
important difference between the content of a legal rule and the expected consequences of
the rule in the minds of (some of) its drafters and advocates.").
42. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398 (2002). Rubenfeld
writes: "Originalism is intention-based, holding that all the intentions formed by the
relevant agents at the relevant time have equal normative status." RUBENFELD, supra note 27,
at 99. It is difficult to conceive of a more wooden and misleading formulation of original-
meaning textualism. I know of no thoughtful modem originalist who would subscribe to
such a position.
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This distinction between objective, original linguistic meaning and
subjective particular intentions- not Rubenfeld's distinction between
"intentions" and "commitments" - explains most (but not all) of the cases and
doctrines that Rubenfeld finds inexplicable on his strawman version of
originalism. Much (but not all) of modem First Amendment doctrine makes a
fair degree of sense if one is applying the original linguistic meaning of the
terms "speech," "the freedom of" speech, and "no law abridging" such
freedom, rather than specific subjective historical beliefs about blasphemy,
vulgarity, and seditious libel.43 So too the result in Brown v. Board of Education,
striking down government-prescribed discrimination on the basis of race (and
overruling Plessy v. Ferguson to the extent of its inconsistency with Brown)
makes entire sense if one focuses on the original linguistic meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment rather than on the mistaken subjective views or
expectations of some individuals at the time that the Amendment's principle
did not extend to segregated education. 44
Rubenfeld's treatment is an extreme instance of the common phenomenon
of positing a strawman version of originalism, exaggerating the extent and
consequences of its supposed conflict with present practice, and then setting up
a false dilemma: "choose my theory or choose the unmitigated disaster of
originalism." To be sure, a considerable amount of our constitutional practice
is not consistent with the original meaning of the Constitution. 4' But a
43. For a brief textualist map of the First Amendment freedom of speech and association, see
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Scouts, Families, Schools, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1917, 1919-22 (2001).
Under such an understanding, the freedom of expressive association of groups is a logical
consequence of the fact that individuals are permitted to band together to express a common
message, and that the group therefore possesses a corollary freedom to control the content
of its own message as a group. Id. at 1922-35. Rubenfeld finds this idea inconceivable as an
application of originalism and intolerable as a political matter, RUBENFELD, supra note 27, at
4, 6, 146-47, 170-83, but does not engage the textual, structural, and historical arguments
that have been marshaled to support it.
44. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 9, at 227 n.23 (collecting authorities).
Rubenfeld also passes over, far too briefly, RUBENFELD, supra note 27, at 41 & 214 n.85,
Michael W. McConnell's powerful historical case that Brown, not Plessy, better captures both
the original meaning and original understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REv. 947
(1995). In light of McConnell's important scholarship, Rubenfeld's flat assertion that
"[c]ertainly the Fourteenth Amendment was originally intended to permit segregation,"
RUBENFELD, supra note 27, at loo, is simply insufficient.
45. In such cases, practice should be changed to conform to the Constitution, not the other way
around. This is how we should treat the departure in practice from the Constitution's
allocation of war powers, which Rubenfeld recognizes as problematic, but for which his
grand theory has no good answer. RUBENFELD, supra note 27, at 68. As I have written
elsewhere, the Constitution does vest Congress with the decision to take the nation into a
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considerable amount of our practice is consistent with the Constitution, too, if
one has the patience (and inclination) to read the text carefully and faithfully. 46
True, original-meaning textualism will leave some difficult cases to be
decided, and reasonable originalists will sometimes disagree as to the right
decision. But that does not go to the correctness of the basic methodology.
Every interpretive theory has its limits, and honest disagreement as to a correct
theory's application is one of them. The limitation is not unique to originalism.
Indeed, it is likely a less severe problem for originalism than for less-disciplined
nonoriginalist approaches.
True, not all would-be originalists employ the method faithfully. It has its
stated adherents who err, or who misuse the theory, just as stated adherents of
other approaches do. But that also does not go to the correctness of the basic
methodology. Moreover, it is easier to spot an errant would-be originalist
interpretation than an errant nonoriginalist, or pragmatist, or Rubenfeldian,
state of war. Congress has this power and the President does not. See Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to War, 19 CONST. COMM. 215 (2002). It is true that some of our
constitutional practice does not conform to the Constitution's allocation of power in this
regard, of course. But the correct answer to that is: so much the worse for constitutional
practice. When the Constitution says one thing, and precedent or practice says the contrary,
the Constitution supplies the rule and the nonconforming precedent or practice must be
said, straightforwardly, to be in violation of the Constitution. See Paulsen, supra note 23, at
2711-24, 2731-34. And violations of the Constitution, no matter how frequently repeated, do
not legitimately change the meaning of the Constitution. See id. at 2731-34; see also
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952) (arguing that past
contrary practice does not alter the Constitution's allocation of power).
46. Among the most common canards in critiques of originalism is that, under the original
meaning of the Constitution, the issuance of paper money as legal tender would be
unconstitutional, sending our economy into disarray. But what is the basis for such a
senseless charge? Congress possesses power to "coin money" and to regulate "commerce,"
plus the power to enact measures it fairly deems necessary and proper for carrying into
execution such powers. If creation of a national bank falls within the scope of Congress's
power to pass laws it deems necessary to execute other powers, it is hard to see why issuance
of paper money would not also fall within the scope of Congress's powers. (Professor Amar
makes a version of this argument quite persuasively. See AMAR, supra note 6, at 123.) The
same can be said in response to objections that originalism would lead to vastly lessened
national legislative powers. See id. at 1O5-19; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Government
of Adequate Powers (Apr. 1, 20o6) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing
that the original meaning of the text of Congress's enumerated legislative powers supports
broad national power). A principled originalism would indeed lead to overturning many
present practices, but not these.
Rubenfeld is scarcely the only, nor even the worst, offender in this regard. See, e.g., CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR
AMEmCA (2005) (arguing, speciously, that originalism would abolish paper money, repeal
most national legislation since the New Deal, undo the application of the Bill of Rights to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and accomplish many other terrible things).
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interpretation. The existence of reasonably firm criteria makes it easier to check
up on originalist interpretations for the soundness of their reasoning and their
adherence to correct principles. Nonoriginalism, on the other hand, means
never having to say you're sorry.
The biggest problem for constitutional law, then, is not (as Rubenfeld
would have it) that there are no criteria for interpreting and applying the
Constitution. On the contrary, the problem is that the Constitution is
reasonably easy to interpret and apply under straightforward criteria but that a
fair amount of our constitutional practice is simply not consistent with the
meaning of the Constitution. And it is at least plausible to believe that we, the
people today, might sometimes prefer contemporary practice to the
Constitution's original meaning. What should one do with this gap between
meaning and practice (whatever size one thinks it is)? And why on earth
should we follow a two-hundred-plus-year-old Constitution rather than our
policy preferences for today in the first place?
C. Pay No Attention to the Man Behind the Curtain
The long-dead-white-males-shouldn't-rule-us critics have a point. There is
no particularly good a priori reason why we should be governed, on important
fundamentals, by a charter drafted (in the main) more than two centuries ago,
by (white) men who have long since died, if we prefer a different arrangement
today, in whole or in part, and make a considered deliberative choice for a new
arrangement. But this is not really a problem with constitutional law. It is a
political theory problem external to constitutional law-a question about
whether one wishes to do constitutional law in the first place. It is a question
about whether one likes what the Constitution says, and, if not, whether the
people as a whole wish to displace it with something else.
The Constitution itself has very little to say about this problem. The
question of whether one wishes to use the Constitution as a set of legal
governing rules is not a question of constitutional law or constitutional
interpretation. It is a question of political theory about constitution-making
and constitution-following. As such, it is a distinct question from the question
of what those legal governing rules are. One needs to know what the
Constitution says before one can sensibly decide whether one likes what the
Constitution says and wants to follow it. Interpretation precedes evaluation,
and is distinct from it.47
47. On this big point, which is scarcely original to me, see Professor Gary Lawson's brilliant
little article, On Reading Recipes... and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823 (1997).
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The Constitution does take this limited stance, however: The bare fact of
being a written Constitution prescribing rules of superior authority to ordinary
current political choices implies a position that a fundamental decision made in
the past sometimes can and ought to be binding as against today's political-
and judicial -decisions that depart from that fundamental decision. That was
the first premise of Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning in Marbury v. Madison
and of Alexander Hamilton's reconciliation of judicial review with democracy
in The Federalist 78.48 In a sense, this could be said to be the background
political theory behind written constitutionalism. Hear Marshall on
constitution-making:
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future
government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to
their own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole American fabric
has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great
exertion; nor can it, nor ought it to be frequently repeated. The
principles, therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And as
the authority, from which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom
act, they are designed to be permanent.49
A decent case nonetheless can be made on political theory grounds that,
whatever the Constitution says, we would be better governed by some
combination of elected officials, appointed judges, and accumulated but
evolving traditions, rather than (to the extent of a conflict) by the rules of law
supplied by a written Constitution, much of which was written long ago with
relatively few recent written amendments. But there is a simple low-political-
theory answer to this: For government officials who swear an oath to support
"this Constitution" - a written document- this is not a valid option. For those
who do constitutional law under this written Constitution, the political-theory
decision has already been made. To willfully depart from the document one is
sworn to uphold is, indeed, revolution by judiciary, an overthrowing of the
ancien regime. It may be justifiable as a matter of some political theory or
another. But it is not justifiable as an account of constitutional law.
48. See Paulsen, supra note 23 at 2712-13; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176
(1803); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 44o (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed. 1987).
49. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176. Rubenfeld gets this point right, with an important insight:
"Treating democracy as government by present popular will severs the dimension of time
from the enterprise of self-government. It offers little or no conceptual space for the
authority of past acts of lawmaking." RUBENFELD, supra note 27, at 141, 75-98, 135-41. At
some level, Rubenfeld accepts the idea of constitutionalism as a legitimate check on present
political decisionmaking.
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But have we not, over time, overthrown in fact what was established in
theory? s" Do we not in fact live in a de facto different constitutional regime
than that established by the written constitution, so that those who do
constitutional law should be understood as swearing an oath not to the
document but to the changes produced by judicial practice over the years?
Marshall and Hamilton rightly cautioned, as a matter of political theory, that
we, the people, should not adopt constitutional regime change lightly or
accidentally. Moreover, they insisted as a matter of constitutional law that it is
wrong to presume, or permit, an unauthorized power of government
institutions under the Constitution to change the regime of the Constitution,
in the name of the people."1 If there is to be an exercise of the inalienable
political right of the people to alter or abolish their form of government when
it fails any longer to serve their happiness, then (putting to one side
amendment by the modes provided for in the document itself) such change by
definition occurs outside the Constitution. In the meantime, any other
departures from the Constitution by actors exercising authority under the
Constitution are simply unconstitutional. 2
It follows that the true problem of constitutional law these days reduces to
this: A fair amount of current constitutional practice cannot be reconciled with
the original meaning of the Constitution and we tend to treat judicial decisions
that depart from the Constitution as nonetheless authoritative, at least
sometimes-a practice itself inconsistent with the original meaning of the
Constitution. 3
so. Cf. Marbuy, 5 U.S. at 177 (noting that for courts to defer to errant misinterpretation of the
Constitution by subordinate authority under the Constitution would "overthrow in fact
what was established in theory").
s5. Ti-E FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 48, at 440-41 ("Though I trust the
friends of the proposed Constitution will never concur with its enemies in questioning that
fundamental principle of republican government which admits the right of the people to
alter or abolish the established Constitution whenever they find it inconsistent with their
happiness; yet it is not to be inferred from this principle that the representatives of the
people, whenever a momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of their
constituents incompatible with the provisions in the existing Constitution, would, on that
account, be justifiable in a violation of those provisions; .... Until the people have, by some
solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the established form, it is binding upon
themselves collectively, as well as individually... ."(citations omitted)).
52. For an extended argument that this is the meaning of Marbury, with many notable
applications that challenge current practice, see Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth ofMarbury,
supra note 23.
53. I have developed this theme in other work. See, e.g., id. at 2731-34; Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency after Twenty-Five Years, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1337,
1349-51 (1999) (arguing that the notion of judicial supremacy is inconsistent with all
evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution).
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But there is a straightforward low-theory answer to this riddle, too. When
a prior interpretation of the Constitution, by any branch of government,
including the courts, has departed from the meaning of the Constitution, one
must always prefer-if one is truly interpreting and applying the
Constitution- the objective, original linguistic meaning of the Constitution's
words and phrases to past departures from that meaning.54
That is a bracing proposition, to be sure, because it is so much at variance
with our commonly accepted constitutional culture as taught in American law
schools for generations. Yet it is the only proposition that is consistent with the
original meaning of the Constitution itself.55 A principled originalist must
reject strong theories of stare decisis. Prior interpretations at variance with the
Constitution are unconstitutional. To follow them, rather than the
Constitution, is to depart from interpreting and applying the Constitution and
to engage in some other political exercise.
This proposition is beyond the pale to most academic constitutional
scholars today-so disruptive of their worldview and training as to be almost
incapable of consideration. Instead, the dominant impulse is that the Court's
decisions must be explained and justified (at least most of them). The body of
decisions, not the Constitution, is the immovable object. And so the desperate
need for new, creative high theory in constitutional law. In part because
reconciling some of the cases to the Constitution's original linguistic meaning
is not possible; in part because today's scholars often prefer the results of the
decisions to the original meaning of the Constitution; and in part because it is
thought off-the-table to say that, well, some of the judicial decisions are simply
wrong and should not be followed, we are drowning in constitutional theory.
Jed Rubenfeld's Revolution byJudiciary stands firmly in that genre.
But pull back the curtain and the candid observer must concede that there
really is no Wizard with magical powers. There is only the Constitution and its
meaning; a set of decisions and practices that does not perfectly square with it;
and a reluctance to face that reality and its implications. We are not in Kansas
anymore. We can either return home-which means leaving some of the magic
behind -or we can continue to live in this somewhat different world, with all
54, For a fuller development of this proposition, see Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury,
supra note 23, at 2731-34.
s. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the
Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, lo9 YALE L.J. 1535, 157o-82 (2000) (arguing that stare
decisis, in the sense of deliberate adherence to erroneous prior constitutional decisions, is
clearly not constitutionally required and cannot be justified on originalist grounds by Article
III's assignment of the judicial power to the courts).
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its beautiful, imaginative constructs. But if we wish to live in Oz, we cannot
keep pretending that it is the Constitution we are expounding.
Michael Stokes Paulsen is McKnight Presidential Professor of Law and Public
Policy, Briggs and Morgan Professor of Law, and Associate Dean for Research and
Scholarship, University of Minnesota.
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TH AL LAW JO RAL
H. JEFFERSON POWELL
Grand Visions in an Age of Conflict
INTRODUCTION
Last spring Professor Laurence H. Tribe commented that federal
constitutional law is in a state of intellectual disarray: "[I]n area after area, we
find ourselves at a fork in the road -a point at which it's fair to say things
could go in any of several directions" and we have "little common ground from
which to build agreement."' No doubt fortuitously, two of our most
formidable constitutional scholars, Akhil R. Amar and Jed Rubenfeld, have
recently published systematic studies that implicitly challenge Tribe's
conclusion that "ours [is] a peculiarly bad time to be going out on a limb to
propound a Grand Unified Theory-or anything close." 2 With admirable
boldness, Professors Amar and Rubenfeld have done precisely that -gone out
on a limb, or rather two very different limbs, to propound their own accounts
of what American constitutionalism is, or should be. Amar's America's
Constitution and Rubenfeld's Revolution by Judiciary are alike in that each is its
author's synthesis of a remarkable effort, sustained over a number of years, to
develop a comprehensive vision of the Constitution. We have much to learn
from their successes as well as from the points at which they are, I believe, in
error.
I. AMAR'S CONSTITUTION
A. The Constitution of Text and Structure
Readers familiar with the prolific work of Akhil Amar will find in America's
Constitution a fitting capstone to two decades of erudite and wide-ranging
1. Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 291, 292 (2005).
2. Id. at 293 (emphasis omitted).
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scholarship. From his first major article, Of Sovereignty and Federalism
(published in 1987), Amar's work has been characterized by an unusually close
attention to the text of the Constitution, to the structure of the instrument as a
document, and to the Federal Republic as a system of government. An intense
interest in history, backed up by exhaustive research, and an admirable
willingness to think outside the confines of what passes in constitutional law
for ordinary science have also been salient elements in the Amar oeuvre. His
lively mind and facile pen have made his work unavoidable for anyone
interested in constitutional law, including many aspects of the law of the
Constitution, such as criminal procedure, that are now treated by almost
everyone else as separate areas of research and writing.
America's Constitution crystallizes both Amar's general approach and his
substantive themes. He comments almost at the beginning that his goal is "to
reacquaint twenty-first-century Americans with the written Constitution"
rather than to contribute to the endless discussion of "legal dictums and
doctrines that appear nowhere in the Constitution itself."4 Almost at the end of
the book's text, he comments that he "ha[s] tried to give the reader facts and
figures -lots of them,"' and he certainly cannot be faulted on either score.
America's Constitution is not exactly a line by line review of the instrument's
provisions, but I know of no other book in many years as comprehensive in its
treatment of all parts of the constitutional text. It is, furthermore, full of
historical information, some of it likely to surprise even the most informed
reader, and all of it arranged so as to lure the reader on rather than deter her.
Amar's interest in structural matters bears fruit repeatedly in discussions of
the origins of constitutional language and of American governmental practice
that are of the greatest interest. I will not stop to give details, but Amar's
treatment of the pervasive role of slavery in the Constitution of 1787, and (on
that topic and others) his industry in asking - and answering - questions about
the practical consequences of constitutional arrangements are excellent
examples of how fascinating his work can be.6 Furthermore, Amar's zest for
this sort of fine-grained and imaginative consideration of structural
arrangements is infectious: When he remarks at the end that he thinks a "well-
3. 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987).
4. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY, at xi (2005).
5. Id. at 469.
6. For specific examples, see his discussion of the 1787 Constitution's attribution to slave states
of representation based on a formula counting each slave as three-fifths of a free inhabitant,
id. at 88-98, his shrewd insight into the historical significance of the Necessary and Proper
Clause's wording for separation of powers, id. at 110-13, and his observations about the
Twelfth Amendment, id at 149-52, 336-47.
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chosen number can be every bit as interesting as a well-chosen quote,"7 I
suspect that a great many readers will feel, as I did, that Amar chose well.
B. The Secondary Role of History
America's Constitution is a learned and in some respects even a brilliant
book, but it is also deeply problematic. Perhaps the briefest way to identify my
concern is that I fear this is a book, and maybe an author, unsure of what the
subject under discussion really is. The result, I think, is that in too many places
the reader not caught up entirely by Professor Amar's facts and figures may
find herself unable to say precisely what sort of conclusions Amar is offering
US.
The full title of Amar's book is America's Constitution: A Biography, and one
might expect the final noun to define, even if metaphorically, the book's genre.
The 1787 text that we refer to as the (original) Constitution has a history in
several senses: It is a historical document and an enormous amount can and
has been said about its antecedents, the history of its drafting by the
Philadelphia Framers, and the debates and political maneuvering by which it
came to be accepted as the constitutive legal instrument of the American
Republic. Similar enquiries can be made about the later bits of text that
together with the 1787 document make up the Constitution to be found in
casebooks on federal constitutional law. It would make obvious if nonliteral
sense to term a historical study of some aspect of these matters "a biography."
It would be clear the author's claims were assertions of political history (i.e.,
this is how Alexander Hamilton and company turned a clear Anti-Federalist
majority into the losing side on the issue of ratification in New York) or
intellectual history (i.e., this is what Alexander Hamilton thought the term
"direct Taxes" meant). Amar gives us a considerable amount of detail about the
politics behind various constitutional provisions and the constitutional
opinions of various historical actors. Furthermore, in the last paragraph of the
book he claims that his goal has been "to understand precisely what the
document did and did not mean to those who enacted and amended it,"
8
suggesting that he is indeed writing intellectual history. However, while it is
dangerous to reject a scholar's own explanation of his methods and goals, I
believe that this statement is in reality erroneous: it is, as I shall argue, quite
contrary to Amar's actual practices in justifying claims about constitutional
7. Id. at 469.
s. Id. at 477.
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meaning in America's Constitution. Despite all its historical detail, political and
intellectual, America's Constitution is not, in the end, a book of history.
Consider, as an example, the lengthy discussion of the Constitution's
Preamble to which Amar devotes the first chapter of America's Constitution. As
in many other chapters, Amar uses his focus on a particular constitutional
provision as the vehicle for a discussion of other, more broad-ranging themes.
Chapter one returns to questions Amar has thought about for many years: the
nature of the Union and the locus of sovereignty within that Union. Amar
quickly and correctly reminds the reader that debate over such matters loomed
large in the antebellum history of the United States. Hamiltonians and
Jeffersonians fought over the scope of congressional power, Webster and Story
squared off against the nullifiers, and Unionists and secessionists alike justified
the Civil War -all in terms of an interminable debate over whether the states
or the Union was originally sovereign, what the various events since
independence might have done to the original arrangements, and (finally)
whether individual states had the legal right to leave the Union.
There are many historical enquiries one can make into this history of
debate, but to be historical enquiries they must address issues about what the
individuals and groups involved meant or did, or about what the ordinary
person of the time would have thought about the matter (often a hard question
to answer with confidence, but not in its nature ahistorical). But Amar's real
interest lies not in the history of antebellum opinion but in what he evidently
thinks of as the answer to a normative or legal question. Speaking in his own
voice, he tells us that "both before and after ratifying the Articles [of
Confederation], the people of each state -and not the people of America as a
whole-were sovereign";9 "[a]lthough states would enter the Constitution as
true sovereigns, they would not remain so after [a] ratification" that "would
itself end each state's sovereign status and would prohibit future unilateral
secession";"0 it is an error to claim "that none of the thirteen original states had
ever been truly sovereign."" Each of these assertions was entirely familiar to
antebellum constitutionalists. Thomas Jefferson and Jefferson Davis agreed
with the first and last while denying the second; John Jay and Abraham
Lincoln held the opposite view ... and Professor Amar is willing to explain to
us where each was wrong and each right, and why.12
9. Id. at 26.
10. Id. at 33.
ii. Id. at 39.
12. I mention Jay only because his discussion of the locus-of-sovereignty question in Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), which Amar never discusses on this issue, is an
especially clear statement of the nationalist position at a point in time immediately after
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It is rather fun to see a twenty-first-century scholar answer nineteenth-
century questions and chastise nineteenth-century statesmen, but if this were
meant to be history, the attempt to do so would be a category error: The views
of historical figures on a question of constitutional interpretation in dispute
among them cannot be right or wrong when the question at hand is what the
historical meaning of the document was. They are witnesses to the question of
historical meaning, whereas the issue of who was right and who wrong is a
normative matter of law or politics or morality. Unless one adopts a strongly
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation, the attempt to adjudicate
between the opinions held by these historical figures mixes intellectual apples
and oranges. The difficulty is not ameliorated even if we shift our attention to
what Amar later calls "the meaning inherent in the basic acts of constitution."' 3
It is true that President Lincoln thought (and Professor Amar believes) that the
inherent meaning of the ratification process of 1787-1788 entailed the merger of
the states' individual sovereignties into an indivisible nation, but President
Jefferson and many others have thought that inherent meaning was quite the
opposite.4 Once again, history cannot prove the correct answer to the
normative question either way, and assertions about the normative answer are
not history.
I slipped in a qualification in the middle of the preceding paragraph. It is
perfectly sensible to argue, for example, that the historical evidence shows that
most Founding-era Americans thought Jefferson wrong and the antebellum
nationalists right on the locus of sovereignty after ratification- though I
personally doubt that the evidence can be marshaled either way. If one
stipulates a strictly originalist view of constitutional interpretation (one
formulation: the normative meaning of a constitutional provision is that which
most competent interpreters would have thought it meant when it was made
law's), then a convincing historical argument on that question of intellectual
ratification. While Amar makes little use of Supreme Court opinions, it is striking that he
ignores Jay while quoting John Marshall's opinion in the much later case of Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
13. AMAR, supra note 4, at 470.
14. While the question of secession is, I assume, permanently off the table, one need only read
Justice Clarence Thomas's opinion for four justices in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514
U.S. 779, 845 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting), to see that Jefferson's understanding of 1787-
1788 as leaving the states' individual sovereignties intact at a basic level is alive and well.
15. There have been many attempts to fine-tune a definition of constitutional originalism. I am
employing the one that seems to me the most plausible, but resolving this definitional
matter is irrelevant for present purposes for, as stated in the text, Professor Amar is not a
strict originalist.
I am indebted to my friend and colleague Walter Dellinger for the adjective. Dellinger
has long argued that the existence of a written Constitution necessarily makes a moderate
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history would answer the normative question of constitutional meaning as
well.
Professor Amar, however, is clearly not a strict originalist. Proofs of this in
America's Constitution are legion: The Commerce Clause, for example, may
provide a constitutional basis for federal regulation of "all forms of intercourse
in the affairs of life, whether or not narrowly economic... if a given problem
genuinely spill[s] across state or national lines"; 6 Article V may not be the
exclusive means of amending the Constitution;' 7 and there may be Ninth
Amendment rights that "might not be inferable from the Constitution's text
and structure but that nevertheless might deserve constitutional status."'"
Amar cannot explain the use of history and law in America's Constitution on
strict-originalist grounds because he does not practice that approach to
constitutional interpretation.
Professor Amar's conclusions about sovereignty are not historical
assertions, nor are they propositions of strict-originalist constitutional law.
Still less are they presented as interpretations of standard legal doctrine, the
usual grist for constitutional mills but an enterprise that (as we have seen)
Amar expressly puts to one side in America's Constitution. In form and logic,
they bear little resemblance to the sorts of empirical, economic, and
institutional enquiries that interest most contemporary political scientists.
Here, as at many other points in the book, Amar's answers to what "the
Constitution" means simply do not speak to the sorts of questions historians,
lawyers, and political scientists raise. So exactly what kind of answers is
Professor Amar giving us - and to what questions ?'9
originalism an indispensable starting point for anything that can plausibly claim to be
American constitutional law: A refusal to use original meaning to establish the starting point
for the words the document uses would render the text infinitely manipulable. Dellinger,
Amar, and I are all moderate originalists in this sense.
16. AMAR, supra note 4, at 107-08.
17. Id. at 295-99. Amar cites only James Wilson from the Founding era as possibly supporting
this idea, and his earlier scholarship to the same effect points to little else relevant to an
originalist. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994). Here, as elsewhere when he diverges
radically from the more usual views, in America's Constitution Amar tends to avoid direct
statements and to present his argument as a matter of interpretive possibility: "shouldn't
Article V... be read as nonexclusive?" AMAR, supra note 4, at 297. My point is that Amar
has no a priori objection to accepting as correct constitutional arguments that cannot be
defended on strict-originalist grounds.
18. AMAR, supra note 4, at 328.
19. Just to be clear: I am not criticizing Amar in the least for his decision not to load the text
down with "quibbling qualifiers." AMAR, supra note 4, at 47o. He is quite clear from the
beginning that America's Constitution is "an opinionated biography." Id. at xii. The problem
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C. The Textualism of Real Meaning
The answer to our conundrum, according to Professor Amar himself, is
that he is "a constitutional textualist""°: He is not, therefore, so much
interested in what any individual, whether founder or twenty-first-century
American, thought or thinks about the meaning of the written Constitution,
but rather in what the Constitution means in itself At the beginning of his
discussion of the questions of national unity and state sovereignty, Amar
comments that "[i]n word and deed, the Constitution yielded its own answers
to these epic questions."2 What Amar seeks to explain, then, is the
Constitution's own resolution of the issues that divided Hamilton and
Jefferson, Lincoln and Davis. His license to adjudicate between these historical
figures - to tell us when Lincoln was right and Davis wrong - stems from the
Constitution itself, which has its own intrinsic meaning that is quite distinct
from the views of even its most distinguished makers and interpreters. From
this perspective, furthermore, concerned as it is with the written Constitution
rather than with matters that "appear nowhere in the Constitution itself,"'
issues such as whether most people in 1788 or 1868 would have agreed with
Amar's conclusions are secondary.
Amar is not, of course, a narrow literalist-recall his invocation of "the
meaning inherent in the basic acts of constitution."23 He writes: "I myself do
not believe that all of American constitutionalism can be deduced simply from
the document." 4 A sophisticated textualism of the sort he intends to employ
must take account of "both constitutional politics (how did the text come to be
enacted?) and constitutional law (what did the enacted text mean?)."" To do
so fully, Amar believes, requires one to transgress the disciplinary boundaries
that, he rather clearly thinks, handicap the work of most other scholars. "Law,
history, and political science-these three disciplines form the legs of the stool
on which this book rests. ", 6 Amar's ambition is "to synthesize" these three
disciplines in writing his account of the Constitution since "each discipline in
with the locus-of-sovereignty discussion in chapter one, a problem that I believe appears
recurrently in America's Constitution, is that it is unclear what Amar is giving his opinions
about.
2o. Id. at 470.
21. Id. at 21.
22. Id. at xi.
23. Id. at 470.
24. Id. at 477.
25. Id. at 469.
26. Id. at 467.
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isolation may be faulted"27 : The lawyer's attention to the logic and normative
implications of the text's provisions, the historian's knowledge of the conflicts
that shaped the text, and the political scientist's interest in how political
structures interact are all necessary if we are to understand in an appropriately
sophisticated way the meaning of the written Constitution.
Amar is not, furthermore, an exegete of isolated clauses. Despite his
deliberate focus at many points on the meaning of particular constitutional
terms, Amar's practice of constitutional textualism is an enquiry into the
meaning of the Constitution-including all of its amendments-as an integrated
and coherent whole. Amar's textualism is not a clause-bound interpretivism
but a broad enquiry into how the "various provisions .. intermesh to form
larger patterns of meaning and structures of decision making. ,,8 Amar
sometimes refers to "the larger pattern '" evidenced by distinct provisions and
the "general . . . vision inform[ing] much" of the Constitution's "overall
structure and many of its specific words."3" He is intensely interested in what
he sees as the "multiple textual harmonies at play"31 among different
provisions-including provisions written and adopted at different times-and in
the "keys and cues" to be found in the details of "the Founding act and text,"3
which, in his judgment, reveal the underlying meaning of the Constitution
viewed as a unified whole. The underlying assumption in all this, of course, is
that the Constitution in fact has a coherent overall meaning, and that its
individual provisions, including provisions enacted at widely separated points
in time, can be put side by side to yield meanings that separately they would
not have. But this is the theory: How does Amar's textualism work in practice?
Before answering that question, I need to be clear about a few matters over
which Professor Amar and I have no dispute. No one doubts that specific
constitutional arrangements (the structuring of the legislative process in Article
I, for example) were intended to produce coherent, or at least workable,
governmental procedures.33 It makes good historical sense to attempt to
discern how the makers of a particular constitutional arrangement meant it to
work, it is worthy political science to examine how the Constitution's
27. Id. at 466-67.
28. Id. at xii.
29. Id. at 301.
30. Id. at 51.
31. Id. at 326.
32. Id. at 472 n.*.
33. Equally, however, no one believes that the Constitution's various makers always succeeded
in doing so-no one including Professor Amar. His unhappiness with the Article V
amendment process is especially striking.
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governmental procedures work and have worked in practice, and it is one of
the lawyer's quintessential tasks to harmonize clashing or discordant
provisions in a binding legal instrument. But Professor Amar's theoretical
"aspiration [is] to holism.., to unite law, history, and political science [and]
to view the document over its entire life span."' His disciplinary tools are
meant to serve a task-the search for the actual meaning of the Constitution-
that transcends them all. As I shall suggest, this search leads to less obvious,
and less obviously correct, results than one might expect. I have space to deal at
length with only one example.
Amar criticizes "modern observers" for slighting "the significance of
geographic/geostrategic considerations that loomed large in the Federalist
vision"" and regards America's Constitution as a creative and even novel
correction to this error. The implicit but unmistakable claim to novelty is
overstated: It is hard to imagine that many scholars would disagree with the
proposition that the Founders were concerned about creating a federal
government capable of addressing the foreign policy and national security
needs of the Republic. 6 However, it is certainly the case that important aspects
of Professor Amar's presentation of this commonplace are original. In his view,
for example, the Founders' "geostrategic vision of union [was] distilled in the
Preamble,"37 by which he means that the Preamble's words reveal that the
Constitution as a whole has as its inherent purpose the creation of "an island
nation ... where foreign powers would be far removed and where internal
borders would be demilitarized." 8 This is a singular assertion: There is, as far
as America's Constitution shows or I am aware, no evidence that anyone in the
Founding era thought that the Preamble did any such thing other than in the
general and almost trivial sense that it was a statement of the Constitution's
goals.
There is a similar problem with Professor Amar's "distinctive claim[]" that
the Preamble's "proper place [was] the Founders' foundation" and that other
34 Id. at469.
35. Id. at 472-73.
36. In fact, the scholarly literature is full of attention to the role of what Amar terms
'geostrategy" in the making and early interpretation of the Constitution. For a provocative
recent example, see Robert J. Delahunty, Structuralism and the War Powers: The Army, Navy
and Militia Clauses, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1021 (2003). Our overall understanding of the role
such considerations play in the making of a constitutional order has been enormously
enriched by PHILIP BOBBIT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF
HISTORY (2002). Professor Amar mentions the work of neither Delahunty nor Bobbitt.
37. AMAR, supra note 4, at io6.
38. Id. at 44.
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scholars have ignored this fact. 9 The claim is distinctive but unpersuasive. The
Preamble's language was cast in the common idiom of American political
discourse and in many respects ("Justice ...common defense ...general
Welfare") that of all Western political discourse. On occasion, to be sure,
constitutionalists and politicians have quoted its particular phrases but the
scarcity of such usages is unsurprising: The common law treated preambular
material in a legal instrument as without direct legal force, and for that and
other reasons the Preamble has understandably played little role in discussion
of a document universally treated as law.4° Amar's claim that the particular use
of this language in the Preamble was of great importance historically, or that it
sheds much light on the legal interpretation of the rest of the Constitution or
on the institutional dynamics of our political system is, at best, unproven in
America's Constitution.
Given Professor Amar's frequent stress on the importance of verbal
parallels, it is appropriate to examine a specific instance of the manner in which
he attempts to use such parallels to show the importance of the Preamble. We
are told that Article I, Section 8 begins with words that show that the
Preamble's "geostrategic vision" informs the Constitution's grant of powers to
Congress: "section 8 began by echoing the Preamble almost verbatim, in
language affirming the need to 'Provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare.' 41 The "echo" is, however, no more exact than the "[s]imilar
phraseology" which, as Amar properly acknowledges at once, is found in
Article VIII of the Articles of Confederation. Indeed, the language of section 8
("provide for the common Defence and general Welfare") seems to me closer
as a verbal matter to that of the Articles ("incurred for the common defense or
general welfare") than it is to that of the Preamble, which breaks the two nouns
into separate infinitive phrases. Why then doesn't Section 8 show that it
39. Id. at 471.
40. In 1791, the first Federal Attorney General, Edmund Randolph, rejected reliance on the
Preamble in constitutional argument in advising President Washington that the national
bank bill was invalid:
"The Preamble to the Constitution has also been relied on as a source of power.
To this, it will be here remarked, once for all, that the Preamble if it be operative
is a full constitution of itself, and the body of the Constitution is useless; but that
it is declarative only of the views of the convention, which they supposed would
be best fulfilled by the powers delineated; and that such is the legitimate nature of
preambles."
Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, The Constitutionality of the Bank Bill: The Attorney
General's First Constitutional Law Opinions, 44 DKE L.J. 110, 125 (1994) (quoting Randolph's
unpublished opinion).
41. AMAR, supra note 4, at 1o6.
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embodies the geostrategic vision distilled in the Articles, the language of which
it echoes almost verbatim? The answer, one fears, is that America's Constitution
posits a sharp contrast between the Articles and the Constitution in this and
other matters, and that the inconvenient parallel in word choice between
Section 8 and the Articles does not serve to advance this contrast. I agree
entirely with any reader inclined to dismiss all of this as insignificant verbal
quibbling-but Professor Amar cannot rightly do so because he puts great
weight on such "textual harmonies."
If this were an isolated example of how Amar's textualism works, one
might properly set it aside as a slip, but the passage is, I believe, exemplary of
how his textualism often plays out in practice. I will give a few other examples
briefly, but to gauge the fairness of my criticism the reader must read America's
Constitution itself. Professor Amar assures us that the Constitution rests on "a
clear commitment to people over property." Perhaps, but the observation that
the expression "private property" never appears in the 1787 document and that
the noun's only occurrence refers to government property4' does little to
advance the claim; slavery, the importance of which to the 1787 Constitution
Amar details at length, never appears as a verbal matter either. Although Article
I "borrow[ed] the name of confederate America's central organ -'Congress'- it
promised a quite different institution," in part (we are told) by expressly
granting to the constitutional Congress "legislative Powers" and referring to its
power to make "Laws"; 43 true enough about the Constitution's terminology,
but the second provision of the Articles referred to "every power, jurisdiction,
and right . . .delegated to" the Confederation Congress, and that body
designated its own enactments as "ordinances." Do the verbal differences mean
that much?44 That the Second, Fourth, and Seventh Amendments "aimed to
protect popular rights [as opposed to sheerly individual ones] via institutions
(the militia and the jury) that would embody 'the people' themselves" is
indicated, Amar believes, by the occurrence of "security" in the Second,
"secure" in the Fourth, and "securities" in an early draft of the Seventh
42. Id. at 17.
43. Id. at 57.
44. The first definition of "ordinance" in Dr. Johnson's dictionary is "Law, rule, precept." The
Federalist describes the enactments of the Confederation Congress as "laws" and asserts, in
the course of minimizing the difference between that body and the legislature proposed by
the 1787 instrument, that the old Congress "have as compleat authority" as the new
Congress would to make its pronouncements legally binding. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No.
21 (Alexander Hamilton), Nos. 37, 45 (James Madison). The point is not that Amar is wrong
to see a significant difference between the two bodies, but rather that his verbal
observations, here as elsewhere, often do little to advance his conclusions.
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Amendment. 4' America's Constitution abounds in this type of ingenious but
unconvincing exegesis of the Constitution's wording.46
D. An Underlying Problem of Method?
When an eminent constitutionalist writes that the 1787 document's concern
with protecting the territorial integrity of the United States "informed... its
pointed Article VI language describing the Constitution as the law of 'the
Land"' 47 it is clear that something has gone wrong. How could such a learned
and industrious scholar make such a claim, or the other, similarly remarkable
assertions that abound in America's Constitution? I believe that at least part of
the answer lies in Professor Amar's desire to craft a new and more sophisticated
textualism employing the three disciplines of history, law, and political science.
His goal, of course, is to reach a richer understanding of the text by melding
these disciplines. All too often, unfortunately, the result is that his textualism
escapes the constraints of all three, and Amar offers us readings of the text that
are indefensible as history, law, or political science.
As a historical matter, the Supremacy Clause of Article VI was obviously
using the familiar language of the Magna Carta. No competent lawyer would
argue in a brief or opinion that the reference to "the land" in the clause sheds
any light on the powers or responsibilities of the federal government (and
certainly not any reference to protecting the territorial jurisdiction of the
Republic), and a political scientist would be interested in the role of federal law
45. AMAR, supra note 4, at 326-27. Professor Amar points out, fairly enough, that the Second and
Fourth Amendments refer to "the right of the people" and that Madison's draft of what
became the Seventh has the same expression with "rights" in the plural. The problem-
besides the odd reliance on a draft that was very substantially modified before it was
proposed and adopted-is, as with his use of the Preamble, that these phrases are the
common coin of Founding-era political discussion. Without more, their use proves only the
truism that the Bill of Rights is cast in the language of the era that created it. The use of
words at various points with the common root "secure" is, I think, of no interpretive
significance whatever.
46. Attorney General Randolph, whom I quoted earlier, pointed out in 1791 the ironic error in
putting this sort of weight on the precise wording of the constitutional text:
"Whosoever will attentively inspect the Constitution will readily perceive the
force of what is expressed in the letter of the convention, 'That the Constitution
was the result of a spirit of amity and mutual deference & concession.' To argue,
then, from its style or arrangement, as being logically exact, is perhaps a scheme
of reasoning not absolutely precise."
Dellinger & Powell, supra note 40, at 1z8 (quoting Randolph's unpublished opinion). Over-
precision in constitutional textualism, in other words, can lead to lead to legal imprecision!
47. AMAR, supra note 4, at 51.
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supremacy in enabling the Republic to safeguard the interests of the whole, not
in what amounts to a pun. Other than as a joke-which he plainly does not
intend it to be -Amar's reference to the language of the Supremacy Clause fits
into no obvious area of discourse.
America's Constitution would have been a more persuasive book if Amar had
actually written the work that his words occasionally suggest -an encyclopedic
examination of the text's original meaning informed by his deep interest in
institutional dynamics. But that would have been merely to write history, and
Amar's deep ambition goes beyond history or law or political science. The 1787
document, as he so often reminds the reader, begins with the words "We the
People," and Amar the textualist takes that bit of text with alarming
seriousness. In America's Constitution, the real story is not his often illuminating
discussions of the political struggles that lay behind the various provisions,
enacted at various times, which we collectively refer to as the Constitution. It is
instead the story of a text that has a unity transcending the limits of history and
chronology,48 a story in which the real actor, the actual creator of the
Constitution, is a People whose identity is not bound by time.49 It is an
imaginative story, told well, but the reader should take it cum grano salis.
II. RUBENFELD'S REVOLUTION
A. The Form of the Argument
In 1989 a young lawyer then in private practice published a remarkable
article entided The Right of Privacy.0 Roe v. Wade has had many defenders, but
those who are academic lawyers have often acted as such with an uneasy
conscience, fearing that the great John Hart Ely was right in rejecting the
decision as one that "is not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an
obligation to try to be."'" Indeed it is arguable, as Ely himself feared, that the
48. Professor Amar's search for echoes and harmonies in the language of constitutional
provisions ranges forward and backward in time: He is as critical of "historians of the
Founding" for "often fail[ing] to show much interest in the intense secession debate that
occurred many decades later," as he is of "Civil War historians [who] are not always fluent
in the facts of the Founding." Id. at 472 n. *.
49. See, e.g., id. at io ("The people had taken center stage and enacted their own supreme law"
in 1788); id. at 468 ("We the People eventually abolished slavery and promised equal rights
to blacks and, later, women").
so. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989).
51. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YAIE L.J. 920, 947
(1973).
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desperate wish to protect the outcome in Roe has led many of its proponents
essentially to abandon the effort to distinguish constitutional decisions by the
Supreme Court from political decisionmaking by Congress or the state
legislatures.5 2 Jed Rubenfeld, on the other hand, made it clear in 1989, once
and for all, that he will have none of that. The Court got the law of the
Constitution right in Roe in his view, and for that reason-and only so-the
Court should adhere to the decision. Rubenfeld's article was the single most
sustained and powerful legal justification for Roe that had ever been written,
and his work since then has combined a forthright adherence as a general
matter to the Court's "liberal" decisions with an unrelenting insistence that
judicial review is legitimate only as the exercise of the power to interpret and
apply law and not as a simple form of political choice. In Revolution by Judiciary,
Rubenfeld has given us his clearest account to date of how the Court ought to
decide constitutional cases, and how in doing so it is interpreting the
Constitution rather than imposing the political preferences of the Justices.
Revolution by Judiciary divides into three parts of roughly the same length.
The third and final section is an incisive critique of the Rehnquist Court's
constitutional legacy, which Rubenfeld identifies as the pursuit of an
unacknowledged and indefensible agenda of opposition to the anti-
discrimination principles that the Court and Congress appropriately enforced
in the past. 3 Important and interesting as his arguments on that score are, 4 I
believe that Rubenfeld's fundamental contribution to constitutional law lies in
the discussion, mostly though not entirely in the book's first section, of how
constitutional decisions are and ought to be reached. In this Commentary I
shall focus my attention on that discussion, although I shall conclude my
consideration of Revolution by Judiciary with some comments on the arguments
in the second section of Rubenfeld's book, which offers a theory of why
constitutional law has normative force.
B. The Missing Law of Constitutional Interpretation
There are two background presuppositions to the argument of Revolution
by Judiciary. The first is that the history of constitutional law is one of "radical
52. See John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where
Courts Are No Different from Lgislatures, 77 VA. L. REv. 833 (1991).
53. JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 175-83 (2005).
54. Among many possible examples, see his excellent, sharply critical discussion of the Court's
adoption of strict scrutiny as the proper form of review for race-based affirmative action. Id.
at 195-201.
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judicial reinterpretation" of the Constitution: the repeated episodes in which
the Supreme Court has rejected established understandings of the Constitution
and replaced them with novel principles and conclusions of its own devising."5
The Court and its defenders often explain such radical reinterpretation with a
"rhetoric of restoration" (what seems novel is in fact the recovery of an earlier
constitutional vision that has been lost) or the claim that all that has changed
are the circumstances of decision and not the constitutional principles the
Court employs. In Professor Rubenfeld's opinion these are charades that serve
only to obscure the truth that in such situations the Court is "creat[ing] ...
genuinely innovative constitutional law -decisions that break profoundly from
both past understandings and present doctrines. '', 6 Brown v. Board of Education
didn't recover the lost truth about the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause:
It introduced a new and creative understanding of equal protection into
American constitutional law.
Rubenfeld's second presupposition is that American constitutional law "has
no account of radical reinterpretation." He asks, "What, if anything, makes it
legitimate for judges to re-read the Constitution radically .... What, if
anything, guides or structures this power? What, if anything, limits it?"' Even
worse, if possible, lawyers and scholars cannot explain how judges are to go
about making constitutional decisions even when they intend no revolutionary
change. "There is no law of constitutional interpretation"; constitutional law
thus "has nearly nothing to say about the connection between the Constitution
and the enormous web of doctrine spun judicially around that document. " "8
This poses no problem, to be sure, for a self-proclaimed pragmatist like Judge
Richard Posner who sees constitutional "law" as the creation of outcomes "well
adapted to the country's needs" without regard to any duty to "'abide by
constitutional or statutory text."'' 9 One takes the Posnerian route, however,
only by giving up on the traditional understanding that constitutional law is
55. "Radical reinterpretation is, precisely, a new interpretation of the basic principles or
purposes behind a constitutional provision. Through this act of reinterpretation, new
constitutional purposes or principles replace the original ones." Id. at 9.
56. Id. at 8-9. "Constitutional law has utterly rejected originalism" as the limiting criterion for
judicial decisionmaking. Id. at 65. I will note below the sense in which one could view
Rubenfeld as a kind of originalist.
S. Id. at 3.
58. Id. at 5.
59. Id. at io. Rubenfeld is quoting Judge Posner's denial of the existence of such a duty in
Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 737, 739 (2002), surely one of the most remarkable statements ever to be made by a
sitting federal judge. Rubenfeld's response to Posner is, I believe, utterly convincing. See Jed
Rubenfeld, A Reply to Posner, 54 STAN. L. REv. 753, 767 (2002).
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authoritative precisely because the judges who make it see their "first duty" to
be "to abide by the Constitution: to deliver a just reading of that document
according to interpretive criteria. ' '6 , Pragmatism in Judge Posner's sense is
simply the abandonment of law altogether, and that Rubenfeld is unwilling to
do.
Fortunately for those of us less intrepid than Judge Posner, according to
Revolution by Judiciary we have no need to give up on constitutional law as law
in the sense I have just quoted. Despite the existence of radical change in
constitutional law, and the nonexistence of a shared explicit understanding
about how to do constitutional law properly, "[t]he extraordinary fact" is that
virtually all of constitutional law-including almost all the many instances in
which the disparate and often political "approaches, motives, and biases" of the
justices have been on display-has been worked out "within a determinate
interpretive structure."6 Although neither the courts nor anyone else has been
consciously working within that structure, Rubenfeld believes that he can
show the existence of an internal logic to constitutional decisionmaking, one
that is continuously at work both in decisions about the Constitution's grants
of power and in ones concerning individual rights. The first part of the book is
a summary and restatement of the work Rubenfeld has long been doing in
uncovering and explaining what his subtitle calls "the structure of American
constitutional law."
C. Does Constitutional Law Have an Implicit Logic?
The key to understanding the implicit logic of constitutional law lies in
what Professor Rubenfeld calls the "impossibly simple distinction ", 62 between
the historical understanding of what a constitutional provision addresses and
historical understandings about those matters that the provision does not
address.
Let us say, as a shorthand, that a prohibitory [provision] applies to
those actions it prohibits, and that it does not apply to those actions it
does not prohibit. So I will call specific understandings of what a
constitutional right prohibits Application Understandings, and of what it
does not prohibit, No-Application Understandings....
Similarly, with respect to constitutional power-granting provisions
(such as the commerce clause), which authorize certain actors to take
60. RUBENFELD, supra note S3, at lo.
61. Id. at 21.
62. Id. at 13.
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certain actions, I [distinguish] specific understandings of what such a
provision authorizes [from] specific understandings of what such a
provision does not authorize.63
Rubenfeld's strong claim is that constitutional law has almost invariably
respected the historical understanding of those issues to which a constitutional
provision applies -the specific actions the Free Speech Clause historically was
thought to forbid or the specific regulations the Commerce Clause historically
was thought to authorize. With respect to historical understandings about the
concerns a provision addresses, even the most radical judicial reinterpretations
have preserved the historical understanding of the text's applications.
Furthermore, the "foundational or core applications" 64 of a provision - its central
or most universally shared "Application Understandings" -have acted not only
to anchor radical reinterpretation in a faithfulness to the text, but also to "serve
as paradigm cases [that] provide the reference points for the construction of
doctrinal frameworks. '' 6, In other words, judges use the historical
understanding about the issues a provision addresses to ground their reasoning
in applying the provision to specific controversies. These paradigm cases thus
define the conceptual universe within which constitutional law is debated and
made. "The foundational paradigm cases are preinterpretive. They precede
interpretation; they define its limits and its objects." 66
But how then does one explain the demonstrable fact that the Supreme
Court has again and again declared a principle to be the law of the Constitution
when the makers and early interpreters of the provision in question would have
been astounded-or shocked-to hear as much? Rubenfeld's answer is that
while the Court has almost always observed Application Understandings, it has
felt entirely free to reject other historical understandings addressing matters as
to which the provision was originally thought to have no application. The Free
Speech Clause was historically understood to prohibit government censorship
and prosecutions for seditious libel, and as Application Understandings those
twin prohibitions are the paradigm cases which subsequent free speech
doctrine has respected and revolved around. In contrast, the Free Speech
Clause was not historically thought to apply to prosecutions for blasphemy,
63. Id. at 14. The matter is complicated by the fact that a provision that is a grant of exclusive
power to, say, Congress, has a prohibitory function as well: It forbids other actors such as
the President from wielding what is put exclusively within Congress's sphere. Rubenfeld
carefully works out this point. Id. at 48-49.
64. Id. at 14.
65. Id. at 15-16.
66. Id. at 132.
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but the Court long ago repudiated that No Application Understanding as a
guide to the proper interpretation of the First Amendment.6" In a parallel
fashion, Commerce Clause doctrine has maintained its fidelity to the paradigm
cases of what the clause was historically understood to authorize Congress to
do, while the Court has repeatedly upheld exercises of the Commerce Clause to
regulate matters to which the founders would not have thought it applicable.68
Grasping the fact that constitutional law treats only understandings about a
provision's applications, not expectations about what it would not apply to, as
the controlling paradigm case(s) is the key to understanding the remarkable
combination of deep continuity and profound change that according to
Rubenfeld is the "characteristic mark of American constitutional
interpretation." 69 The Court has not hesitated to reach decisions "at odds with
original No-Application Understandings," 7° while even the most radical
reinterpretations have "labor[ed] under the continuing obligation to do justice
to the paradigm cases -or, more precisely, to do justice to the text in light of its
paradigm cases.""1 It therefore would be possible to call Rubenfeld's theory a
form of originalism, for he insists that what renders constitutional law a
coherent and workable form of law, an interpretation of the text of the
Constitution and not an untethered exercise of power by unelected judicial
politicians, is this obligation to build judicial doctrine and decision around
historically determined paradigm cases. But those who usually call themselves
originalists go further and insist that the Court is obliged to follow original
understandings about what constitutional provisions do not address (No
Application Understandings) as well - a practice that the Court has never
followed and that, if one truly accepted it, would render most of modern
constitutional law both erroneous and unintelligible.72 Rubenfeld, true
67. Id. at 25-29.
68. Id. at 53-56.




"What the originalists fail to see is that [the Court's] selective treatment of historical
meaning is neither arbitrary nor unusual. It is part of the basic structure of American
constitutional law." Id. at 31.
Professor Rubenfeld's position is further distinguished from that usually thought of as
originalism in that he believes that under certain circumstances a new understanding of a
provision's applications, one not actually entertained when the provision was adopted, can
become "a 'fixed star' or reference point by which future interpretations are measured." Id.
at 122. In short, a new paradigm case. He points as examples to the processes by which the
Sedition Act of 1798 became a paradigm case of what the First Amendment prohibits and by
which Brown v. Board of Education became a paradigm case of what equal protection




GRAND VISIONS IN AN AGE OF CONFLICT
conservative that he is, declines to follow would-be originalists into this
interpretive radicalism.
If Rubenfeld's description of the paradigm-case method of constitutional
interpretation is persuasive, it thus solves at one and the same time the
intellectual puzzles created by the existence of radical reinterpretation and the
absence of a law of constitutional interpretation. Radical reinterpretation
respects the true paradigm cases while treating freely other historical
understandings; the Court has followed this pattern of decision with great
fidelity and it is only now in a time of great intellectual disarray (I go beyond
Rubenfeld's words) that Rubenfeld's articulation of our law's implicit logic has
become necessary. And it does so without discarding law as interpretation
altogether (Judge Posner) or delegitimizing the history of judicial
decisionmaking since the founding (the originalists).
D. The Success of the Paradigm-Case Method
This claim is so bold as to be breathtaking, but has Professor Rubenfeld
pulled it off? In my opinion, the answer is, bluntly, yes. The reader can
properly reach her own judgment only by going through Part I of Revolution by
Judiciary herself, but let me indicate why I think Rubenfeld has made good on
his claim. First, while one could quibble about details and Revolution by
Judiciary does not attempt a comprehensive examination of constitutional law
issues, I believe that Rubenfeld is justified in his historical assertion that the
Court has seldom if ever rejected what Rubenfeld calls the paradigm case(s)
informing a provision of the text. The endless examples one can give of the
Court clearly reaching results contrary to the expectations and intentions of the
text's makers will turn out, almost invariably, to concern No Application
Understandings; in other words, the discarded historical understanding
concerned an issue to which the right or the grant of power was not thought to
apply. Merely to have observed this apparent pattern in our constitutional law
is a stunning achievement, and even those who reject Rubenfeld's overall
argument are obligated to see the observation as one that they must recognize
requires. Id. at 122-23. Rubenfeld's view of such after-the-fact understandings is carefully
nuanced: "[S]ubsequendy developed Application Understandings... have a status close to
that of a foundational paradigm case," but not identical, and "In]one of them is beyond the
Court's power to undo, but the Court would be under an obligation to demonstrate
compelling justifications for doing so." Id. at 123.
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and deal with in offering their own accounts of constitutional
decisionmaking.73
A second reason for my belief that Rubenfeld has succeeded is that his
description of constitutional law as reasoning from the text's paradigm cases
addresses constitutional law as the Justices and others have actually practiced
it; his method, if not his terminology, is recognizable as a description of the
type of basically common law reasoning that American lawyers and judges have
employed in interpreting the Constitution since the founding.7 4 In his
conclusion, Rubenfeld remarks that "[t]he purpose of constitutional theory is,
and always has been, to hold the mirror up to constitutional law," while
immediately conceding that any theory will to some degree distort its subject. 75
That has to be correct, at least if the term "constitutional theory" is to denote
any real connection to the constitutional law that goes on in the courts. A
besetting problem in much highly ambitious constitutional scholarship is its
remoteness from the practice of constitutional law, and in particular the
impossibility of imagining anyone other than the scholar himself being able to
73. Professor Rubenfeld admits the possibility of two counter-examples: the Contracts Clause,
as to which the Court's 1934 decision in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 90 U.S. 398
(1934), arguably upheld a clear example of the sort of law prohibited by the clause's
paradigm case; and the use of military force by the President in the absence of a
congressional declaration of war. As to Blaisdell, Rubenfeld suggests that if the decision did
in fact violate the Contract Clause's paradigm case the Court should overrule it; with respect
to the Declare War Clause, he asserts that "American courts have never officially retreated
from the principle that the President may not unilaterally declare war." RUBENFELD, supra
note 53, at 67-68. Well, no they haven't-although that formulation of the constitutional
issue is, I think, uncharacteristically imprecise and misses the point made by some scholars
(me included) that there is a plausible or even persuasive original understanding that the
President may make unilateral use of military force in some situations and that the courts
have not erred in failing to rule otherwise. But if my doubts about Rubenfeld's brief
discussion are justified, it only supports his historical claim that the paradigm case theory
explains the patterns of continuity and change by eliminating one of the two counter-
examples.
74. In addition to the historical claim that he has identified what in fact the Court has been
doing for the past two centuries, Professor Rubenfeld properly notes that his account of
constitutional law reasoning systematizes the old common law approach to the
interpretation of a normative instrument. He is also aware, of course, of the important work
of other distinguished constitutional lawyers who hold somewhat similar views of
constitutional law. See RUBENFELD, supra note S3, at 205 n.1 (citing the work of Philip
Bobbitt and Richard H. Fallon, Jr.); see also H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION
OF AMEucAN CONSTITUTIONAUSM 74-86 (1993) (arguing that traditional common lawyers
looked to the concrete details of past controversies in interpreting the meaning of legal
rules). "For classical common lawyers, rules were discovered in, debated in terms of, and
decided with reference to stories of past situations and decisions." POwELL, supra, at 78.
75. RUBENFELD, supra note 53, at 201.
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employ the tools supposedly on offer. (How would one know what counts as a
textual harmony and what is a mere chance parallel in terminology?) Part I
(and Part III as well) of Revolution by Judiciary are strongly marked by
Rubenfeld's keen interest in showing, both by reflection and by example, the
specifically legal character of constitutional interpretation.
I also think that Rubenfeld has rebutted the major criticisms of his legal
argument that have been or might be made. A critic, first, might worry that the
problem with Rubenfeld's paradigm-case account of constitutional law is not
that it distorts the history or the legal character of constitutional law but that it
fails to shed much light on how constitutional law ought to be done. If this is
so, the account fails to address the questions raised by what Rubenfeld
identifies as the presuppositions of Revolution by Judiciary.76 As he himself
readily admits, to identify constitutional law with reasoning on the basis of
paradigm cases does not transform the enterprise into a deductive science.
Paradigm cases do not dictate unique answers to most constitutional
questions. Different judges will see the paradigm cases differently; it
will almost always be possible to capture the paradigmatic applications
of a particular constitutional right or power within more than one
interpretive paradigm. This means that five justices of the Supreme
Court can, at any given moment, redetermine the basic meaning of the
paradigm casesY
Second, and still more fundamentally, our critic might observe, there can
be disagreement over what paradigm case is embodied in a constitutional
provision -and even whether there was any foundational or core Application
Understanding at all.78 Third and finally, the fact that there can be good-faith
disagreement over the nature and implications of the paradigm cases means
76. My colleague Erwin Chemerinsky advanced this concern in his review of an earlier version
of Rubenfeld's account of the paradigm-case method. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Grand
Theory of Constitutional Law?, loo MICH. L. REV. 1249, 1261-62 (2oo2) (reviewing JED
RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
(2001)). For the reasons stated in the text, I think that Revolution by Judiciary provides a
satisfactory answer to Professor Chemerinsky's criticism.
77. RUBENFELD, supra note 53, at 17.
78. Professor Rubenfeld admits that there is "[n]o a priori necessity dictat[ing] the existence of
any specific, core, actuating, applications for the various rights and powers included in the
American Constitution." Id. at 119. In his judgment, however, "it just so happens that there
were [such actuating applications] for just about every one of the Constitution's most
important rights and powers," id., so the point is largely theoretical. In the case of a
provision with no paradigm case, the constitutional interpreter would simply be left with
applying whatever "principle or proposition [is] set forth in the text" itself. Id. at 134.
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that there can be bad-faith, manipulative arguments as well, which the method
itself cannot distinguish on their face from intellectually honest ones.
This last, third point can be easily dealt with-as alluded to above,
Revolution by Judiciary assumes from start to finish that the constitutional
interpreter it is addressing acknowledges that her "first duty" as an interpreter
is "to abide by the Constitution [and] to deliver a just reading of that
document according to interpretive criteria."79 The scientific method doesn't
stop researchers from falsifying their results, but it would be silly to reject the
method for that reason. In just the same way it is not an interesting criticism of
the interpretive criteria Rubenfeld proposes that the criteria do not in
themselves prevent an unscrupulous judge from manipulating them.
The second criticism, that in some instances we may not be able to find, or
at least to agree on, a paradigmatic Application Understanding for a given
provision is, I think, more serious, but only modestly so. As Rubenfeld
implies,8" there is in fact a lot of historical information about the perceived
original purposes of most important constitutional provisions likely to come
into controversy. Recall that a Rubenfeldian interpreter is interested only in
specific Application Understandings, when they exist, and not in the broader
question of what a provision's original meaning in general was. This
significantly reduces the difficulty of making (in an intellectually responsible
manner) the historical assertions necessary to paradigm-case reasoning as
compared to those required by a strict originalism: It is easier to conclude that
the one thing the Fourteenth Amendment was unquestionably meant to do was
to outlaw the black codes than it is to determine who is right about other,
broader issues of original meaning. And-from my perspective if not (to the
same extent, anyway) from Professor Rubenfeld's - it causes no theoretical
discomfort to admit that in the absence of a persuasive argument about what a
provision's paradigm case is, the provision simply doesn't apply beyond
whatever force can be given to its words.
Finally, our critic's first worry over the indeterminacy left in place by
Rubenfeld's account of constitutional law is, I think, ultimately
indistinguishable from worry over indeterminacy in the law generally. It is
true, without any doubt, that at any given point in time there are a great many
constitutional issues about which reasonable, good-faith interpreters can reach
opposite conclusions, from identifying what the paradigm cases are and what
principles they embody to determining how they apply to resolve
contemporary disputes about very different issues. It is equally true, however,
79. Id. at iO.
So. Id. at 119.
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that not all arguments are equally plausible, and that the very heart of Anglo-
American law rests in making contestable judgments about which arguments
are better and which worse whenever one happens to be arguing. It is a
strength, not a weakness, of Rubenfeld's book that he avoids any suggestion
that his own arguments, using what he believes to be the implicit logic of
constitutional law, are invulnerable to contrary arguments that use the same
logic more persuasively. What he has identified for us is the way in which we
have made and should make arguments to one another in the shared task of
interpreting the Constitution. We should not expect greater precision in
executing our practices than the subject matter will allow.
E. Why Is Constitutional Law Binding? An Unnecessary Answer
In my judgment, then, Revolution by Judiciary is a tremendous contribution
to our understanding of federal constitutional law. Professor Rubenfeld has
identified a pattern in the almost infinitely complex and ever-changing
substance of constitutional law that rescues the field from the charges of
unintelligibility or sheer political choice. He has, furthermore, suggested what
I believe to be an entirely satisfactory rationale of why judges should follow the
traditional interpretive practices of our legal culture in making constitutional
decisions: Those practices define what constitutional law is,81 and those who
have undertaken as judges (or others) the obligation to make decisions
according to constitutional law have a duty to act accordingly. Consider his
2002 comment on Judge Posner's denial that a judge has "some kind of moral
or even political duty to abide by constitutional or statutory text, or by
precedent '' s2 :
Unless Posner intends a distinction between abiding by the
Constitution and abiding by "constitutional text" (and I don't think he
intends this distinction), Posner's statement could be said to amount to
an express repudiation of his oath of office. In fact, Posner's view seems
to make the oath a kind of lark. The whole point of an oath is to create a
moral or political duty.3
No more is needed, I think, to explain the normative force for a
constitutional judge of a correct account of constitutional decisionmaking: She
is under a moral and political duty stemming from her acceptance of her public
81. See id. at 132-34.
82. Posner, supra note 59, at 739.
83. Rubenfeld, supra note 59, at 767.
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office. The same is true of other citizens - legislators, executive officers,
jurors -acting in public capacities. In defining for us what constitutional law
is, Rubenfeld has suggested to us the reason why constitutional law has
normative force.
A bit ironically, one person who would certainly dissent from my
confidence in the persuasiveness and the completeness of Professor
Rubenfeld's argument (as I have restated it) is Rubenfeld himself. For him, an
account of why the law of constitutional law binds judges must go deeper, to
wrestle with and solve what he calls "the paradox of commitment" - the
philosophical problem generated by the oddity of treating as normative our
past commitments when they conflict with .our present preferences. 4 Most of
the second section of Revolution by Judiciary builds on Rubenfeld's earlier work
employing philosophy and game theory to address the relationship between
constitutional law and democracy. Rubenfeld's work in this has led him for
years to critique "presentist" understandings of democracy and to insist that
self-government (whether an individual's or a society's) requires the making
and maintenance of commitments over time."s My sense is that Rubenfeld's
current formulation has achieved new levels of clarity and conceptual power.
And, in this context, I think, the philosophical work is unnecessary and
distracting. Professor Rubenfeld forthrightly admits, at the beginning of the
second section, that he is simply assuming "without ever proving, that what is
true of individual commitments is true, mutatis mutandis, of constitutional
commitments- that political self-government may be profitably understood by
analogy to individual self-government." 6 Precisely: The theory of self-
government set out in this book rests on a highly contestable analogy between
the moral identity of individuals and the nature of a democratic and
constitutional state. Many of his readers, myself included, will not find the
analogy persuasive, and for us the attempt to ground constitutional law in the
theory therefore fails to get off the ground. I think that Rubenfeld's analysis of
the role of temporally extended commitments in our individual moral lives is
potentially a major contribution to philosophical ethics, and I hope that he
pursues this work further, unshackled by a felt need to relate the analysis to
constitutional law. But he should also free his powerful and persuasive account
of constitutional law from the link to a novel, highly contestable philosophical
84. See RUBENFELD, supra note 53, at 71-79.
85. It would be impossible to summarize Professor Rubenfeld's elegant argument in a footnote,
and I will not try. But see id. at 88 (summarizing the solution to the paradox of commitment
as lying in the necessity of being able to make and keep commitments to "self-government
over time" if an individual or society is to enjoy autonomy).
86. Id. at 72.
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theory. The law doesn't need the theory any more than the theory benefits
from being forced to accommodate the law.
Professor Rubenfeld, I can imagine, might respond that there is a serious
problem with my suggestion that he disconnect his legal theory from his
philosophical one. With respect to judges and others with public duties they
have voluntarily undertaken, he might concede that one can point to those
voluntary undertakings as the basis for holding that they have a moral and
political duty to act in accordance with the norms defining the practice of
constitutional decisionmaking, but such reasoning does not address the duties,
or lack thereof, of the vast majority of Americans, the vast majority of the time.
Most of the time, most of us have undertaken no public duty and exercise no
public office. What gives the Constitution normative force for us? Why should
we, for example, obey constitutional laws enacted by Congress? These are
profound questions, but they are (let it be noted) simply a peculiarly American
twist on the great problem of political obligation, which goes back to Socrates
if not before in the Western tradition alone. Many conflicting answers have
been proposed, and American society has never had -and doubtless never will
reach - a consensus on what the American answer is, or rather what it ought to
be. That is, furthermore, a good thing: I think (and I believe Professor
Rubenfeld thinks) that one of the most attractive features of American
constitutionalism is the absence of prescriptions about "what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion."8s The question
of what, if any, moral obligations we owe the Republic simply because we find
ourselves within its jurisdiction and subject as a practical matter to the exercise
of power by its public officials, is not, in the end, a matter of constitutional law
at all, 8 and in turn constitutional law does not depend on or need a
philosophical foundation. Like the Republic it structures, the practice of
constitutional law is a political reality based not in theory but in history.8 9 By
rethinking and clarifying Rubenfeld's account of paradigm-case reasoning,
87. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
88. There is perhaps an exception: The Thirteenth Amendment purports-or so it has been
interpreted by the Court, along with the right to travel interstate -to apply to private as well
as governmental action, and one might expect then that private citizens would stand in the
same position with respect to the enforcement of the Amendment that public officials stand
with respect to all constitutional commands. As an empirical matter, however, I think most
Americans would accept, from their varying moral perspectives, the existence of a moral
prohibition on enslaving someone else, so the difficulty seems hypothetical.
89. "American constitutional law begins with specific commitments, sometimes written in
blood. This is not a matter of a priori or conceptual necessity; it is a matter of history."
RUBENFELD, supra note 53, at 134.
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Revolution by Judiciary makes a signal and highly welcome contribution to our
understanding of the law of the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
America's Constitution and Revolution by Judiciary are very different books,
but they share a robust confidence in the possibility of writing constitutional
law in a grand manner even in an era in which almost everything in the field is
"passionately contested, with little common ground from which to build
agreement."9" The books are marked by some strong similarities as well as
striking differences. Both books rest on an almost medieval "realism" in talking
about "We the People" that is startling to those of us of a nominalistic mindset;
the reader of this Commentary will have gathered by now that I think both
books are marred by misidentifying (as I see it) the language of American
political discourse with a reality external to that language. Furthermore, and
positively, both books take seriously the role of original understandings in
American constitutionalism in ways that transcend the tired old originalism
battles of the late twentieth century. Where the two books most sharply
diverge is that Revolution byJudiciay has as its ultimate focus the actual practice
of constitutional law, while America's Constitution is concerned with unveiling a
set of textual meanings that are not finally rooted in history or law.
Perhaps most importantly, however, both these books suggest that the
right response to the existing discord in constitutional law and scholarship is
not to retreat to small-scale projects, but to seek with renewed zeal a grand
vision of constitutional meaning. Professor Amar and Professor Rubenfeld
have shown real moral courage in going out on Professor Tribe's limb to offer
us broad-ranging attempts to speak about the whole of their respective,
somewhat different, subjects. I have suggested some criticisms of each book
out of the conviction that we honor a scholar when we take his or her work
seriously enough to disagree.
H. Jefferson Powell is Professor of Law, Duke University. He is grateful to Erwin
Chemerinsky and Jed Purdy for very helpful conversations on his thoughts on the
books under consideration.
90. Tribe, supra note 1, at 292.





I do not know Michael Stokes Paulsen or his writings, but I will do my best
to reply to his gracious and elegantly impartial review. His absolute refusal to
engage in sycophancy should be a model to us all. I cannot imagine why he
likens himself to "a skunk."'
It is difficult, however, to respond to objections to your work when the
objector repeatedly objects to the exact opposite of what you are saying.
Consider, for example, what Paulsen says about Home Building & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell.2
Blaisdell is important because it is one of the very few cases of modern
constitutional law-perhaps the only one -in which the Supreme Court seems
to explicitly repudiate a foundational Application Understanding. Blaisdell
therefore stands as a counterexample to the pattern I describe as otherwise
ubiquitous in constitutional law. Despite this, and even though the central
thesis of my book is that courts must inviolably adhere to foundational
Application Understandings, Paulsen says I "accept[]" the decision.'
According to Paulsen, I say that Blaisdell, even though it violated a
foundational Application Understanding, is a "'widely admired decision' and
should be understood as creating a new interpretive paradigm-a new
constitutional commitment, as it were."'4 My endorsement of Blaisdell is
supposed to look bad when contrasted, as Paulsen contrasts it,' with my
arguing in other contexts against judges violating foundational Application
1. Michael Stokes Paulsen, How To Interpret the Constitution (And How Not To), 115 YALE L.J.
2037, 2040 (2006).
2. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
3- Paulsen, supra note i, at 2037, 2054 & n.39.
4. Id. at 2054.
5. Id. at 2055.
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Understandings. And I guess my endorsing Blaisdell would be pretty
embarrassing-if I had endorsed it.
It is true that, on page sixty-seven of my book, I say that Blaisdell "is a
widely admired decision."6 It is also true that on page sixty-eight, at the
conclusion of the very same paragraph, I say that Blaisdell-if in fact it does
repudiate a foundational Application Understanding-"is wrong and should be
overturned."7
Very few readers would view "is wrong and should be overturned" as
"acceptance." For the record, nowhere in my book do I say that Blaisdell
"creat[ed] ...a new constitutional commitment."' The whole point of my
entire argument, as any minimally competent reader-without some peculiar
axe to grind-would know, is that a decision abandoning a foundational
Application Understanding violates a constitutional commitment.
Or consider the opening of Paulsen's "review," which takes issue with the
opening of my book. I begin Revolution by Judiciary by contrasting
constitutional law with statutory and administrative law, where the Supreme
Court has at least in principle established legally authoritative interpretive rules
and protocols that lower court judges are supposed to follow when construing
statutes or regulations.' By contrast, I point out, there are "no official
interpretive rules" of constitutional interpretation.10 While there is a law of
statutory and regulatory interpretation, "[t]here is no law of constitutional
interpretation."" I write, "Incredibly, American constitutional case law has
almost nothing to say about what judges are supposed to be doing when they
go about the business of interpreting the Constitution. " "
Paulsen, calling this "nonsense," says:
If there is a problem with constitutional law today, it surely is not that it
has "almost nothing to say" about how to "go about the business of
interpreting the Constitution." It is that it has far too much to say! Our
cases, our practice, and our theorists point in wildly different
directions, offer and illustrate competing interpretive theories, and
reveal a cacophony of voices virtually screaming for attention ...
6. JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JuDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN
CONsTITUTIONAL LAW 67 (2005).
7. Id. at 68.
8. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 2054.
9. RUBENFELD, supra note 6, at 4-5.
1o. Id. at 5.
ii. Id.
12. Id. at 4.
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Surely Rubenfeld jests. We suffer not from a deficit but a surfeit of
constitutional theory.
3
There are so many foolish errors in this paragraph it's hard to know where
to begin. I will focus on the two most important.
First, the subject of my sentence was "American constitutional case law."
When Paulsen reads the term "case law," he evidently thinks it includes
"theorists." It does not. Everyone knows that constitutional theorists have a
great deal to say about how judges should interpret the Constitution. But when
I say "case law," I mean case law. There are plenty of theories of constitutional
interpretation; it remains true, however, that "[t]here is no law of
constitutional interpretation."
Second, as to everything else in his paragraph, Paulsen seems to think that
restating my point counts as refuting it. Of course the cases "point in wildly
different directions." Of course they "offer and illustrate competing
interpretive theories." I never said constitutional law lacks exemplars of
different interpretive approaches. I said (in the sentence immediately preceding
the one Paulsen criticizes) that the case law "lacks an accepted account" of
interpretation. 14 I said (on the very next page) that the whole problem with
current constitutional case law is that the cases are so all-over-the-map
interpretively that practitioners can argue from "text, precedent, original
meaning, morality, tradition, structure, and so on," but "there is no knowing
why or whether or when or in what priority these 'modalities' of argument will
be considered in any given case."" How could a minimally competent reader
think he had objected to this point by saying that the existing cases "offer and
illustrate competing interpretive theories"?
"There is no law of constitutional interpretation": It is logically impossible
to read this statement as denying the existence of "theorists" espousing
different views of constitutional interpretation. "Under current case law, judges
are fully authorized" to "rely[] on" or to "ignor[e] original intent"": A first-
year law student would understand that this sentence does not deny, but rather
asserts, the fact that the cases offer competing interpretive theories.
"Practitioners know they can argue from text, precedent, original meaning,
morality, tradition, structure, and so on," but "there is no knowing why or
whether or when or in what priority" judges will accept these arguments: No
13. Paulsen, supra note 3, at 2053-54.
14. RUBENFELD, supra note 6, at 4.
15. Id. at 5.
16. Id.
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reasonable person would think he had objected to this proposition by
exclaiming that "our practice .. points in wildly different directions." 7
There is little point responding to a "review" so manifestly unable or
unwilling to follow relatively simple arguments. Therefore I am going to skip
over the rest of what Paulsen says about my book and offer a word about what
he says of his own approach.
Paulsen describes himself as an originalist who believes in "read[ing] the
text carefully and faithfully.' 8 I leave it to readers to judge whether Paulsen
has demonstrated a capacity to read a text carefully.
He seems to think he scores points for his version of originalism by saying
he is against "grand theories" of constitutional interpretation. 9 This is just
vacuous rhetoric.
Originalism is of course a theory of constitutional interpretation. Perhaps it
is not very grand intellectually. But originalism is indeed "grand" if "grand"
implies, as I suppose it is meant to do, that the theory rests on a large
philosophy of some kind (whether political, linguistic, or something else) that
in turn rests on fundamental (and controversial) premises concerning the
status, purpose, and legitimacy of constitutional law. To be sure, originalists
may not like having to explicate and defend the foundations of their theories,
but that does not make their theories less grand. It merely makes them half-
baked.
Consider Paulsen's particular brand of originalism. He purports to reject
"crude intentionalism."2  Original meaning, says Paulsen, is properly
understood to be the "objective linguistic meaning of the words of a text (in
historical context),"21 as distinct from any "subjective," "concrete historical
understandings"" of the text, including any "historical beliefs" about the
applicability of the text in specific settings. 3
This position is either incoherent or fundamentally misguided or both.
It is of course conceptually possible to divorce the "objective linguistic
meaning" of uttered words from the subjective, concrete historical
understandings of those words held by the people who wrote or spoke them.
What we might call the "semantic content" of words, derived from the
17. Paulsen, supra note 3, at 2053.
18. Id. at 2o61.
19. Id. at 2056-58.
20. Id. at 2059.
21. Id.
22. Id. (quoting Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398 (2002)).
23. Id. at 2060 & n.43.
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linguistic rules of the relevant community, can always differ from the speaker's
or author's "intended meaning." People often employ words whose semantic
content (in the above sense) differs slightly or significantly from their intended
meaning. When we hear such words, we always have a choice in principle
between interpreting them according to their semantic content or their
intended meaning. Paulsen wants to say that only by following the original
linguistic meaning can interpreters interpret correctly, remaining faithful to the
actual written law as opposed to creating new law. 4
The fallacy in this thinking is easy to demonstrate. A recipe says "flour"
where "sugar" may have been intended. An interpreter of this recipe can
certainly choose to use flour, saying "flour means flour, and it meant flour at
the time the recipe was written." The words "means" and "meant" in this
declaration would refer to the semantic content of the word -derived from the
general rules and usage of English-which in this case (let's suppose) is not
open to doubt. But someone else trying to follow the recipe could always say,
"I think the writers of this recipe may have meant sugar." He may then pursue
a "crude intentionalism" and try to uncover the authors' actual subjective
historical understandings. If he discovers that sugar was in fact intended, he
will say, "See -they did mean sugar," and use sugar.
In the case of a recipe, it would probably be stupid to use objective
linguistic meaning when it is known to contravene intended meaning. In any
event, whether stupid or merely adventurous, using linguistic meaning would
in an important sense not be faithful to the original recipe. It would produce a
new recipe.
What is true of a miswritten recipe is not, of course, necessarily true of a
constitution. There may be good reasons to follow historical linguistic meaning
in constitutional law when linguistic meaning departs from widely shared,
well-understood concrete historical understandings. But one thing that cannot
be said in favor of doing so is that following linguistic meaning will not
produce "new" law.
24. Id. at 2o61. Others fall into the equivalent but opposite error, insisting that texts can be
correctly interpreted only in accordance with the intended meaning and denying the
possibility of interpretation according to any "semantic meaning" other than the intended
meaning. See, e.g., Paul Campos, The Chaotic Pseudotext, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2178, 2189 n.25
(1996) (claiming that "the semantic meaning of a text is identical to the [communicative]
intentions of its author, and it follows from this that the correct interpretation of a text is
always the act of successfully determining those intentions"); Steven Knapp & Walter Benn
Michaels, Against Theory, in AGAINST THEORY: LITERARY STUDIES AND THE NEW
PRAGMATISM 11 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1985).
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There is an excellent example of this point in Robert Bork's The Tempting of
America.25 Like Paulsen, Bork tries to defend an originalism that casts aside the
actual concrete historical understandings of the Constitution in favor of a
supposed objective meaning of the text. He does so in an effort to make
originalism safe for Brown v. Board of Education.
Yes, Bork admirably concedes, "those who ratified the amendment did not
think it outlawed segregated education or segregation in any aspect of life. "26
Nevertheless, Bork asserts, Brown could "have clearly been rooted in the
original understanding."27 How? Well, "equality and segregation were
mutually inconsistent, though the framers did not understand that," says Bork,
and "equality, not separation, was written into the text.,,28
In other words, the subjective understanding of the ratifiers - their concrete
historical understandings -were out of whack with the objective meaning of
the words written into the text. Equality means equality; this is not
anachronistic; equality meant equality in the 186os; equality was written into
the text; segregation is unequal; hence segregated public schools are
unconstitutional. Paulsen indicates that he essentially agrees with this analysis:
"[T]he result in Brown . . . makes entire sense if one focuses on the original
linguistic meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than on the mistaken
subjective views or expectations of some individuals at the time that the
Amendment's principle did not extend to segregated education."
29
The problem is not that Brown cannot be squared with the original
linguistic meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Of course it can. The
problem is that a great many other things can too. An originalism that cuts
anchor with concrete historical understandings in this way can no longer
coherently present itself as originalism.
The one virtue of originalism was that it purported to offer determinate,
demonstrable answers to real constitutional controversies. Does the Eighth
Amendment ban the death penalty? "Of course not," an originalist could say;
"I can easily prove to you that it was not so understood at the time of
enactment. Any contrary reading by the Court today would therefore be a
usurpation - government by judiciary."
25. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
(1990).
26. Id. at 75-76.
27. Id. at 82.
28. Id.
29. Paulsen, supra note 3, at 2o6o.
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But when originalism cuts anchor with concrete historical understandings,
the death penalty's unconstitutionality certainly could be "rooted in the
original understanding." "Capital punishment was inconsistent with
abolishing cruel and unusual punishment," a Borkian originalist judge could
say, "though the framers did not understand that, and the bar on cruel and
unusual punishments was written into the text." Even a Marxist judge could
now be an originalist: "Private property and equality were mutually
inconsistent, though the framers did not understand that, and equality was
written into the text." Or how about abortion? "Roe v. Wade makes entire sense
if one focuses on the original linguistic meaning of the Thirteenth
Amendment's prohibition of 'involuntary servitude,' rather than on the
mistaken subjective views or expectations of some individuals at the time that
the amendment's principle did not extend to laws banning abortion."
Nothing in the objective linguistic meaning of "cruel and unusual" in the
178os or "involuntary servitude" in the 186os-when considered at a level of
generality that excludes reference to concrete historical understandings -blocks
the conclusion that the death penalty or a ban on abortion is unconstitutional.
What prevents a clear-thinking originalist from reaching these conclusions is
not the objective linguistic meaning. It is rather, precisely, a set of concrete
historical understandings, consisting of the "subjective" views or expectations
of a great many individuals at the time concerning the applicability of the text
in specific settings.
As soon as an originalist starts saying that the framers' and ratifiers'
concrete historical understandings of a constitutional provision were
"mistaken" and may therefore be ignored in favor of the semantic or objective
linguistic meaning of the words at the time of enactment, he is no longer an
originalist but a Dworkinian. Dworkin's distinction between "concept" and
"conception" (with Dworkin claiming to honor the concept as opposed to the
conception) tracks very closely, if it is not identical to, a distinction between the
original semantic meaning of the words in the text and the concrete historical
understandings of how that text would apply to particular cases.30
Proper interpretation of constitutional terms like "the equal protection of
the laws" or "involuntary servitude" starts not from objective linguistic
meaning, but from concrete historical understandings: namely, from the
foundational paradigm cases. That's what gives the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendment their core meaning, and that core meaning properly structures all
subsequent Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment doctrine. Many of our
30. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 75-76 (1996); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-46 (1977).
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constitutional guarantees are like this: They take their core meaning from
historical paradigm cases.
The account of constitutional interpretation that I give in my book captures
this phenomenon and explains it. Neither a Dworkinian account of
interpretation, nor an account based on objective linguistic meaning that
repudiates Americans' concrete historical understandings of the provision they
were enacting into the Constitution, ever can.
As to Professor Powell's commentary, I can only say that his criticisms of
some parts of my book are quite well-taken, and that his praise of other parts is
very kind and probably undeserved.
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AKHIL REED AMAR
An Open Letter to Professors Paulsen and Powell
Dear Mike and Jeff,
A book is an open invitation to a conversation between an author and his
(or her) readers, and I am delighted that you both have accepted the invitation
that I sought to extend in America's Constitution: A Biography. I recall many
face-to-face conversations with each of you when we were all students together
at the Yale Law School in the early 198Os. I learned a great deal from you at
that time; I have continued to learn a great deal from you in print since then -
indeed, you are both repeatedly cited with approval in my book; and I look
forward to learning more from each of you in the days to come as the
conversation that we have begun in this Journal ripens into what I hope will be
additional, more informal, discussions among us.
Mike, I have only two quick things to say in response to your very warm
review.
First, thank you. Thank you for your enthusiasm and encouragement, and
most of all for your generosity of spirit. (Perhaps all that time you spent trying
to set me straight in law school was not wasted after all.) Since you raise the
question of whether your glowing review might be thought by some to be
strongly colored by our long friendship, it may be worth noting (though it is
immodest of me to do so) that several other leading reviews, written by
eminent lawyers and historians whom I know much less well, have been
similarly glowing-much closer to your bottom line than to Jeff s.'
1. See, e.g., Scott Turow, Everything Is Illuminated, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2005, at BWo3
("[E]legantly written, thorough but concise, and consistently enlightening.... As one
expects from the best history, America's Constitution illumines many contemporary debates.
... I expect to be taking Amar's volume off my shelf for years to come as an indispensable
reference whenever I want to know more about the actual words that underpin
contemporary constitutional debates. . . It is . . . an uncommonly engaging work of
scholarship and deserves to be valued as such."); Gordon S. Wood, How Democratic Is the
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Second, stay tuned. You raise important questions about a couple of
suggestive but underdeveloped paragraphs that I penned on the Ninth
Amendment. I hope to revisit this issue in greater detail in what will be a sequel
of sorts, tentatively entitled America's Unwritten Constitution: Between the Lines
and Beyond the Text.2 The challenge, as I see it, is to take seriously
unenumerated aspects of our constitutional tradition and practice but to do so
in a way that does not undermine the preeminent virtues of a written
constitution. Perhaps this cannot be done. Perhaps I am questing for a square
circle. But as John Ely famously reminded us all in Democracy and Distrust, at
critical moments the document itself does seem to gesture beyond its own four
corners; and I aim to take seriously the gestures of both the Ninth Amendment
and the Privileges or Immunities Clause. I hope to do so in a way that leads
directly away from Dred Scott-not toward it, as you fear. As you note, my
book sharply criticizes Taney's disgraceful opinion on originalist grounds. In
my view, Taney's outlandish and outrageous conclusion that federal free soil
laws were generally unconstitutional could in no way have been justified by
honest reference to my proposed benchmarks for unenumerated rights-
namely, "the great mass of state constitutions," "widely celebrated lived
traditions," and "broadly inclusive political reform movements."3 The majority
of state constitutions in 1857 were themselves free soil; the actual lived tradition
in antebellum America was of various federal free soil laws stretching
uninterruptedly back to the Northwest Ordinance passed by the very first
Congress; and slavocrats in the Deep South could hardly be reckoned a broadly
inclusive movement given the massive political exclusions in the South-of
slaves, of free blacks, and of antislavery whites.
In my hoped-for sequel, I also aspire to think carefully about the role of
judicial case law and stare decisis. I see a somewhat larger role for stare decisis
than do you, but like you I believe that ultimately the doctrine should be
Constitution, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Feb. 23, 20o6, at 25, 25-27 ("[A]n extraordinarily full, rich,
and fair-minded interpretation of the text of the Constitution that ought to be read by
anyone interested in the document .... [A]s a reference book, it is superb. It is, so far as I
know, the fullest and most reliable explanation of the written Constitution that we have....
[Amar's] case for the fundamentally popular and democratic origins of the Constitution in
the setting of its time gives his book a special distinction as a work of history.").
2. I hint at the general contours and contents of this hoped-for sequel in the closing page of my
postscript. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERPCA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 477 (2005).
3. Id. at 329.
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subordinate to the text, enactment history, and structure of the document
itself, and its grand theme of popular sovereignty.4
Jeff, you raise more questions for me (and about me) and so I owe you
more answers. I appreciate that space constraints limited your ability to flesh
out all your reservations about my recent book (and about some of my earlier
work), so I hope that the conversation between us begun in this Journal can
continue outside it. Like you, I shall confine myself here to a few exemplary
points rather than trying to cover everything that you say.
For starters, you raise questions about my general interpretive
methodology. I have tried to explain and exemplify my preferred method
elsewhere-most elaborately in a couple of articles that appeared in the
Harvard Law Review.' Readers of this Journal can also get a sense of my overall
approach from the other pieces in this Colloquium. You are right to call me a
constitutional textualist,6 but I also fancy myself a constitutional structuralist
and a historian of original meaning. Generally, I seek to braid together
arguments from text, (enactment) history, and structure into a satisfying
account of the document itself as distinct from much later case law interpreting
the document, sometimes quite loosely. You wonder whether my approach
mixes apples and oranges. I can only say that (1) if I do, there are times when
mixture is appropriate (consider for example the fruit salad); and (2) there are
4. I briefly develop this way of thinking about stare decisis and "precedent's proper place" in
Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine,
114 HARV. L. REv. 26, 78-89 (2000).
5. See AMAR, supra note 2, at 329; Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARv. L. REV. 747
(1999).
6. A brief aside on textualism. There is, as you note, an inherent danger that a textualist may
overread the text. I try to minimize this danger - though doubtless I fail at times - by trying
wherever possible to use enactment history and structure to confirm the seemingly best
reading of the text, and to reconsider my initial textual leaning if confirmation is not
forthcoming. For example, at one point you raise a question about my emphasis on the
power of Congress under the Constitution to wield "legislative power" and to adopt
"laws" -words pointedly absent from the Articles of Confederation. You ask whether there
is an important difference between "laws" enacted by the post-1788 Congress and
"ordinances" adopted by the old Confederation Congress. I think the answer is yes, and my
book provides historical support for this answer. See AMAP, supra note 2, at 516 n.61 (citing
Richard P. McCormick, Ambiguous Authority: The Ordinances of the Confederation Congress,
1781-1789, 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 411 (1997)). Given that you yourself seem to concede the
correctness of my bottom line that the Constitution's "Congress" was "a quite different
institution" with far more effective coercive power than the Confederation "Congress," the
difference between us may at times be an aesthetic one: You would prefer that a particular
textual point go unmentioned since you see it as wholly makeweight, whereas I prefer to
highlight the text in combination with my other constitutional arguments that confirm my
reading of the text.
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many distinguished constitutional scholars and practitioners -liberals and
conservatives, on the bench and off-who are roughly in the same
methodological camp as am I (consider for example Hugo Black, John Hart
Ely, Doug Laycock, and Steve Calabresi).7
You also pose pointed questions about whether I am a proper historian.8
You are right that ultimately I am concerned with legal meaning. But legal
meaning may of course pivot on certain historical facts. For example, on the
question of the legal permissibility of secession, I think it hugely relevant that
leading Federalists in leading places during the ratification process explicitly
said that the new system would be indivisible; that no prominent Federalist
ever said otherwise (even though this made it much harder to convince states'
rightists and fence-sitters to vote yes); and that in the New York ratifying
7. You seem to think that I cannot be reckoned a proper originalist because of my views on
Congress's power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes." I believe that whether or not you accept my
interpretation of this clause, my argument is emphatically one based on text, Founding-era
history, and structure. Journal readers can judge this issue for themselves, for most of my
argument about this clause appears in my introduction to this Colloquium, with additional
methodological elaboration on my part. You also point to my views about Article V. On this
topic, the views expressed in the book are different from the views that I put forth in earlier
articles. (Mike is right to see important shifts in my thinking here and elsewhere.) In any
event, regardless of what you might think about the ultimate soundness of my Article V
arguments, they, too, are based on text, Founding-era history, and structure. (For what it's
worth, my earlier articles on this topic also featured much more than the views of James
Wilson. Rather, the argument was based on a textual analysis of various parts of the original
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, on the meaning of state constitutions, and on things
said by many Founding figures other than Wilson about the Preamble, and about the First,
Ninth, and Tenth Amendments.)
At the risk of kibitzing on your conversation with Jed, I would also note that in an
important respect, I think you have misstated his argument as well. He does not claim that
Court doctrine has always hewed to the core Application Understandings. Rather, he claims
only that today's doctrine generally does so. I think he is right to limit his claim, though all
this does raise real questions about the Court's fidelity to his approach over the actual course
of American history-a topic that you as a historically minded commentator might have
interestingly commented upon. For example, Supreme Court Justices gleefully enforced the
Sedition Act of 1798 and again enforced laws criminalizing mere antigovemment speech in
the 191os in violation of core Founding-era understandings. If, as I have tried to show-and
as Jed has nowhere denied-a core Application Understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment was that the Bill of Rights would in general (and expression rights would
especially) be applied or incorporated against the states, then here too we confront decade
after decade of Supreme Court nonenforcement of core rights. So too with much of the
Fifteenth Amendment, alas.
8. Interestingly enough, this is not a question that has typically arisen when various
distinguished card-carrying historians- such as Jack Rakove, Gordon Wood, Pauline Maier,
David B. Davis, Les Benedict, and Eric Foner have evaluated my work.
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convention, the secession issue arose in a highly visible way and was resolved
by a clear set of anti-secession-right votes at a time when all eyes on the
continent had good reason to be glued to New York and when the Federalists
understood that their stubbornness on this point might cause them to lose the
ultimate ratification vote in this key convention. None of these facts made it
into your critique of my account; but I think these facts from history do very
much bear on the public meaning of the Constitution at the time of its
enactment. I further explain how this public meaning was codified in various
provisions of the Constitution's text -the "more perfect union" language of the
Preamble, the uncompromising words of the Article III Treason Clause and the
Article VI Supremacy Clause, and the evident contrast between the enactment
rules of Article VII and the amendment rules of Article V-and by basic
features of the Constitution's geostrategic national security structure.
If you think my legal bottom line is wrong, perhaps it might have been
better for you to have set forth the entirety of my constitutional arguments -
based on text, structure, and enactment history - and then presented your own
legal counterarguments, so that the reader could judge for herself. You instead
invoke the views of two earlier Jeffersons -Thomas Jefferson and Jefferson
Davis. (What is it with you Jefferson guys, anyway?) To me, what Thomas
Jefferson may have thought in the 179os and 18oos is not particularly helpful in
understanding the public meaning of a document publicly debated and enacted
in 1787-1788, when Jefferson was an ocean away from the main event. Jefferson
Davis (who was not even alive in 1788) likewise was in no real sense a
"witness" to the relevant public conversation, and the textual, historical, and
structural arguments that he made on behalf of secession simply failed to
mention much of the relevant history that I have tried to bring to the surface,
and in my view failed to rebut the strong arguments against him based on
constitutional text and structure. Judged by legal ground rules of text,
(enactment) history, and structure, Lincoln's bottom line was in my view
right-not because he was a witness to the Founding but rather because his
bottom line best squared with what the Founders said and did.
To the extent that you might disagree with Lincoln's bottom line on this
issue, I would say, with all due respect, so much the worse for you. The
question here is not some abstract hypothetical or merely some "fun" (your
word) parlor game allowing "a twenty-first-century scholar [to] ask
nineteenth-century questions and chastise nineteenth-century statesmen."9
The legality or illegality of secession was probably the most serious
constitutional question ever to arise in America. As a result of Lincoln's and
9. H. Jefferson Powell, Grand Visions in an Age of Conflict, 115 YALE L.J. 2o67, 2071 (2006).
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Davis's different answers to this question, hundreds of thousands died, and
ultimately our Constitution was reborn in the ashes. if Jefferson Davis was
legally right, then it would seem that Abraham Lincoln was a lawless butcher -
well intentioned, perhaps, but hardly a constitutional hero. Or if, as you at
times seem to imply, neither side was clearly correct on the secession question,
that legal conclusion, too, would I think badly tarnish Lincoln as both a lawyer
and a President, charged as he was with preserving, protecting, and defending
the Constitution.
Finally, a few words about the Preamble, constitutional geostrategy, and
the Supremacy Clause. You quote Randolph pooh-poohing the significance of
the Preamble, but do not note that I invoke perhaps the three most significant
opinions of the Marshall Court-Marbury,° McCulloch," and Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee 2 - each of which does turn to the Preamble at key moments. (As
a rule, I'll take John Marshall and Joseph Story over Edmund Randolph any
day.) The Preamble also of course looms large in the text itself- and was
central to the ratification debates. You say that I make the "implicit but
unmistakable" (and self-aggrandizing) claim that my book is "novel[]" in
arguing that geographic-geostrategic and national security considerations
drove the Founding. 3 I make no such claim, and in fact I say just the opposite:
Many important scholars have discussed these issues before me. The idea that
the Founding was primarily about national security and geostrategy was, in
fact, probably the dominant view of most scholarship prior to Beard, and I cite
several leading post-Beardians who have seen the light, including Frederick
Marks III, David F. Epstein, and Peter Onuf.'4 Indeed, in my Postscript, I say
that "I am especially indebted to Frederick Marks III, for his brilliant work
establishing the primacy of national-security and foreign-policy concerns in the
making of the Constitution.""5 To repeat: I do not say that my view about the
io. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803).
ii. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,402-05 (1819).
12. 14 U.S. (i Wheat) 304, 324-25 (1816).
13. Powell, supra note 9, at 2075.
14. See AMAR, supra note 2, at 523 n.95; see also id. at 561 n.30, which cites, among other works,
your own excellent book on presidential powers, The President's Authority over Foreign
Affairs: An Essay in Constitutional Interpretation, and Dean Koh's fine book, The National
Security Constitution.
is. See AMAR, supra note 2, at 47. In passing you note that I do not cite a 2002 book and a 2003
article. Despite over loo pages of endnotes, I of course could not cite everything, and I chose
to highlight the works that most influenced my thinking and that appeared in print before
my own published work on this topic, which first appeared in 1987-1991. See Akhil Reed
Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 443, 469-78 (1989); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YAU L.J. 1425,
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primacy of these concerns is novel. Rather, I claim that most scholars have not
yet seen the light, as they are in the grip of various towering twentieth-century
scholars -Beard, Merrill Jensen, and even to some extent my hero Gordon
Wood-who have downplayed these issues in their accounts.
What I do claim is novel is my specific argument: (1) that the Preamble's
phrase about "form[ing] a more perfect Union" strongly resembled, and was
perhaps consciously borrowed from, the British indivisible Union of Scotland
and England of 1707; (2) that the Preamble phrase blended language from the
official 1707 enactment, which spoke of "rendring the union of the two
kingdoms more intire and compleat," 6 with language from Queen Anne's July
1, 17o6 letter to the Scotch Parliament, which spoke of an "entire and perfect
Union"; 7 (3) that the conceptual linkage between the Preamble's more perfect
union and the earlier 1707 union was publicly explained to ratifying Americans;
and (4) that this high visibility 1707 model -this paradigm case, to use Jed's
jargon -of an indivisible island-nation drove the basic Federalist argument in
1787-1788 for an indivisible America that would rely on her oceans to secure her
liberty, a la Britain. You say that there is no evidence that anyone at the
Founding understood how the Preamble reflected and codified this vision.
Here is a snippet of evidence - taken from The Federalist No. 5-that I would
say does make the link between the Preamble's language and the 1707 Act:
Queen Anne, in her letter of the ist July, 17o6, to the Scotch Parliament,
makes some observations on the importance of the Union then forming
between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. .... "An
entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting
peace: ....
The history of Great Britain... gives us many useful lessons....
Although it seems obvious to common sense that the people of such an
island should be but one nation, yet we find that they were for ages
1462-63 n.162 (1987); Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, S8 U.
CHI. L. REV. 483, 485-97 (1991). In retrospect, I do wish that I had mentioned my towering
friend Philip Bobbitt, from whom I have learned so much in print and in person. See Akhil
Reed Amar, In Praise of Bobbitt, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1703 (1994). Though Bobbitt's 2002 book
came to hand too late to influence the particulars of my analysis in America's Constitution, I
suspect that some of my appreciation of the centrality of national security issues has come
from casual conversations with Phillip.
16. See AMAR, supra note 2, at 36.
17. Id.
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divided into three, and that those three were almost constantly
embroiled in quarrels and wars with one another. Notwithstanding
their true interest with respect to the continental nations was really the
same, yet by the arts and policy and practices of those nations, their
mutual jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long series
of years they were far more inconvenient and troublesome than they
were useful and assisting to each other.
Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four
nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar
jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being
"joined in affection and free from all apprehension of different
interests," envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and
affection, and the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the
general interests of all America, would be the only objects of their policy
and pursuits. Hence, like most other bordering nations, they would
always be either involved in disputes and war, or live in the constant
apprehension of them.'
8
I believe that readers will find lots more evidence in the opening chapter of
America's Constitution.9
Finally, we come to the words in the Supremacy Clause that speak of "the
land" - words that you insist have no conceivable legal bearing on the
territorial-geographic nature of the American Constitution. You assert that
"[n]o competent lawyer"2" would point to these words in, say, explaining why
a state could not unilaterally take its land with it and leave the Union. I
consider Lincoln a pretty darn competent lawyer, and though I admit that he
did not highlight these two words in precisely the way that I have highlighted
them, he did in his First Special Message to Congress on July 4, 1861 say that
"even Texas gave up [her sovereign] character on coming into the Union; by
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 5, at 18-19 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
19. You mention that the Articles of Confederation also contained important language about
"common defence" and note that I too point this out. You somehow think language from
the Articles thus undercuts my constitutional argument. How so? I think the central
purpose of the Articles was to secure common defense, and that it was failing its basic
mission- hence the need for a new Constitution that would accomplish the most basic aims
of 1776. This was indeed the basic Federalist argument- that the new Constitution would in
fact vindicate the national security purpose of the old Articles. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 40-
41, 45 (James Madison). But all this stands in tension with the Beardian and neo-Beardian
view that still prevails in many modem circles and that focuses more attention on class
issues, the Contracts Clause, and matters of internal governance.
20. Powell, supra note 9, at 2078.
21o8 Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
11522101 20o6
AN OPEN LETTER TO PROFESSORS PAULSEN AND POWELL
which act, she acknowledged the Constitution of the United States, and the
laws and treaties of the United States made in pursuance of the Constitution,
to be, for her, the supreme law of the land";21 and then in his Second Annual
Message (on December 1, 1862) Lincoln proceeded to elaborate at great length
the significance of territorial-land-based considerations that argued strongly
against secession. I quote extensively from this Message in my book, and I shall
not repeat the passage here.' (It's also worth mentioning here that in his
Inaugural Address, Lincoln argued against secession by quoting and
highlighting the Preamble phrase about "form[ing] a more perfect Union."23)
Now, I think it will be quite clear to any fair-minded reader of my book
that my specific reference to the words "the land" in Article VI is only one of a
long string of pieces of legal evidence that I invoke for my views about the basic
indivisibility of the Constitution and for the significance of geography and
geostrategy in its creation. But you seem to think that this is the thirteenth
chime of the clock that calls into question all that went before. OK, I'll take the
bait and take you on here. However, every reader of this Journal should be
aware that I am spending vastly more space elaborating a small point than I
actually spent making it my book. And I am doing so only because you think
this is somehow proof of my fondness for arguments that no competent lawyer
would make. 4
First, the "land" language of this clause was added at Philadelphia at
precisely the same instant that various changes to the Preamble were made that
textually highlighted the geostrategic link to Britain's perfect union-and by
21. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421,434 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
22. See AMAR, supra note 2, at 52. Here is some additional language from this speech linking
land and law:
A nation may be said to consist of its territory, its people, and its laws. The
territory is the only part which is of certain durability. "One generation passeth
away, and another generation cometh, but the earth abideth forever." It is of the
first importance to duly consider, and estimate, this ever-enduring part. That
portion of the earth's surface which is owned and inhabited by the people of the
United States, is well adapted to be the home of one national family; and it is not
well adapted for two, or more.
Id.
23. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 21, at 262, 265.
24. Really, Jeff, surely you can't mean this. One quick data point: my own work has been cited
with approval by the Supreme Court about twenty times in the last twenty years-by
Justices from every wing and on a broad range of topics. This is not how one would expect
the Court to treat some legal incompetent who does not understand the basics of
constitutional argumentation.
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precisely the same Committee of Style (led by Gouverneur Morris).2s You say
that the "land" language was simply lifted from Magna Charta, but it is widely
understood that in America "the law of the land" can mean something different
than in England. For example, here, "the law of the land" Clause establishes
judicially enforceable limits on the power of Congress whereas English law
does not envision judicial review of acts of Parliament. In part, this is because
of other differences in language between England's "law of the land"
documents and America's Article VI. But it is also well established that even the
identical words can sometimes sensibly mean different things when used in a
different context. (For example, Americans thought that various words of
Magna Charta meant jury trials, when in fact this was probably not so
originally. Much of the language of the Bill of Rights meant something rather
different to the Fourteenth Amendment framers who reglossed it than it did to
their Founding forbearers. Various words from the Establishment Clause
changed meaning dramatically when copied verbatim by state constitutions.)
Moreover, even in England, there were and are strong territorial elements
worthy of our attention. In a feudal system in which military obligations
traveled through land, a person born of foreign parents on English soil owed
permanent obligations to the English crown; and England had strict territorial
ideas about the use of the militia outside English soil and about the presence of
slavery on English soil.
In short, I mentioned the words "the land" not because these words must
be read in the way I suggest, but because they may permissibly be so read if
such a reading makes good structural sense and coheres with the broad
enactment history and the overarching purposes of the Constitution itself-
which I think it does (and here I build on arguments that President Lincoln
made long ago). Whether or not you agree with my argument, I believe that
you should admit that it is strictly legal, and even (dare I say it?) competent.
I am loath to close on this note of sharp disagreement. So let me instead
issue another invitation: Let's keep the conversation going. Mike, Jeff, next
time you are in New Haven, the pizza is on me.
Sincerely,
Akhil
25. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 565, 572, 590, 603 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1937).
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